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Planning for a pandemic influenza outbreak at a college or university cannot be done in a 
vacuum. Like any emergency plan, it needs to be a coordinated effort by a dedicated and 
unselfish group of individuals at the university pulling together a multitude of people and 
resources focused on a common goal. There is an ongoing struggle among emergency 
preparedness coordinators at colleges and universities to know when they have done “enough” in 
preparing their campus to respond to and recover from a pandemic influenza or some other 
infectious disease outbreak. Every year new ideas emerge from various governmental, health or 
emergency response organizations on improved methods to assess the threat of a pandemic and 
updating response plans. The need to add to or modify existing plans to better ready their 
institutions of higher learning for such an emergency is ongoing.  
 In this dissertation, an effort was made to survey key individuals from emergency 
planning groups at colleges and universities in the U.S. to gather information on what is 
important in their pandemic flu plans and how they are structured. This survey evaluated whether 
these collective college or university plans are in substantial agreement with current CDC and 
WHO guidelines for effectively and comprehensively anticipating, preparing for, responding to 
and recovering from pandemic emergencies at their institution and in the nearby community. The 
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data generated from this research study can provide pandemic flu planners with tools for 
evaluating when their plans are sufficiently robust to meet a pandemic threat and to minimize the 
impact on their campus in the face of rising costs, shifting university priorities and increasing 
demands on their time. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Emergency Management Models, from FEMA.gov (2013) 
All Hazard Approach – Developing an emergency plan that considers a multitude of threats or 
hazards and the risk each poses to an organization.  
Comprehensive Emergency Management – the preparation for and the carrying out of 
all functions, (except military actions) essential to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from emergencies.  
Command and Control Approach – imposing fixed standards or actions with the force of law 
behind them to enable a quick non-negotiable response to emergencies. 
Homeland Security Model – guiding principles for emergency exercises and a common 
framework for emergency program management that includes planning, developing, conducting 
and evaluating disaster drills. 
Incident Command System – standardized approach to the command, control, and coordination 
of emergency response providing a common hierarchy by which responders from multiple 
agencies can be effectively utilized.  
Integrated Emergency Management – refers to the FEMA all-hazard approach for the 
coordination, direction and control of emergencies independent of their type, origin, size, and 
complexity.  
National Incident Management System (NIMS) – is a systematic, proactive approach to guide 
agencies from all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to 
work together seamlessly and manage incidents involving all threats and hazards regardless of 
cause, size, and location. 
Network-Centric Approach – using a network of experts having the technological advances to 
analyze complex disaster scenarios or the spread of infectious diseases and to test response 
strategies such as rescue simulation and evacuation planning. 
Haddon Matrix – is a grid of columns and rows showing the agents and/or environmental 
factors involved, set against the time sequence of an incident such as a disease outbreak. The 
cells of the matrix illustrate the range of risk or protective factors involved showing the nature of 
possible interventions.  
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Planning Models, from Hudson (1979) and Lindblom (1959) 
Rational Model – Technocratic or Synoptic Approach: This tradition was well suited to 
formalized government mandates requiring a set of constrained objectives, budget restrictions 
and accountability. Comprehensive and systematic; goals clearly stated; alternatives are 
compared without bias and subject to quantitative analysis; relies on cause and effect theory. 
Incremental Model – Pragmatic or Pluralistic Approach: Not comprehensive but simple goals; 
relies on a few current policies and plan alternatives relative to current experience or past 
practices; goals, values and alternatives are considered together; analysis is value-laden often 
relying on inadequate data; feasible decision made after a succession of limited comparisons. 
 
SITAR Blend, from Hudson (1979) 
Synoptic Planning or the Rational/Comprehensive Model – has four classic elements that 
include the following: 1) goal-setting, 2) comprehensive identification and analysis of many 
policy alternatives, 3) mathematical evaluation of means verses ends, and 4) implementation of 
rational decisions. 
Incremental Planning or the Pragmatic Model – the “Science of Muddling Through” referring 
to the British bureaucratic decision making process where political maneuvering, past practices, 
public opinion, human values and less than perfect alternatives are all considered equally 
important for getting as close to the goal as possible. 
Transactive Planning – often involves face to face contact with the people most affected; 
focused on the importance of human dignity, personal growth, values and generosity in the 
decision making; financial considerations given little weighting.  
Advocacy Planning – Arguments of social justice are used to challenge sensitive plans pointing 
out unintended side effects; conflict resolution and the just distribution of benefits are key.  
Radical Planning – endorses the maximum participation of the people affected in defining and 
controlling how a plan will be managed; the resolution of social, environmental and political 
problems are focal to this model with less regard to sustainability.  
 
Planning Practice, from Dooris (2003), Settar (2006), Hartzell (2013), and Kezar (2001) 
Strategic Planning – broad in scope considering the organization as a whole, its mission and 
long range vision for the next 3 to 5 years. 
Tactical Planning – supports the strategic plan translating it into smaller, more detailed 
processes needed to achieve the mission and vision. 
Operational Planning – narrow focus implemented over an even shorter time frame containing 
a high level of detail on individual roles and responsibilities 
Contingency Planning – alternative directions to take when a plan fails or unexpected events 
indicate that the initial course of actions will not work. 
 
 
 
 
 xvi 
Organizational Considerations (From Argyris, 1977; Schon, 1978; Kezar, 2001) 
Learning – a process by which institutions, individuals or committees, through their conceptual 
knowledge about a subject, detect errors in practice or rapidly changing conditions and develop 
solutions to correct the situation. 
Change – cultural and social perceptions or the thought process and values of the individuals 
cause organizations to change. Many changes occur because leaders, change agents or others 
simply believed that a change was necessary.  
Development – shared organizational culture determining the criteria for leadership and 
establishing the rules and norms that determine group behavior and development. 
 
 xvii 
ACRONYMS 
CDC –  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
CIDRAP –  Center for Infectious Disease Reporting and Prevention 
CSHEMA –  Campus Safety, Health and Environmental Management Association 
DHS – Department of Homeland Security  
DHHS –  Department of Health and Human Services 
FEMA –  Federal Emergency Management Association 
H1N1–  Pandemic Influenza Virus 
HSEEP –  Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program  
IOM –  Institute of Medicine 
NFPA –  National Fire Protection Association 
NIMS –  National Incident Management System 
NRP –  National Response Plan 
PAHPRA –  Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013. 
PPD-8–  Presidential Policy Directive 8  
PPE –  Personnel Protective Equipment 
TCL –  Target Capabilities List 
UKDH –  United Kingdom Department of Health 
WHO –  World Health Organization 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Preparing for a pandemic influenza outbreak on a college campus requires a multidimensional 
effort by a staff of individuals experienced in the unique ways a university functions. Planning 
theory and practice, committee organizations, community relations, organizational learning, 
change and development, risk, human behavior, leadership and emergency management are just 
some of the disciplines that must be called upon for a campus pandemic flu plan to be effective.  
The recent history of natural or manmade disasters at colleges and universities has taught 
us some hard lessons about insufficient emergency preparedness planning. School buildings and 
surrounding businesses have been severely damaged or destroyed in fires, floods and hurricanes. 
Lives have been lost and the safety of faculty, staff and students threatened in many different 
ways because of storms, shootings and riots. Campus life, academic studies and research efforts 
have been severely disrupted as a result of these catastrophes. In a few cases, colleges and 
universities have been forced to terminate programs, lay off employees or even close their doors 
in the aftermath of these events. A severe pandemic flu outbreak or even the threat of one can 
have equally disruptive consequences if emergency preparations are not in place as we learned 
during the 2009-2010 flu season. Many sage authors or speakers have made statements similar to 
the quote “If we don’t remember where we came from we can’t expect to get where we need to 
be.” Remembering our shortcomings during any crises of the past can only assist us in correcting 
our mistakes and making for a better response in the future.  
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In 2009 a pandemic influenza threat enveloped many colleges and universities throughout 
the U.S. An influenza pandemic is arguably one of the most life threatening and widespread 
emergencies that can strike a university campus. Unlike a fire, flood or violent crime that may 
occur more frequently but are limited in scope, the unknown risks often perceived about the 
severity and rapid spread of a pandemic influenza, or any infectious disease having the potential 
to affect everyone on campus as well as their families and friends, is staggering to comprehend.  
When a natural disaster or manmade crisis happens on a college campus, injuries or 
deaths may occur but survivors and others nearby instinctively want to help. University 
personnel on campus know or have been trained on what to do in response to some emergencies. 
They know how to protect themselves or others from further harm and who to call for help. 
Trained first responders (police, fire fighters and paramedics) can be expected to arrive on the 
scene and take charge to initiate security, rescue or recovery efforts. Other trained professionals 
and volunteers from the university, outside agencies or the health care community can help 
implement emergency plans to evacuate people to safe areas, provide food, shelter and medical 
treatment, facilitate clean-up efforts and begin a return to normalcy.  
With a pandemic flu or some other life threatening illness like bacterial meningitis, 
measles or even a serious seasonal flu outbreak, even though most organizations have a “plan” in 
place, the unknown health risks, the lack of infectious disease training and the alarming spread 
and severity of the illness along with the scarcity of effective treatments may limit the response, 
even among those whose job it is to care for students. Currently, most clinics, hospitals and 
doctors’ offices prefer that patients with the flu stay home and self-isolate to prevent spreading 
the illness. Most college and university pandemic flu plans also recommend sending students 
home for the duration and encourage faculty and staff to stay away from work when they are 
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sick. However, this practice may not be an option on a college campus particularly with out of 
state or international students or students too ill to travel.  
Because of the “unknowns” associated with these illnesses, especially when otherwise 
healthy young people are dying, unprepared police and paramedics may be reluctant to transport 
patients suspected of having the flu to avoid the infection risks (Balicer et al., 2006). 
Roommates, RAs, custodial personnel and food service staff may express unwillingness to visit 
or service a dorm room where a critically ill student is quarantined.  
Theoretical models of crisis/risk communication speculate that the typical human 
response to help another person in trouble during a natural disaster or manmade crisis when the 
risks to self are known or readily accepted may not manifest when unknown risks are present. 
(Sandman, 2010; Barnett et al., 2010; Balicer et al., 2006). Based on infection data from the 
swine flu pandemic of 1918, which killed more than 675,000 people in the US, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) warned Americans to expect infection rates around 30% 
and the death of between 34,000 and 70,000 people nationwide during a swine/avian flu 
pandemic. Typically in the U.S. between 5% and 20% of the population get the flu each year and 
around 36,000 die from this seasonal flu or its complications (Duda, 2014). During the 2009-
2010 flu pandemic the CDC reported approximately 18,300 U.S. deaths due to the H1N1 virus 
and the WHO claimed this swine flu virus killed more than 284,000 people worldwide (IB 
Times, 2015). The CDC has estimated that during the 2014-2015 flu season, as many as 50,000 
people in the U.S. may die and more than 200,000 will be hospitalized because of an ineffective 
vaccine against this years’ strain(s) of seasonal influenza virus coupled with the unwillingness of 
a large segment of the population to be vaccinated (Bloom, 2013).  
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Various, strains of avian or swine flu repeatedly pop up around the world infecting small 
numbers of humans handling those animals, without significant or serious human to human 
infections, this time. As the FDA, CDC and the WHO confer on next year’s seasonal flu vaccine 
controversy exists as to which strains of flu virus to protect against and how much vaccine to 
produce (CIDRAP, 2015). Worldwide virus hunters are hoping that the seasonal flu vaccine they 
just recommended for the northern and southern hemispheres are at least marginally effective 
against those viruses. These same virus hunters remain vigilant that none of the selected 
avian/swine/human flu variants, anywhere in the world, mutates in a way that catches everyone 
off guard creating a pandemic of devastating severity. It is these kinds of biological unknowns 
coupled with the fact that pharmaceutical companies have no way to mass produce vaccines fast 
enough to head off a flu pandemic that give college emergency planners much to worry about.   
During the 2009-2010 flu pandemic, most colleges and universities throughout the U.S. 
along with health care, governmental agencies and business organizations scrambled to modify 
existing emergency plans to address emerging pandemic flu shortcomings. Since that time, 
hundreds of books, white papers and website publications have been developed providing 
guidance to organizations on being better prepared to deal with pandemic flu emergencies. 
Federal, state and local governments, non-government agencies, hospitals, businesses have 
joined colleges and universities in updating plans, stockpiling emergency supplies, training 
personnel and conducting drills to more effectively respond to emergencies including pandemics.  
Pandemic influenza preparedness planning is necessary at every level of government as 
well as for large and small business organizations, schools, hospitals and even at the family level. 
Achieving a high level of preparedness and protection at a college or university requires 
extensive and focused planning at multiple organizational levels by a dedicated committee of 
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stakeholders each having a role in managing the prevention, mitigation, response and recovery 
efforts during a pandemic flu emergency. Joining forces in this fashion should help everyone 
involved at the local level to more effectively respond to a pandemic, better maintain business 
continuity and quicken the recovery from a pandemic flu emergency. This document will 
examine the development of pandemic influenza plans by university and community emergency 
planning committees, exploring the roles of long standing planning theory and practice within 
the organizational frameworks necessary to achieve the desired goal of protecting the campus 
and its occupants during an infectious viral respiratory disease outbreak. 
Unfortunately, as time passes and the pandemic threat fails to materialize, human nature 
allows complacency to set in. Other factors can also shift the focus away from pandemic flu 
preparations. Perhaps a city, school or organization experiences a natural disaster or has to 
contend with some other crises or man-made threat causing a change in priorities and the 
allocation of emergency resources and funding to other projects. In another scenario, Sandman 
(2010) writes about the lost credibility of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in overstating the 2009 pandemic threat 
causing wasted time, effort and resources. Unfortunately, these kinds of miscommunications and 
risk judgment errors are harsh realities that all organizations, including colleges and universities, 
have to face and will continue to deal with considering the unknowns surrounding influenza 
virus mutation. Organizational change and a customized planning theory along with better 
contingency planning practices may hold the key for higher education. In light of these realities 
or theories, this document will examine how the individuals tasked with anticipating; mitigating, 
responding to and recovering from emergencies at colleges or universities can create and 
maintain more effective yet flexible pandemic flu plans. By surveying administrators of current 
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pandemic flu plans at several U.S. colleges and universities, perhaps some insight can be gained 
on when they have done “enough” through preparation and plan modification to create a 
comprehensive pandemic influenza plan at their institution.      
  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This document is presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements of a Dissertation Overview 
by Frank Pokrywka for the degree of Doctor of Education. This study will answer the following 
three guiding research questions.  
1. When organizing their Pandemic Flu Committees, do universities optimize representation 
by departments, campus groups and outside agencies? 
2. Do universities’ Pandemic Flu Plans include elements that are comprehensive in scope 
and content?  
3. How does the Pandemic Flu Plan fit into the larger emergency planning framework for 
ongoing course instruction, research, and business continuity?  
  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This project consisted of an e-mail survey of colleges and universities peer to the University of 
Pittsburgh assessing their committee organization and level of emergency preparedness with 
regard to flu surveillance, risk assessment, mobilization, counter measures, communications, 
training and response to a pandemic influenza using an updated preparedness response 
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framework developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta 
(CDC, 2014). The new CDC framework shown in Table 1 below and issued in September 2014, 
expanded the 2006 WHO and CDC framework organization from 4 (inter-pandemic, alert, 
pandemic and transition phases) to 6 phases (investigation, recognition, initiation, acceleration, 
deceleration and preparation). As recommended by the CDC (2014), “this updated framework 
provides greater detail and clarity regarding the potential timing of key decisions and actions 
aimed at slowing the spread and mitigating the impact of an emerging pandemic” (p. 1).  
Table 1: 2014 Preparedness and response framework for influenza A virus pandemics 
World Health 
Organization phases CDC intervals 
Federal indicators for CDC 
intervals 
State/Local indicators for 
CDC intervals 
Interpandemic 
phase:  
Period between 
influenza pandemics 
Investigation:  
Investigation of novel 
influenza A infection in 
humans or animals 
Identification of novel 
influenza A infection in 
humans or animals anywhere 
in the world with potential 
implications for human health 
Identification of novel 
influenza A infection in 
humans or animals in the 
United States with potential 
implications for human health 
Alert phase:  
Influenza caused by a 
new subtype has been 
identified in humans 
Recognition:  
Recognition of increased 
potential for ongoing 
transmission of a novel 
influenza A virus 
Increasing number of human 
cases or clusters of novel 
influenza A infection 
anywhere in the world with 
virus characteristics, 
indicating increased potential 
for ongoing human-to-human 
transmission 
Increasing number of human 
cases or clusters of novel 
influenza A infection in the 
United States with virus 
characteristics indicating 
increased potential for 
ongoing human-to-human 
transmission 
Pandemic phase:  
Global spread of 
human influenza 
caused by a new 
subtype 
Initiation:  
Initiation of a pandemic 
wave 
Confirmation of human cases 
of a pandemic influenza virus 
anywhere in the world with 
demonstrated efficient and 
sustained human-to-human 
transmission 
Confirmation of human cases 
of a pandemic influenza virus 
in the United States with 
demonstrated efficient and 
sustained human-to-human 
transmission 
Acceleration:  
Acceleration of a 
pandemic wave 
Consistently increasing rate of 
pandemic influenza cases 
identified in the United States, 
indicating established 
transmission 
Consistently increasing rate 
of pandemic influenza cases 
identified in the state, 
indicating established 
transmission 
Deceleration:  
Deceleration of a 
pandemic wave 
Consistently decreasing rate of 
pandemic influenza cases in 
the United States 
Consistently decreasing rate 
of pandemic influenza cases 
in the state 
Transition phase:  
Reduction in global 
risk, reduction in 
response activities, or 
progression toward 
recovery actions 
Preparation:  
Preparation for future 
pandemic waves 
Low pandemic influenza 
activity but continued 
outbreaks possible in some 
jurisdictions 
Low pandemic influenza 
activity but continued 
outbreaks possible in the state 
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Pandemic flu plans modeled after the CDC framework will include six framework 
intervals (two pre-pandemic and four pandemic intervals) that are further broken down into eight 
domains for coordinating Federal, State and Local agency response efforts within each interval. 
The eight domains include; incident management, surveillance and epidemiology, laboratory, 
community mitigation, medical care and countermeasures, vaccine, risk communication, state 
and local coordination. The 2014 CDC framework is not meant to be definitive or 
comprehensive but is designed to help federal, state and local officials make informed decisions 
during a suspected flu pandemic.   
Focusing on the CDC’s local agency response in the 2014 framework and assuming that 
colleges and universities have established liaisons within their local area, the survey 
questionnaire attempted to determine if university pandemic plans were comprehensive in scope 
and content based on the new matrix. The CDC (2014) and CIDRAP (2009) recommend that 
business or university pandemic flu plans not be made in isolation but rather be developed in 
conjunction with the local community. These joint campus and community plans, based on a 
personal level of trust and cooperation, can better rely on the shared use of key resources and the 
coordinated effort of local businesses, healthcare facilities, emergency services, and volunteer 
agencies in preparing for and responding to each of the six (6) pandemic intervals.  
Scholars in the fields of sociology, psychology, public health and higher education have 
been researching and discussing the human aspects of school crises for at least 30 years. 
(Haddow & Bullock, 2003; Quarantelli, 1977; Blanchard, 2005; Sandman, 2010;, Kezar, 2001) 
A review of several university websites reveals impressive and informative emergency plan 
response information, directing students, faculty and staff what to do in an emergency. Some 
schools subscribe to and “all hazards” approach relying on less specific preparation to deal with 
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a variety of crises while others subscribe to an “Incident Command” model that lays out a 
distinct chain of command and specific response actions for various emergencies. Most schools 
rely on a hybrid of the two for their emergency planning efforts.  
In a crisis situation such as a fire, an earthquake, a gunman on campus, or a pandemic flu 
emergency will everyone know what to do, where to go or who to call? Will department heads, 
faculty, RAs, staff and students react as stated in the emergency plan? Are there departmental 
response teams? Does each team member know what is in their emergency plan for a given 
situation; have they studied the plan and shared it with co-workers and students? Have they 
practiced the plan by conducting drills or table-top exercises, are they really prepared to respond 
to an emergency? In a crisis situation there may not be time to get the emergency plan off the 
shelf or to check the website for guidance; the power may be off and computers and phones may 
not work; communication may be difficult, lives may be at risk for every minute wasted. To be 
effective during a crisis, emergency responders must know their personnel responsibilities and be 
familiar with the overall planned response and its implementation.  
Most university emergency plans also include pandemic preparedness websites that have 
been in place for several years. Some plans are updated annually but how many people at the 
intuition actually review the updated information and are familiar with their current pandemic flu 
emergency plans is unknown. How many universities activated their plans during the 2009-2010 
flu season and what plan modifications were made in response to any noted shortcomings? Have 
individual departments at the university acted to reduce their flu vulnerability or business 
continuity by preparing departmental specific emergency plans and assigning key individuals to 
encourage staff to keep current with vaccinations, to cross train on job responsibilities, to 
stockpile emergency supplies, etc.? These are some of the questions to be explored in this work. 
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Among the institutions included in the survey were the nation’s larger universities based 
on enrollment that are members of the Campus Safety, Health and Environmental Management 
Association. These schools are considered by many to be the elite of the doctoral degree granting 
research institutions in the U.S. many with affiliated medical centers and near urban areas. With 
their status, security and reputation at stake, one would expect these schools to be most ready to 
deal with any disaster, natural or manmade. This study will assess the current format of 
pandemic flu planning at the universities and evaluate the emergency plan’s approach as well as 
the perceived effectiveness of their plans. As the survey data was collected, university names 
remained anonymous and codes were used to identify each institution for reference and follow-
up clarifications. 
This study attempted to answers the research questions and to gain further incite for 
determining the level of pandemic flu preparedness among the selected institutions. In doing so, 
the author hoped to encourage all institutions of higher education to take a closer look at their 
programs; particularly their level of training, frequency of drills and overall response capabilities 
and to make any needed improvements towards emergency preparedness.  
Just in the past few years, a number of infectious disease crises have impacted colleges 
and universities throughout the United States most notably 2009-2010 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic. Were the emergency scenarios anticipated in their pandemic plans and were the 
risk/crisis communication, response and mitigation efforts effectively implemented? Did schools 
have the critical infrastructure in place to maintain resilience and business continuity or did they 
need more? What did they do right in their response and were there things that could have done 
better? Did they use the “lessons learned” to modify their pandemic plans thereby enhancing 
their overall preparedness and resiliency? 
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 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
  BACKGROUND 
Over the past 10 years, an abundance of practical “how to” information has been provided by 
federal and state agencies, various law enforcement and fire protection groups and media 
publications or trade journals on creating emergency plans (CDC, 2014; CIDRAP, 2009; FEMA, 
2009). Despite the wealth of information available to deal with emergencies and crises of all 
types, our nation’s overall response to disasters, from the federal level to the personal level, has 
been less than desirable in many instances. Government leaders, businesses, education 
institutions and the general public do not seem to learn what is important for resilience in a 
disaster until it is too late. Sometimes the response is “overwhelming”, way beyond the needs 
warranted by the crisis. The ineffective outcomes of many disaster planning programs have 
resulted in a “tsunami” of opinions on the best approach to emergency preparedness and 
response, while little is mentioned or done to mitigate hazards, improve response or build-in 
disaster resilience.  
Currently in the literature one can read about the “All Hazard” Approach, Comprehensive 
Emergency Management, the Command and Control Approach, the Homeland Security Model, 
the Incident Command System, Integrated Emergency Management, the National Incident 
Management System and the Network-Centric Approach. Blanchard (2008) has determined that 
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each of these emergency management systems or approaches, while containing various mixtures 
of disaster response principles can be categorized into two basic models, the Technocratic Model 
and the Vulnerability Model, which will be discussed later in this work.  
For the past 10 years or so, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
the emergency management research community are promoting an “All Hazards” approach 
towards crisis preparedness. In this approach, Federal, state and local governments are 
encouraged to join forces with disaster relief agencies, community law enforcement, emergency 
services, businesses, medical facilities and institutions including colleges and universities, to 
establish networks for mutual aid and support. Using this all hazards philosophy, states, cities 
and local municipalities can assess, plan, build, sustain and improve their capabilities to mitigate 
against and prepare for disasters. In times of crisis, communities with such an emergency 
management plan in place are better able to coordinate and integrate all of the activities 
necessary to cope with, respond to and recover from natural disasters, acts of terrorism or other 
man-made disasters (FEMA, 2003). 
This research project attempted to categorize the crisis management approach at larger 
universities throughout the U.S. related to pandemic influenza and compared the content 
institutions emergency plan regarding their facilities, services, and materials needed for the 
functioning of a campus community during and after an pandemic emergency. It asked the each 
of the university EH&S Directors to comment on comprehension of their pandemic preparedness 
plan via a survey questionnaire noting parameters such as transportation, food service, housing, 
medical facilities, communications, IT systems and utilities (water, heating and power lines) 
enhancing the university’s ability to withstand an influenza pandemic. The study also looked at 
the university’s frequency and type of disaster drills, tabletop exercises and employee training in 
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order to assess their university emergency plans and practice regimen aimed at preventing, 
responding to and recovering from a pandemic emergency. 
  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
  The Pandemic Flu Threat and the Need for Planning 
As stated earlier, an influenza pandemic is arguably the most life threatening and long-lasting 
emergencies that can strike a university campus. Unlike a fire, flood or violent crime that occur 
more frequently but are usually limited in scope and duration, the unknown risks perceived about 
the severity and rapid spread of a pandemic influenza along with its risk to all campus faculty, 
students and staff as well as their families and friends is staggering to comprehend.  
When a flu pandemic strikes, even though most organizations have a “plan” developed, 
the health risks, lack of flu trained personnel on campus and the rapid spread of illness along 
with limited effective treatments all act to heighten concerns about the plan’s adequacy for 
handling the outbreak. Even among those whose job it is to care for the health and well-being of 
students, the concerns for dealing with large numbers of flu victims can be overwhelming. Many 
flu plans state that clinics and doctors’ offices prefer patients with influenza to stay home and 
self-isolate with the proper medications to prevent spreading flu. As hospital resources may be 
stretched to extremes, public health officials often request that only the most critically ill seek 
hospital care to avoid exposing other very sick hospital patients to the flu virus (Colorado State 
University, 2007; CDC, 2009; CDC, 2010; UKDH, 2007). Given these guidelines and 
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restrictions, questions arise as to how colleges and universities are supposed to care for their 
students, faculty and staff as well as maintain school operations without a solid plan in place. 
  Emergency Planning 
For years many college pandemic flu plans have called for closing the campus and sending 
students home when a flu crisis was approaching (Colorado State University, 2007; Ithaca 
College, 2012; University of Pittsburgh, 2007). Questions remain, however, on the wisdom of 
isolating students showing flu-like symptoms on a college campus or arranging for them to 
return home when they may already be infected with the flu virus. This relocation would be 
difficult to accomplish safely with students from distant parts of the country and especially with 
international students. Plans must be formulated to care for these students on campus or at some 
local facility where they can be quarantined.  
Even with the perceived life threatening “unknowns”, police, paramedics and medical 
staff, will be expected to transport or treat patients suspected of having the flu while trying to 
avoid the infection risks to themselves and their families. On a college campus, Resident 
Advisors, custodial personnel and food service staff may be unwilling to provide required 
services or even visit a dormitory where flu victims are quarantined. How should these concerns, 
real or imagined, be addressed in a pandemic flu plan? Can universities and other organizations 
learn from their mistakes and adjust their plans or practices to the ever changing environments 
that might exist during a pandemic flu? There is need for additional research in this area to 
answer some of these questions.  
Emergency planning and preparedness for large scale disasters go hand in hand. All 
organizations, whether private, public or governmental, are susceptible to the consequences of a 
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crisis or disaster and must be prepared (Haddow and Bullock, 2003). From the 1950s to the 
1970s, most local agencies prepared for a response to storms, fires and floods, while the focus of 
emergency planning was primarily a federal function urging citizens to prepare for bigger issues 
like a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. In 1979, the serious radiation incident at the Three 
Mile Island (TMI) nuclear plant demonstrated the need to shift this planning management from a 
federal function to local responders and the need for better emergency plans that educated, 
trained and prepared the public in addition to responders for emergencies. Haddow and Bullock 
(2003) described how the TMI incident was the first real test for the newly created Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in emphasizing the importance of planning, training 
and exercising for all levels of government as well as the private sector.  
One of the nation’s first attempts to develop an emergency preparedness framework was 
begun in the 1960s by Dr. William Haddon. It was a multidimensional analytical study of traffic 
safety injury epidemiology and prevention to attain a better understanding of contributing factors 
related to pedestrian traffic accidents and injuries (Runyan, 2003). Known as the Haddon Matrix, 
it used a grid of four columns representing the contributing factors to injury in the columns (host, 
agent/vector, physical environmental and sociocultural environment) and three rows containing 
the time phases of injury (pre-event, event and post event). By using this matrix, complex issues 
could be broken down into manageable segments for detailed analysis with each of the 12 cells 
in the grid corresponding to a policy decision or actionable priority (Barnett et al., 2005). 
Realizing that this analytical matrix logic could fit perfectly into the world of public 
health, epidemiology and infection control (host, agent/vector, physical and sociocultural 
environments), Haddon (1968) modified his 12 cell grid to describe the primary, secondary and 
tertiary prevention of polio outbreak. This same matrix grid was more recently applied to study 
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public health planning and emergency preparedness response during the SARS epidemic in 
2002-2003 (Barnett, Balicer et al., 2005). Based on these two public health applications of the 
Haddon Matrix, it became the starting analytical matrix for the 2004-2006 WHO and CDC 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plans until they were expanded to the current six phase 
framework (CDC, 2014).    
Preparedness was defined by FEMA as “the leadership, training, readiness, exercise 
support, and technical and financial assistance to strengthen citizens, communities, state, local 
and tribal governments, and professional emergency workers as they prepare for disasters, 
mitigate the effects of disasters, respond to community needs after disasters and launch effective 
recovery efforts” (Haddow and Bullock, 2003, p. 116). FEMA preparedness focused on 12 
emergency functions that must be independently managed but are also highly dependent on each 
other during an emergency. The 12 functions include transportation, communication, public 
works and infrastructure, firefighting, information and planning, mass casualty care, resource 
support, health and medical services, search and rescue, hazardous materials, food and energy 
(Haddow and Bullock, 2003). These authors also explained an important distinction between 
preparedness and mitigation of an emergency, both of which are building blocks of emergency 
planning and key parts of the preparedness cycle. “Preparedness deals with the functional aspects 
of emergency management such as the response and recovery from a disaster, whereas mitigation 
attempts to lessen these effects through pre-disaster actions such as creating disaster-resistant 
communities” (Haddow and Bullock, 2003, p. 117).  
According to Haddow and Bullock (2003) effective emergency preparedness called for a 
systematic approach to planning requiring both ties to academic research traditions and analytical 
methodologies. Without these pre-established and practiced ties, the authors claim that 
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coordinating the efforts of multiple responding agencies and organizations would be impossible 
to manage during an emergency. FEMA’s systematic approach to emergency preparedness 
involves two cyclical planning processes, with one revolving continually inside the other 
(Haddow and Bullock, 2003). The outer circle is comprised of a four-part cycle that includes 
planning, preparation, evaluation and assessment. The inner cycle has seven finely detailed steps 
that involve conducting a threat assessment, gauging vulnerabilities, identifying shortfalls and 
ways to improve, implementing plan enhancements, training responders, conducting exercise 
drills, re-assessing preparedness and starting the cycle over again as often as necessary (FEMA, 
2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: FEMA Preparedness Planning Cycle 
Source: Adapted by the author from Haddow and Bullock (2003, p. 117). 
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 After the September 11, 2001 terror attack in New York City and the devastation of 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the United States, along with most of the world, was forced to realize 
the importance of emergency planning and preparedness and the need to continually rework and 
practice these cycles. In 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under a Presidential 
Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) developed the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP), establishing guiding principles for emergency exercises and the common framework 
for all emergency program management including planning, developing, conducting and 
evaluating disaster drills (Homeland Security, 2013). The current HSEEP doctrine is a set of 
fundamental principles framing a common approach to exercises that; 1) are guided by elected 
and appointed officials, 2) are capability-based and objective driven, 3) use a progressive 
(advocacy) planning approach, 4) integrate the entire community, 5) are based upon the 
perceived risk, and 6) use common methods and terminology. In a recently prepared document, 
Homeland Security (2013) believes that applying HSEEP principles to the planning, 
development, conduct and critical evaluation of individual and coordinated exercise programs 
will provide an effective examination of an organization’s response capabilities as well as 
identifying any shortcomings in their planning efforts.  
From the HSEEP Initiative came the National Response Plan (NRP), the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), the Universal Task List (UTL) and the Target 
Capabilities List (TCL), which all combined to become the “official” emergency preparedness 
framework for organizations in the United States. The HSEEP doctrine was intended to be 
flexible, scalable and adaptable for use by stakeholders nationwide in operational planning for 
the prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery from disaster and emergencies of 
any kind. If properly incorporated into an institution’s emergency plan, HSEEP provided a 
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strategic mechanism for measuring and sustaining the core competencies of individuals and 
institutions during emergency response (Brown, 2011). 
In December, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) intended to improve the federal response to public health and other 
emergencies (Hodge et al., 2007). PAHPA placed the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) rather than Department of Homeland Security (DHS) squarely in charge of leading the 
federal health and medical response during pandemics, bioterrorism and natural disasters while 
DHS dealt with non-medical and man-made emergency response issues. Under this Act, DHHS, 
including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), was instructed to coordinate 
with state, tribal and local emergency managers to assist and enhance their overall response to 
pandemic flu issues including rapid vaccine development, fair allocation of resources, volunteer 
training, health care surge capacity and the protection of privacy during medical surveillance. 
Hodge et al., (2007), explained that the goals of the PAHPA were to streamline the federal public 
health response, to hold states and local agencies accountable for their performance, to create a 
national surveillance structure, to facilitate volunteerism, and to ensure the expedient deployment 
of medical countermeasures. According to Hodge et al., (2007), critics of the Act contended that 
it lacked specifics on how these goals were to be met and provided few incentives for state and 
local agencies to commit resources for improving their public health emergency preparedness.  
On March 30, 2011, President Barack Obama signed and released Presidential Policy 
Directive 8 (PPD-8) along with several revised component policies and the “Implementation 
Plan” intended to guide everyone in the U.S., from federal responders to private citizens, on how 
to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to and recover from threats posing the 
greatest risks to national security, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics and 
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catastrophic natural disasters (Brown, 2011). Using a “strategic” National Preparedness System, 
DHS and FEMA established five separate National Planning Frameworks that each address one 
of the emergency “mission areas” (prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery) in 
achieving our National Preparedness Goals or the desired “ends” for the plan (FEMA, 2013; 
Brown, 2011). When adopted, the five combined planning frameworks became the National 
Preparedness System and the “means” for achieving the “ends” desired before, during and after 
an emergency or disaster. PPD 8 also requires an annual National Preparedness Report (NPR) 
summarizing the nation’s progress in building, sustaining and delivering the 31 core capabilities 
outlined in the National Preparedness Goals for a secure and resilient nation. These core 
competencies identify specific issues in each of the 5 “mission areas” involving planning, hazard 
identification, communication, intelligence gathering, risk assessments, safety, supply chain 
integrity, resilience, response measures, infrastructure preservation and economic recovery to 
name a few. Two NPRs have been published to date, one in 2012 and another in 2013 to inform 
Americans how responders were doing with regard to National Preparedness and outlining what 
more they needed to do (FEMA, 2013). Brown (2012) also points out that PPD-8 revised or 
rescinded other Presidential Directives on emergency preparedness initiated by Presidents Bush 
and Regan.  
 At its core, PPD-8 requires the involvement of everyone, not just the federal 
government, in a coordinated effort to keep the nation safe from harm and resilient when 
confronted with natural disasters, terrorism and pandemics (FEMA, 2013). DHS and FEMA are 
responsible for implementing PPD-8 by coordinating a multi-agency effort to work with 
individuals, families, businesses, faith based and community groups, non-profit organizations, 
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and representatives from all levels of government (federal, state, local, tribal and territorial) in 
assuring that everyone’s needs are met (FEMA, 2013). 
It is significant to point out that many college and university emergency planning 
committees incorporate portions of these comprehensive federal preparedness guidelines into 
their school emergency plans directly or by reference. Eventually these plans will be updated to 
reflect the six planning/response intervals recently suggested by the WHO and CDC in 2014.   
  The History and Evolution of Planning  
Before one can understand or select the “best” planning strategy to use for effective pandemic flu 
preparedness at a university, it may be helpful to review the history of “planning” and to 
compare the planning traditions or theories that have evolved over the years including those used 
by the federal programs mentioned above. Being familiar with planning history will provide a 
better understanding of why planning is important to a flu pandemic preparedness at the 
university level.  
Merriam-Webster (2013) defines planning as an act or process of establishing or carrying 
out a policy or procedure to achieve a goal for a social or economic unit. Hudson (1979), one of 
the fathers of modern planning theory, defined planning as foresight in formulating and 
implementing programs and policies. Zhang (2006) defines planning as an institutional 
arrangement between the government, the marketplace, and society in response to a needed 
social change in a particular society during a specific time period.  
Planning for the implementation of government programs and policies can be found as 
far back as ancient historical records. Nearly 4,000 years ago, King Hammurabi chiseled his 
code of laws, which Babylonians were expected to live by, onto a black stone monument. 
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Interpretations of his “code” divulged the earliest-known example of a ruler proclaiming publicly 
an entire body of laws, arranged in orderly groups, so that his subjects knew what was required 
of them. The carved diorite monument, eight feet high and containing 282 laws, was publically 
displayed to guide citizens on rules pertaining to government operations, contract and liability 
law, just punishments for offenses, religious beliefs, military service, trade, slavery, the duties of 
workers, codes of conduct, food preparation, household and family relationships such as 
inheritance, divorce, paternity and sexual behavior (Biography.com, 2013). 
Throughout history kings, tribal rulers, religious clerics or military leaders have used 
their governing authority and the counsel of perceived “experts” to establish plans for urban 
design, public works projects, transportation networks and military defense or expanding their 
empires (Hudson, 1979). These “experts” under the authority of their governing ruler, would 
often dictate non-negotiable regulations for coinage, trade, and the prevention of disease and 
disorder (Hudson, 1979; Friedman, 1987). Mannheim (1954), a critical theorist, philosopher and 
intellectual on the “sociology of knowledge” wrote that before the industrial/scientific revolution 
(about 1750) many leaders believed that the gods, religion or fate ran the world and that it was 
not prudent for man to plan or attempt to intervene in events. Since that time, scientifically 
based, sociological, political and philosophical knowledge about human rights, natural laws and 
the needs of society has led to the expansion of planning thought and action on how institutions, 
business organizations, countries and the world in general should be governed (Friedman, 1987). 
After WWII there evolved two primary planning groups, rational planners and pragmatic 
planners. Planners in the 1950s called “Rationalists” considered planning as a bureaucratic goal-
setting process based on scientific data and mathematical means verses ends calculations 
followed by the comprehensive analysis of alternatives as suggested by several authors 
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(Lindblom, 1959; Friedmann, 1987; Schon, 1971). Pragmatic planners, on the other hand, 
rejected using natural laws, scientific knowledge and objective principles as their sole planning 
guidelines, accepting instead practical judgments based on social learning from new ideas or 
evidence discovered through life’s experiences and interacting with others along with their own 
morals, intuitions and feelings (Healey, 2008; Hoch, 2002).  
Planning and preparation have played critical roles in warfare, business, education, 
sports, emergency preparedness and life in general. Famous quotes have alluded to the 
importance of planning. Benjamin Franklin was first credited with the saying “by failing to 
prepare, you are preparing to fail.” Hillary Rodham Clinton, in her recent book Living History 
had a similar quote based on Franklin’s, “fail to plan, plan to fail.” Finally, General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, in strategizing for war, said “In preparing for battle I have always found that plans 
are useless, but planning is indispensable.”  
Today, planning can be a complex management function for deciding in advance what 
needs done to reach a goal or objective, how best to achieve that goal, the time frame required to 
accomplish the objective and determining who should be involved in the process (Settar, 2012). 
Settar (2012) also states that planning is a demanding process requiring a delineated course of 
action, based on a defined purpose, the knowledge gathered on the subject, a cost estimate and 
time needed to meet the objective.  
This dissertation seeks to convey the importance of planning in general and pandemic 
planning in particular by addressing several modern planning theories along with their intended 
strategies, similarities and differences as well as the usefulness of each planning level for solving 
problems situations. In addition, the essay hopes to portray the importance of “fitting” various 
planning techniques to different situations and how plans can impact the outcome of future 
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events. Not knowing the history and details of a problem, the planning needs, its advocates or 
opponents and its proposed outcome, subjects an organization to shortsighted decisions where 
they are likely to make or repeat mistakes. Planning professionals have concluded that unless a 
plan is affordable, comprehensive, flexible and able to adapt to meet changing needs, the 
planner’s ability to activate the plan in a timely fashion and sustain it may suffer (Hartzell, 2013; 
Friedman, 1987; Hudson, 1974). 
  Planning Theory 
Considering the pluralistic nature of modern society, the diverse direction of social 
developments, and the uncertainty of social and political events along with the non-linear 
trajectory of planning theory, it is important to develop an understanding of planning theory 
evolution as well as the diverse and innovative approaches taken by planners to meet social 
change over the years (Zhang, 2006). From the industrial revolution to the 1950s the focus of 
formal planning strategies has been about wartime battle plans, social reform or the architectural 
and civic planning related to the layout and construction of urban and regional communities by 
professionals and politicians (Stiftel, 2000). During this time period, the predominant planning 
theory involved a rational, comprehensive tradition often called the Synoptic Tradition or the 
Technocratic Model. (Hudson, et al., 1979). This tradition was well suited to formalized 
government mandates requiring a set of constrained objectives, budget restrictions and 
accountability. Stiftel (2000) states that Synoptic Planning or the Rational/Comprehensive Model 
has four classic elements that include the following: 1) goal-setting, 2) comprehensive 
identification and analysis of many policy alternatives, 3) mathematical evaluation of means 
verses ends and 4) implementation of rational decisions. Beginning in the 1960’s planning theory 
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began to be viewed by some through a moral or social lens with greater emphasis on 
transparency, inclusiveness and truth-seeking schools of thought (Friedman, 1987). Where 
Rationalists believe their ideas and data, being logical and precise, provided a better approach 
when developing plans, Pragmatists followed an approach that considered local customs and 
morals, social experience, feelings and intuition when coping with problems (Hoch, 2002).   
In a classic article on pragmatic planning and policy setting, Lindblom (1959) criticized 
the dominant belief in public administration of his time, that all problems could be technically or 
scientifically solved using a rational-comprehensive approach involving complex mathematical 
models and quantitative analysis while largely ignoring the human dimension, social problems 
and the public interest of those most affected by the plan. Lindblom (1979) proposed an 
alternative to the Rational-Comprehensive Model that he called the Incremental Model or the 
“Science of Muddling Through” referring to the British bureaucratic decision making process 
where political maneuvering, past practices, public opinion, human values and less than perfect 
alternatives are all considered equally important for getting as close to the goal as possible. In 
making his case for the Incremental Planning Model, Lindblom (1959) states that less effort 
should be made to set comprehensive goals or policies rather, fewer and simpler goals should be 
set and policies should be considered in relation to current and past practices. A reasonable 
number of goals values and alternative goals are considered in concert and analyzed based on 
past experience and solid human values. In the end, decision makers select the most feasible 
policy alternatives agreeable to all affected parties.  
In comparing the Rational Model with the Incremental Model of planning, Lindblom 
(1959) and Chilton (2003) state that the principles behind the Rational (Technocratic) Model are 
comprehensive and systematic where each goal is clearly stated and separated from a listing of 
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alternative goals. The policy makers evaluate the pros and cons of goals and alternatives 
subjecting each to unbiased quantitative analysis to mathematically determine if the means 
justify the ends. When all the data have been processed, and decision makers can agree, the best 
policy or plan that fits the model and will attain the goal is adopted.   
The Incremental (Pragmatic or Pluralist) Model discussed by Lindblom (1959) was an 
alternative to the Rational-Comprehensive planning of the day. This model does not intend to be 
scientifically comprehensive and establishes fewer and simpler goals. Before setting goals or 
directives incremental planners look at proposed programs or policies “branching” from past 
experience or successful current practices. Reasonable end-goals, not mathematical fits, are 
established considering the time and resources at hand and planners consider each goal along 
with human values that minimize deviation from the status quo. Limited evaluations are made to 
consider alternative goals and limited means realizing that there may be public consequences to 
be dealt with if the plan comes up short. Incremental decision makers tend to agree on a feasible 
policy that just “suffices” as it is derived from a very human value-laden process described by 
Chilton (2003) 
 The Evolution Continues: The SITAR Framework 
Combining the synoptic and incremental planning traditions mentioned earlier and adding three 
other models, Hudson (1979) proposed an alternative planning theory. It was an American theory 
defined as using foresight in formulating and implementing programs and policies. This planning 
theory used an acronym based on an ancient musical instrument the SITAR. The sitar is an 
instrument having five strings that, like this planning tradition, can be played individually or 
harmoniously combining tones for a more satisfying outcome.  
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The first string of this planning theory is Synoptic Planning that involves the dominant 
rational, comprehensive, technocratic and quantitative tradition in setting limited objectives with 
analytically derived budget restrictions and full accountability throughout the process. With these 
mathematical limitations always in mind, synoptic planners set their goals but have policy 
alternatives pre-established if it becomes apparent that the means allocated will not achieve the 
ends proposed and that an alternative decision must be implemented. The human dimension is 
typically overlooked in synoptic planning (Hudson et al., 1979).  
The second string of Hudson’s SITAR approach involves Incremental or Pluralist 
Planning that uses a free market approach and democratic bargaining to get things done. Not 
unlike Lindblom’s British decentralized approach of “muddling through”, incremental planners 
use intuition and the experience of “experts” to solve problems using their “rules of thumb” 
(proven practices or successful policies) derived from their past experience. Reportedly, 
incremental planners often have hidden agendas and are not forthcoming with known 
shortcomings (Hudson et al., 1979).   
The third string of the SITAR model relies on Transactive Planning which involves face 
to face contact with the people most affected by the planner’s decisions. These interactions focus 
on the importance of human dignity, personal growth, values, cooperative spirit and generosity in 
planning and making decisions. Financial considerations are given little weighting in transactive 
planning. (Hudson et al., 1979).  
The SITAR model’s fourth string is Advocacy Planning which uses the principals of 
social justice to challenge plans that appear to be too insensitive. It injects normative principals 
into planning with sensitivity towards the unintended side effects of decisions on the public. 
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Conflict resolution and the just distribution of benefits are major considerations in advocacy 
planning. (Hudson et al., 1979). 
Radical Planning makes up the fifth and final string of the SITAR theory. It seeks to 
manage program development in an equitable and community based manner with limited 
authoritarian involvement. This planning method also endorses maximum participation of the 
people involved in defining, controlling and experimenting with their own environment via 
dialog and bargaining. Social and political problem resolutions are two of the focal points of 
radical planning with less regard to the feasible sustainability of the plan. (Hudson et al., 1979). 
 
Table 2: Relative Emphasis of SITAR Theories Based on Selected Descriptive Criteria 
 (Hudson et al., 1979) 
 
Planning theory 
Characteristics 
Synoptic 
objective & 
authoritative 
Incremental 
Intuition & 
experience 
Transactive 
Dialog with 
those 
affected 
Advocacy 
Social 
sensitivity 
Radical 
Participation 
to change 
values 
Descriptive 
Criteria  
     
1.Public interest o o o x x 
2. Human dimension   x  o 
3. Feasibility x x    
4. Action potential o o o o o 
5. Substantive theory  o o  o 
6. Self-reflective   o o o 
x- Major strength or area of concern 
o- Partial or one-sided treatment 
Cells Left Blank- characteristic weakness 
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 SITAR Criteria 
As shown in the Table 2 above (Hudson et al., 1979), none of the SITAR planning traditions 
completely satisfy all six descriptive criteria deemed necessary for the “perfect” plan. Each of 
the traditions have at least one major strength and weakness while giving only partial or one 
sided treatment to the other descriptive characteristics of a plan.  
The first descriptive criteria, Public Interest, refer to the theory that there will always be 
conflicts among groups affected by a plan. Planners must decide how much effort should be 
made to resolve every conflict before implementing a plan. Hudson (1979) relates that the 
greater the public interest the more efforts should be made to articulate significant social 
problems. As shown above, advocacy and radical planning make a maximum effort to address 
differing opinions while the other traditions do less.  
Knowing that personal and spiritual beliefs can be impacted by policy decisions, the 
second criteria, Human Dimension, refers to the weighting planners should give to subjective 
realities such as; political, cultural, psychological, historic or sociological concerns as opposed to 
objective frameworks based on cost benefit analyses or scientific data when making decisions. 
Only transactive and radical planning considers these human dimensions in trying to facilitate 
understanding and mutual learning between the planners and their constituency during problem 
resolution.  
The third descriptive characteristic, Feasibility, refers to making planning methods easy 
to understand without oversimplifying issues especially when there is a lack of convincing facts 
or trend data. The easier a plan is to understand and apply to a problem, the more practical and 
adaptable it will be. Synoptic and incremental planning tend to focus on explaining the facts 
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represented by the data and accounting for possible alternatives while the other traditions largely 
overlook scientific data and statistics.  
The fourth descriptive criteria, Action Potential, refers to the likelihood that once a plan 
is developed it will be filed away and never implemented. Action potential provides for carrying 
ideas into practice, building on experience and finding new solutions. All of the planning 
traditions have some provision for seeing a plan through to implementation. Action plans will 
vary with each tradition from a detailed plan following through successive stages in synoptic 
planning to the other traditions where the emphasis may be on implementation through social 
policy reforms and long range growth rather than formal plan development.  
Criteria number five, Substantive Theory, refers to subjectively addressing the resolution 
of difficult social problems such as poverty, education, housing and industrial development when 
developing plans rather than just presenting the objective statistics and forecasts. Difficult 
problems need to be studied and understood so that a process of social change can be enacted. 
Incremental, transactive and radical planning traditions attempt to provide a moral and sensitive 
interpretation of these issues while the synoptic and advocacy theories tend to focus on more 
objective solutions and procedures such as trend extrapolation. . 
Lastly, criteria six, Self-Reflective, planning should be self-critical and open to counter 
proposals. This criterion refers to the tendency of planners to be explicit on shortcomings of the 
plan making clear the known limitations and what may have been left out of the process. 
Incremental planners are least explicit in this regard figuring they will muddle through any 
shortcomings while synoptic planners make an effort to lay deficiencies on the table so they can 
develop solutions for every contingency using feedback from surveys and recalculations. 
Transactive planners develop trusting relationships in their planning committees and use dialog 
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to address shortfalls in the plan. Advocacy planners will mobilize people to challenge decisions 
and policies that go counter to their collective interest. Radical planners will call for ideas to be 
tested in action with the intentions of permanently changing institutional norms or values. 
(Hudson et al., 1979).   
 Planning Practice 
One of the main functions of management today is planning. Whether it is a business, a school or 
a governmental function, managers make plans on a regular basis to achieve an organizational 
goal, to establish a program, or to avert a crisis (Hartzell, 2013). Four levels of planning practice 
are generally discussed in the literature, they include; 1) strategic plans, 2) tactical plans, 3) 
operational plans, and 4) contingency plans (Zubair, 2006; Hartzell, 2013; Settar, 2012). Each of 
these planning levels can be characterized by their size, focus, scope and timeframe to determine 
which level or levels would be most effective to establish an emergency or pandemic flu plan. 
An effort will be made in this essay to discuss planning level hierarchy and determine the criteria 
most adaptable to a university campus and its many stakeholders.   
Before moving forward with a pandemic flu planning process, it is important to become 
more familiar with the content of the four planning levels to decide which practice best fits the 
needs of the university stakeholders, including the administration, faculty, students, parents and 
staff as well as the larger community in which they live and work. For example, when selecting 
individuals to serve on the planning committee, it is important to know what each person might 
contribute to the plan given their skills and area of expertise. It is also important to know 
something about the preferred method of planning within the university organization as well as 
any sociological, cultural, political, psychological issues or historic concerns that need to be 
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addressed in the plan (Hudson et al., 1979). Organizational learning and the ability to detect and 
correct errors or shortcomings in a plan and perhaps realizing what they know about a situation 
requires a complete change of direction is often critical to a successful planning committee 
(Argyris, 1977).  
  First Level Strategic Planning  
Strategic Planning experienced its greatest popularity in business during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Prior to that time, its primary use was the rational planning strategy concentrated in military 
planning, corporate growth and international development (Dooris, 2002-2003; Werrell, 2011). 
Colleges and universities took a closer look at strategic planning in the 1980s and by the 1990s 
its use was widely emphasized in higher education as a rational tool for orderly, systematic 
school management (Dooris, 2002-2003). Strategic Plans are generally broad in scope taking into 
consideration the organization as a whole, its mission and long range vision for the next 3 to 5 
years as perceived by top management. In their descriptions of strategic planning, Schmidtlein 
(1981), Hartzell (2013), Werrell (2011), and many other planning professionals discuss the 
importance of scanning the external environment surrounding an organization and assessing the 
opportunities and threats existing there and how these factors may impact the long range vision 
and mission.  
In addition to scanning outside the organization, strategic planners look internally at 
organizational strengths and weaknesses for operating in their current environment and how 
these can be optimized to achieve desired goals and objectives. Strategic planners aim to create 
an image of the desired future and design ways to make the plan a reality (Tomey, 2004). 
Marquis et al., 2003, presented a 12 step list of what should be considered in a strategic plan.  
1. Analyze the organizations internal and external environment (SWOT analysis). 
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2. Assess the stakeholders. 
3. Define the purpose of the organization, its mission and vision. 
4. Clarify the values important to the organization. 
5. Set the organizations goals and objectives. 
6. Communicate the goals and objectives to constituents. 
7. Identify strategic pathways and set timelines for each task. 
8. Establish and allocate resources. 
9. Develop and communicate a marketing or business plan.  
10. Establish system for implementing and monitoring policies, procedures and rules.  
11. Establish a system for exchanging information and building consensus. 
12. Provide a mechanism for evaluation and change.  
Two major steps in strategic planning involve analyzing the internal and external 
environments of an organization using SWOT and PEST analyses. The acronym SWOT, 
referring to strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, is a useful analysis and decision 
making tool that an organization or business can use to develop a long range plan. It requires a 
critical inward look at an organizations strengths and weaknesses including its resources, assets, 
people, experience, knowledge, finances, culture, attitudes, and reputation. It also requires 
looking outward at opportunities and threats that could enhance or interfere with planning efforts 
and must be dealt with for successful implementation. In addition, it is often helpful when 
strategic planners conduct a PEST analysis looking at political, economic, sociological, and 
technological issues that can impact the plan externally or internally. The PEST analysis usually 
lays the groundwork for factors to consider and plan around during a SWOT analysis (Chapman, 
2012).  
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In the 1990s, critics of strategic planning questioned its usefulness long term and many 
found it too formal, outdated and counterproductive based upon its complexities and rigid 
structure (Dooris, 2002-2003). Current proponents of strategic planning find it most useful in 
avoiding surprises and providing an overall picture for setting management goals, overcoming 
problems, measuring performance and estimating budget needs within an organization 
(Fairholm, 2009).  
Long range strategic planning serves as the framework for two lower level planning types 
(tactical and operational) in considering the direction an organization wants to go and making 
plans to get there. According to Hartzell (2013), these lower stages of planning should involve 
each level within an organization so that everyone understands their significant role in the plan. 
At the tactical and operational levels, planners and strategic thinkers (leaders) can also use the 
organizations vision, mission, values and philosophy to break out department and unit priorities 
and to establish implementation timelines, policies, procedures, budgets and marketing strategies 
for enacting a plan (Tomey, 2004). The strategic plan is periodically revisited by strategic 
thinkers at all levels to evaluate how the organization or institution is doing, to see if they on the 
right path to achieve their goals and if changes or additional financing are needed to improve the 
strategic plan (Fairholm, 2009). 
  Second Level - Tactical Planning  
Tactical Planning has a moderate scope with a shorter but extended time frame 
supporting the strategic plan by translating it into smaller but more detailed programs and 
processes needed to achieve the mission and vision of the organization (Hartzell, 2013). While 
strategic planning helps organizations determine what they are trying to accomplish, tactical 
planning helps them determine how they are going to accomplish their goals. Strategic plans are 
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an organization’s guideline for setting actions to perform while tactical plans provide the details 
on how to implement those actions and determining who will be involved with the process. 
Managers use tactical plans to outline what each team in an organization must do in the short 
term (<1 year) to implement the strategic plan successfully (Olsen, 2012). Tactical planning is 
often done mid-year after a strategic plan is enacted affirming the current plan or redirecting 
portions of it for the coming year (Zubair, 2006). Tactical plans tend to focus on people and 
action, covering issues such as staff performance, adding resources or employees to a task and 
personnel development to enhance strategic plan implementation (Hartzell, 2013; Settar, 2006; 
Zubair, 2006). Group managers within the organization use tactical planning to outline what their 
various groups must do over the next year delegating specific responsibilities to supervisors for 
them to act upon to reach specific goals and objectives within their area of responsibility. 
Tactical plans are also concerned that each unit has the necessary infrastructure personnel and 
resources needed to support the overall program (Olsen, 2012).  
  Third level - Operational Planning  
Operational Planning has an even narrower focus than either strategic or tactical plans 
and is implemented over an even shorter time frame. (Hartzell, 2013; Settar, 2006). Sometime 
called “business plans,” they can be standing plans or single use plans initiated by middle 
managers and executed by front-line managers. Operational plans contain a high level of detail 
on individual roles and responsibilities and are designed to stand the test of time being modified 
as needed to meet changing circumstances. Operational or business plans often define the day-to-
day activities performed at the unit or department level that support the higher level strategic and 
tactical plans. Single use plans are designed to be used only once or a limited number of times to 
handle a very specific problem or event. Both standing and single use plans can be developed as 
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a policy, procedure or rule. Policy statements or guidelines aid managers or employees in 
understanding their responsibilities within an organization regarding performance, disciplinary 
actions or training. Procedures typically refer to step-by-step details for carrying out tasks such 
as ordering supplies, scheduling personnel or assessing problem situations. Rules provide 
employees with guidelines for behavior within an organization. Zubair (2006) and Travers 
(1992) define the seven steps in operational planning as follows: 
1. Setting objectives – determine what you wish to do. 
2. Setting priorities – distinguish between what is important and urgent. 
3. Stating assumptions – list your expectations. 
4. Reviewing any and all limitations – anticipate possible problems. 
5. Developing back-up plans – have a good plan and prepare for any possibilities. 
6. Implementing the plan – act decisively and set time limits. 
7. Setting up a control system to follow progress towards results, making corrections and 
establishing new objectives.   
  Fourth Level - Contingency Planning  
Contingency Planning provides organizations with alternative directions to take when a 
plan fails or unexpected events indicate that the initial course of actions will not work (Hartzell, 
2013; Settar, 2012). Following through with step 5 of an Operational Plan, Zubair (2006) notes 
that contingency planning can be reactive or proactive in doing what is necessary to manage 
problems that interfere with getting the work done. Adding that contingency planning is issue 
specific for determining optional policies or actions needed to resolve anticipated or 
unanticipated problems (Zubair, 2006).  
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Contingency plans, involve extra work for managers (strategic thinkers) but provide 
flexibility to an organization and can be invaluable when realizing the unexpected. Hartzell, 
(2013) compares a contingency plan to a skydivers reserve parachute in that “it is better to have 
it and not need it than to need it and not have it” (p.3). In summary, contingency plans can save 
an operational plan during a crisis; operational plans get the work done needed to attain tactical 
planning goals and tactical plans lead to the success of the greater strategic plan (Hartzell, 2013).  
The Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8) discussed earlier in this essay, helps illustrate 
the relationship between Strategic, Tactical and Operational Planning in emergency preparedness 
(Brown, 2012). If one imagines the National Preparedness Policy as a pyramid, the top of the 
pyramid is strategic planning represented by the main PPD-8 document, its Implementation Plan 
and the National Preparedness Goals. These three FEMA documents present the policy 
objectives (mission and vision), the goals to be reached and the overall guidance for achieving 
preparedness. In the middle section of the pyramid, tactical planning is represented by the 
National Planning Frameworks and the other managerial elements of the National Planning 
System. These management documents spell out the roles and responsibilities of the federal 
government along with those of their interagency partners as they begin to shape the operational 
plans where delegation of tasks or actions by the participants will be detailed and integrated. At 
the wide base of the pyramid is operational planning that would be beyond the scope of any 
PPD-8 policy but would involve local organizations. (At the level of operational planning, the 
National Planning Frameworks are used to translate the “vision” of the National Preparedness 
Goals into a more detailed set of directions for stakeholders on how to prepare for and implement 
the emergency plan)  (FEMA, 2010; Penn State, 2011).   
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 Transitioning from Planning Theory into Practice 
In 1984, philosopher and sociologist Jurgen Habermas wrote a landmark book entitled the 
Theory of Communicative Action, in which he provided the framework for a new planning theory 
that he claims emerges from the study of planning practice (Innes, 1995). According to 
Habermas (1984) communicative action re-constructs (emancipates) the concepts of reason and 
social or cultural understanding that are developed via the communication of human action, 
experience, and perceptions, rather than reliance on objective and rational knowledge. With 
regards to planning theory, Innes (1995) explains how communicative action closes the gap 
between theory and practice allowing planners to use the questions and puzzles arising from their 
study of practice to develop “real” solutions to “wicked” problems rather than trying to develop 
plans based on hypothetical information. Communicative action planners apply an intellectual 
lens to illuminate what they see in the community or the political arena and to actively 
communicate these needs in their planning practice (Innes, 1995). Not only is this method of 
planning more interesting to planners, it allows them to become more accessible, even embedded 
in the communities that they serve.    
In the 1970s, some American planners revived the Pragmatic Planning Theory that 
utilized philosopher John Dewey’s concept of human action to bridge the gap between doing 
good and being right (Hoch, 1984). In comparing Rational planning with Pragmatic planning, 
Hoch (2002) argues that while rationalists may offer objectivity and precision to plans, they do 
so sacrificing context and continuity. “A pragmatic outlook embraces context and seeks 
continuity among diverse viewpoints. It avoids the separation between analysis and action. The 
Rationalist asks, how can I be sure that my analysis is correct and certain? The Pragmatist asks, 
what must I know to cope with this problem” (p. 54)? 
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Healey (2009) also identified the important dimension of the pragmatic planning tradition 
in its common sense approach to social learning that draws upon the human ability to make 
practical judgments on learning and discovery through life experience and the expertise of others 
involved in the process. Hoch (1984) goes on to describe three common elements of pragmatic 
planning used in some way by all other planning theories in attempting to be right and do good. 
The first of these pragmatic concepts is problematic experience. A pragmatic person is 
sometimes willing to use whatever means possible to achieve a good end even if it involves 
doing something wrong or immoral. Pragmatic people learn the truth of things from the 
consequences of their actions whether justified or not. Justification must come from prior 
experience through which we learn what counts as a problem or a solution. The second 
pragmatic concept described by Hoch (1984) is experimental inquiry that involves testing plans 
of action to determine which plan works best and meet one’s needs. Through this 
experimentation one learns something about the plan and “knows” what is right and good. The 
third pragmatic concept discussed by Hoch (1984) involves democratic participation and 
pragmatic truth whereby a body of knowledge is rarely developed by individual inquiry. The 
more likely outcome, as Healey (2009) points out, is that knowledge and truth are more often 
socially learned via the intelligent and reflective transactions of a democratic process involving 
bargaining, negotiating and persuasive argument.  
Yet another model of planning, Progressive Planning occurs when a group of advocacy 
planners takes a more radical turn believing that a current American institution no longer meets 
the needs of the poor and a new arrangement is needed (Davidoff, 1965; Grabow and Heskins, 
1973). Progressive planners advocate public land ownership, promotion of industries to absorb 
more unemployed, and a bottom-up approach in planning process. This movement named 
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“progressive planning” established social justice, public participation, and planning legitimacy as 
their goals.  
The previous discussion of planning models illustrates how difficult the use of only one 
planning tradition or theory can be when addressing a problem, especially within a diverse 
university group, each having their own agenda, goals, budget restrictions, core beliefs and 
philosophies. One can appreciate how playing all five “strings” of the SITAR planning tradition 
and adopting parts of the modern planning traditions aimed at putting plans into practice can 
result in outcomes addressing multiple sides of the problem and greater satisfaction among 
affected parties. Zhang (2006) believes that planning theory will continue to evolve with societal 
innovations in a changing world and also with the changing demands of institutional 
arrangements planning to live in that world.  
 In summary, Hudson et al. (1979) pointed out that planning is not simply a technical or 
mathematical manipulation of objective data, skill set, procedure or institutional “knowledge”. 
Equally important are the moral, social and political philosophies of the planner, the sponsor and 
the constituency affected by the plan. The authors go on to state that in some instances it may be 
sufficient to assess the objective needs and to deliver solutions to the target community but in 
most cases, “it is necessary to understand the problems needing resolution through face-to-face 
interactions with those affected” (p.395). In these instances the planner must establish open 
communications between the planning team and the clients so there is mutual understanding of 
value choices, political sensitivities and other important viewpoints (Hudson, et al., 1979).  
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  Committee Organization, Learning, Change and Development  
This dissertation ultimately will attempt to address the complex problems posed by flu pandemic 
planning on a college campus and why it requires a special type of planning committee as well as 
a commitment far beyond the normal responsibilities of managers committed to watching over 
the needs of students, faculty and staff in a University system. The planning committee make-up, 
core competencies possessed by select members of the committee, organizational learning and a 
change strategy will be crucial to developing a successful plan.  
 Committee Organization 
Committee organization is generally a management function commonly used in planning 
development. Settar (2012) defines the management function as a process through which human 
skills and material resources are made available and effectively directed within a plan to 
accomplish the goals and objectives of an organization. He goes on to state how managing the 
committee requires the execution of supervisorial acts involving conceptual, technical, human 
and conjoined skills that are both the art and science of organizing people, providing them with 
resources, making necessary changes to beliefs or attitudes and working with them as a leader to 
assist the organization in achieving its goal.  
 Organizational Learning 
Organizational Learning is an important concept that plays a major role in developing successful 
planning committees, particularly in a university setting. Organizational learning, as defined by 
Argyris (1977), is a process by which institutions, individuals or committees, through their 
conceptual knowledge or learning about a subject, detect errors in practice or rapidly changing 
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conditions and develop solutions to correct the situation. In his view, organizations learn through 
the actions of individuals that are part of the organization. Huber (1991) constructs four 
components that are essential for organizational learning: 1) knowledge acquisition, 2) 
information distribution, 3) information interpretation and 4) organizational memory. He states 
that this learning does not have to be conscious or intentional and that it may not increase the 
learner’s effectiveness or change behavior immediately but, if the individual does learn 
something, the potential for change exists. Some confusion has been created by several authors 
who use the terms organizational learning and learning organizations (referring to a particular 
group) interchangeably (Steininger, 2010). Steininger (2010) goes on to provide a simple 
clarification that a learning organization is one that is good at organizational learning. Senge 
(1990) also defines a learning organization as group of people continually enhancing their ability 
to create what they want to create by having an ingrained philosophy for anticipating, reacting, 
and responding to change, complexity and uncertainty within the organization.  
Argyris and Schon (1978) and others have used a model describing three levels or 
“loops” of organizational learning. The first level is referred to as “single loop learning.” This 
occurs when individuals within a group detect errors and correct them without significantly 
altering the organization’s plans or practices. The second level, “double loop learning,” takes 
place when the organization recognizes that the errors are significant and they require major 
changes to the organizations underlying policies, goals and objectives along with their ways of 
thinking and doing business. The third level of organizational learning, called “deutero-
learning,” takes place when members of an organization, realizing that their current method of 
knowledge acquisition is insufficient, learn to improve their learning process (Steininger, 2010). 
Argyris and Schon (1978) suggest that deutero-learning often results in an organization 
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modifying their values, strategies and expectations. Despite several different approaches to 
organizational learning most authors can agree on the five shared principles listed below (Burns, 
2009).  
1. An organization’s survival depends on its ability to learn at the same pace or faster than 
changes in its environment. 
2. Learning must become a collective process relying on several key individuals within an 
organization.  
3. There must be a fundamental shift toward systems (or triple loop) thinking and learning 
within an organization.  
4. By adopting organizational learning, an institution acquires both the ability to adapt 
quickly to changing circumstances, and to quickly transform itself when necessary.  
5. Having the ability to transform itself an organization can adapt to, influence and even 
transform its environment. 
 Organizational Change 
Organizational Change: Early theories and observations about “change” in an organization 
focused on why a change occurred, what physically changed in the organization, how the change 
came about and the resultant outcomes of the change (Kezar, 2001). These theories often failed 
to capture the cultural and social perceptions behind the change or the thought process and 
values of the individuals behind the change. Many changes occur because leaders, change agents 
or others simply believed that a change was necessary. Kezar (2001) explains in detail the six 
main categories of change models and offers how reviewing these theories can assist in our 
understanding, describing and developing insights about the change process. Each model has a 
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distinct set of assumptions on why and when the change occurred, how the change process 
developed, how long the process took and what the outcomes were. 
The six organizational change theory categories as summarized by Kezar (2001) include: 
1. Evolutionary change – a response to an external environment, demand, circumstance or 
situational variable. The change occurs slowly over time in a rational, linear fashion as an 
organization attempts to adapt to the changing environment hopefully resulting in new 
plans, structures, clients or processes.  
2. Teleological change – also occur as the result of a rational, linear plan modeled by 
individual leaders inside the organization with a formal purpose to change an internal 
structure or environment also resulting in new structures and reorganized principles 
within the organization. Organizational Development, Strategic Planning and Re-
engineering processes fall into this change model.  
3. Life Cycle change – this change model focuses on the natural stages of growth, maturity 
and decline that usually occur within an organization or in individuals within that group. 
It is perceived as a natural and systematic progression resulting from training, motivation, 
behavior modification and institutional identity. This change strives to achieve a new 
organizational identity and improves employee social habits, attitudes and personal 
identity within the group.  
4. Dialectical change – a political model that characterizes change attributed to human 
interaction resulting in tension and clashes of ideology, values, norms or patterns of 
behavior. Change processes involve bargaining, raising awareness, persuasion, discipline, 
influence and power. A new organization ideology is the outcome goal. Collective 
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bargaining, empowerment, political organizations and Marxist theory are examples of 
this change model.  
5. Social cognition change – this model describes organizational change as being tied to 
common sense and other mental reasoning such as appropriateness or dissonance. The 
change process occurs as individuals see a need to grow mentally learning new ways of 
doing things or changing their behavior or way of thinking as they look through different 
lenses or use alternative thought paradigms.  
6. Cultural change – occurs slowly over a long time period as human environments are 
changed along with values, beliefs, myth and rituals within an organization. Changing an 
organizational culture is a non-linear and unpredictable process that if successful can 
result in an improved social culture within a group.  
Kezar (2001) concludes in this categorization of organization change theories that many 
of the assumptions from these models can coexist in other theories and that combining several 
theories may be necessary to better understand organizational change.     
 Organization Development within a University 
Kezar (2001) further describes the importance of understanding the nature of Higher Education 
as a key to successful organization development and change at a college or university. 
Overlooking the unique nature of university organizations may lead to using a planning concept 
and change strategy that is foreign to the institution. This in turn may lead to a failure to engage 
university leaders critical for accomplishing the goal or the bringing about a needed change. The 
following characteristics unique to university organizations must be considered when assembling 
a committee to accomplish an important task such as pandemic planning, especially if the task 
involves functioning outside normal university operations.  
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Thirteen characteristics of higher education institutions, as defined by Kezar (2001), 
describe these organizations as:  
1. Interdependent  
2. Relatively independent of their surroundings 
3. Having the unique culture of the academy 
4. Striving for Institutional status 
5. Values driven 
6. Multiple power and authority structures 
7. Loosely coupled system 
8. Organized, anarchical decision-making 
9. Professional and administrative values 
10. Shared governance 
11. Employee commitment and tenure 
12. Goal ambiguity 
13. Image and success 
Because of these distinctive organizational features, Kezar (2001) suggests that affecting 
change  within institutions of higher learning might best be accomplished by following the more 
cooperative, social, humanistic and values driven theories of cultural, social-cognition and 
dialectical change.  
Schein (2004) in another description of organizational development writes that effective 
groups or committees in any business need to have a shared organizational culture. At a 
university, this shared culture determines the criteria for leadership and establishes the rules and 
norms that determine group behavior. In a university setting, leaders must perceive and strive to 
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understand the functional and dysfunctional elements in the institutional culture. Very often, 
universities perform work and planning within the scope of committees. Managers work within 
these committees when trying to change the necessary elements to accomplish the task at hand. 
Effective committees at a University need the commitment of top administration and 
participation by unit managers with the authority to make things happen. 
 Organizing a University Emergency Planning Committee 
To assist university administrations in developing Emergency Planning Committees, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2012) and the Federal Emergency Management 
Administration (FEMA, 2013) included guidelines for committee development in their published 
recommendations for schools. The CDC and FEMA recommend that university pandemic flu 
committees in conjunction with the institution’s emergency management committee, like many 
other institutional planning groups, need the buy-in from the administration and ongoing 
cooperation of all department stakeholders at the school including; Student Affairs, Academic 
Affairs, Employee Relations, Housing, Food Service, Facilities Management, Student/Employee 
Health and Environmental Health and Safety.   
When organizing this multi-disciplinary committee, working groups should be 
established within the committees to begin detailed planning for student considerations, research 
continuity, academic considerations and administrative operations. The committee should also 
maintain liaison with local, state & federal or international agencies involved with pandemic 
planning, health care and other emergency management operations.  
Many universities, along with the communities in which they reside, have been involved 
with emergency planning for many years to address other events such as fires, floods, storms and 
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other natural or man-made disasters that affect the campus. Managing these kinds of 
emergencies, although somewhat different from a pandemic or campus health crisis, can provide 
a solid framework for pandemic flu planning.  Blanchard (2005) discusses a general framework 
of 10 competencies that all organizations, including universities and colleges, that are involved 
in emergency management planning should include to enhance program development. He 
considers it a mistake for an organization to appoint individuals to emergency management 
leadership positions who do not have a solid understanding of these competencies.  
1. Comprehensive Emergency Management Framework or Philosophy – A comprehensive 
emergency management plan takes an “all hazards” approach to planning developed by 
the FEMA that includes provisions for dealing with a broad range of hazards likely for 
that organization to encounter (weather, fires, violence, pandemics, etc.). These 
provisions and individuals should be adaptable to a variety of disaster scenarios during all 
phases of an incident response taking into consideration the hazard mitigation, prevention 
and readiness needs of each.   
2. Leadership and Team-Building – Building a good emergency management team and 
installing a competent leadership structure is critical for effective response in a crisis. 
Blanchard (2005) discusses the importance choosing a strong leader in an organization 
who can quickly establish a command presence along with demonstrating vision, 
compassion, flexibility, resolve and courage. These leaders must surround themselves 
with competent and enthusiastic team members who are able to think and act quickly and 
decisively to break down bureaucratic barriers for moving people and resources to where 
they are needed. Probably one of the hardest jobs of an emergency plan leader is to 
convince the administration how important it is to commit the time, money and resources 
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to developing a plan, ordering supplies, training people and conducting practice drills. 
Without this commitment, even the best paper plans will fail when the disaster hits.    
3. Management – No matter how good the Emergency Plan leader may be they will always 
need to have a good organization behind them to perform effectively. During a crisis, 
Blanchard (2005) reiterates the importance of strong group leaders, each competent in 
their area of responsibility and supported by a team of well trained and experienced staff 
drilled on their roles during a crisis. The members of this emergency management team 
may vary to some extent depending on the emergency response needed but a core team of 
all hazard planners consisting of key organization leaders should be maintained capable 
of coordinating and managing responders from both inside and outside an organization.  
4. Networking and Coordination – Within an organization, Blanchard (2005) admits that the 
designated Emergency leaders along with their core management team usually have other 
duties not involving emergency planning or response. This is true of most private and 
public organizations as well as federal, state and local governments and non-government 
organizations like the Red Cross or Salvation Army whose job (role) it is to provide 
assistance in crisis situations. Many of these organizations are used to dealing with minor 
emergency situations on a regular basis, having the staff and resources at hand for a quick 
response without outside help. However, the need for ongoing networking and 
coordination becomes apparent when a major crisis or widespread disaster occurs. So 
often in these situations the lines of communication become crossed and responsibilities 
are blurred leading to confusion, over-reaction, mismanagement and ill feelings during 
and after the fact. Blanchard (2005) recommends that all organization have provisions in 
their emergency plan to network with other agencies in their community and beyond 
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sharing their capabilities and resources that may be called upon in a crisis situation. This 
networking plan should include the names and contact information for groups or 
individuals that can be called upon when needed. Frequent contact with these individuals 
is recommended along with periodic joint disaster drills that should be planned so 
everyone knows their role when an emergency arises providing a reliable and coordinated 
response.    
5. Integrated Emergency Management – Effective emergency management, especially 
during a major disaster or wide spread crisis goes beyond the organization’s planning 
committee and public safety responders. Sometimes, as Blanchard (2005) states, an 
effective response and recovery plan requires the integration of other groups both inside 
and outside the organization. Companies or volunteer organizations involved with public 
works, utilities, transportation, housing, food service and medical care may be needed to 
deal with infrastructure breakdowns, equipment and supplies or large numbers of 
displaced persons. Also it may be necessary to call upon crisis management specialists to 
handle ongoing planning, mental health interventions, vaccine development and 
administration or relocation demands.  
6. Emergency Management Functions – Numerous functions are typically rolled into the 
emergency management plan and may change (increase or decrease) frequently due to an 
evolving crisis. Blanchard (2005) lists a number of critical functions that should become 
central to any organizations emergency plan. The first function involves completing a 
risk assessment to prioritize the hazards most likely to be encountered by an organization. 
The next step is to develop a comprehensive plan for dealing with the higher risk 
scenarios incorporating prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery plans 
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into the organizations emergency operations. A third step requires committing time, 
manpower and resources into training personnel and conducting emergency drills and 
table-top exercises to assess capabilities and identifying shortfalls. Next, every 
organization must establish a formalized command structure to clearly establish 
responsibilities, expectations and lines of communication. Based upon this organizational 
structure and function, a centralized command center should be established as a secure 
base of operations housing all of the emergency plans, alternate power supplies, 
computers, radios, back-up communication equipment and other infrastructure necessary 
to managing a crisis scenario for an extended period. Finally, emergency managers must 
keep current with emergency research and the lessons learned by other organizations 
experiencing a crisis as well as updates to federal, state and local emergency management 
programs.   
7. Political, Bureaucratic, Social Contexts – As with almost every aspect of life in the U.S. 
Emergency Managers and their organizations must deal with the political, bureaucratic 
and social aspects of emergency planning. Remembering the SITAR planning theory, 
every plan developed no matter how comprehensive and well-conceived will be open to 
criticism and perhaps to demands that key provisions be changed to make them more 
politically correct and socially acceptable to influential groups. Blanchard (2005) 
cautions that emergency planners must be sensitive to these issues, realizing that they 
may be required to operate under certain constraints understanding how some individuals 
or groups might react to disasters.    
8. Technical Systems and Standards – Organizations and individuals involved with 
emergency preparedness must become familiar with the language, key regulations, 
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federal documents and technologies that have become integral parts of emergency 
management. Some of the principle documents and legislation include; the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Plan (NRP) and the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1,600 “Standard for Disasters and 
Emergencies.” Various competency exams and certifications in emergency management 
are available to demonstrate proficiency in these areas. In addition, advances in computer 
software programs, geospatial technologies (GPS and GIS) and satellite communication 
systems are available to help emergency managers and planners keep track of resources 
and instantly communicate with responders or others during a crisis. Even advances in 
social media via cell phones and the Internet such as Facebook, Twitter and others can be 
used and has proven useful to communicate emergency messages, warnings and 
instructions to persons likely to be in harm’s way during a crisis.   
9. Social Vulnerability Reduction Approach – In almost every disaster scenario there is 
always a group of individuals considered to be the most vulnerable in a crisis. Advocacy 
and radical planners would tend to focus their efforts on assuring that the vulnerable 
groups are considered a priority. While most other planning theorists would not exclude 
these vulnerable groups from their planning efforts, many, especially the synoptic and 
incremental (technocratic) planners might focus more on assuring that greater numbers 
survive a disaster by making effective use of the resources for that purpose. Blanchard 
(2005) alludes to a technocratic “label” that is often given to emergency management 
instruction by academic programs based on their teaching responders to rely on the 
traditional governmental management of disasters. Many of the federal standards listed in 
No.8 above call for maximizing technological and engineering solutions to disasters 
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while reducing emergency risks that lean towards maximizing benefits often ignoring the 
more vulnerable populations.  
10. Experience – Blanchard (2005) expounds on FEMA’s three keys to emergency 
management as education, training and experience (preferably disaster experience). One 
fact that all emergency managers must learn is that the standard bureaucratic operating 
methods, taught in academic classes and FEMA courses, might not work in all disaster 
scenarios and that it is often necessary to operate outside of the normal business 
constraints to achieve better objectives in a disaster response. Learning alternative 
emergency response techniques usually happens through first-hand experience and 
several agencies including FEMA and the Red Cross are helping academic institutions to 
develop this experiential learning through internships, FEMA service learning, exercise 
participation and volunteer training by disaster response organizations. 
 Emergency Planning Framework (10 Principles) 
In their book on emergency planning, Perry and Lindell (2003), discuss how important it is for 
emergency planners in the U.S. and elsewhere to focus less on the plan as a written document 
and more on the planning process itself. While a written plan can serve as the basis for training 
programs and revising or expanding the plan to meet other needs, emergency planners should 
continually be involved in a process to 1) expect the unexpected, 2) plan for contingencies, 3) 
evaluate the University’s or Community’s ability to respond to various disaster scenarios and 4) 
consider the application of more than one organizational change theory or planning tradition to 
achieve a better plan. 
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Quarantelli (1982), along with Perry and Lindell (2003), developed a framework of 10 
principles to assure that organizations had guidelines to follow for maintaining an emergency 
planning process. The first principle states that the emergency planning process should be “based 
upon accurate knowledge of the threat and the likely human response” (p.340). This principle 
may be accomplished via a thorough hazard assessment and vulnerability analysis assuming that 
sufficient information and technology is available to establish a credible risk. Insufficient data 
and speculation can result in faulty predictions, over or underestimated hazard assessments and 
wasted resources. In estimating the human response during disasters, several myths should be 
dispelled (Perry and Lindell, 2003). Despite what is often perceived by the general public, the 
media and public officials, disaster victims usually act rationally once given information about 
the disaster. “As a familiar saying goes, the problem is not so much that people do not know 
what is true, but what they do ‘know’ is false” (Perry and Lindell, 2003, p.341). In an emergency 
situation, the majority victims do not flee in panic, wander aimlessly in shock, or comply 
docilely with instructions from first responders. In an emergency, victims or citizens will more 
likely make their own decisions on when and where to evacuate, how to seek assistance or when 
to provide help. Statistics show that after a disaster, panic and civil disobedience can often be 
controlled if people are given clear, trustworthy information by emergency personnel, officials or 
the media (Perry and Lindell, 2003).  
A second planning principle encourages quick, appropriate actions by emergency 
managers. Quarantelli (1982) argued that an appropriate response, based on valid information, 
was more crucial than an impulsive one done quickly. Perry and Lindell (2003) added that an 
accurate threat assessment is critical to assure an appropriate response and that the assessment 
should be initiated during the planning phase and continued throughout the disaster period. 
 54 
Rushing into a dangerous situation based on bad assumptions or incomplete information can 
result in an ineffective response at best, or worse, to serious injury and death of unprepared 
emergency crews. The discipline among emergency responders created by an effective planning 
process where the hazards and the response techniques are well known and practiced may save 
both lives and property (Perry and Lindell, 2003).   
The third principle for effective emergency planning states that it is impossible to cover 
every contingency given the dynamics situations created during an emergency. Planning instead 
should focus on the “principles of response” rather than trying to detail a specific response for 
every situation (Perry and Lindell, 2003). The planning process should emphasize flexibility 
among crews along with preparations and sufficient training to enable responders to adjust to 
changing conditions during an emergency or disaster. In addition to the difficulties of trying to 
address every contingency with an elaborate written plan, experience has shown that many 
details can become outdated quickly. Also, an overly detailed plan often is too complex and 
confusing to responders and difficult for managers to implement making it an unreliable plan in 
an emergency and difficult to use for training exercises. 
Given the facts that an emergency situation or disaster may involve multiple outside 
agencies including law enforcement, hospitals, public health departments, the military, the Red 
Cross and other emergency managers, the fourth planning principle calls for the plan to address 
inter-organizational coordination (Perry and Lindell, 2003). Ideally, all of the participating 
organizations will know their roles and will work together so that each can successfully complete 
their responsibilities during an emergency. This coordination among responding organizations 
will more likely function well if each group is aware of each other’s mission, structures, 
capabilities and limitations that have been vetted during the planning process and enhanced via 
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joint training exercises. During the crisis situation it is important that the plan has clearly 
established the chain of command and that the incident commander knows who is on scene and 
has good lines of communication with each group to effectively allocate their skills and 
resources where most needed.  
The fifth emergency planning principle presented by Perry and Lindell (2003) details the 
importance of integrating all single hazard plans likely to impact a community or organization 
into a multi-hazard plan better enabling comprehensive plan management. Quarantelli (1992) 
describes how the same emergency response functions can be utilized in many different 
emergency scenarios and by consolidating these functions into a multi-hazard plan can simplify 
training, eliminate redundancy and reduce costs.  
The sixth disaster planning principle describes the importance of every emergency plan 
having a training component. Because of the many different individuals and organizations that 
may be involved in a planning process either directly or indirectly, it is critical that provisions of 
the plan be explained to everyone involved in the response (Perry and Lindell, 2003). In addition 
to administrators and employees of response organizations participating in training exercises, it 
will be necessary to share planning provisions with elected officials, the business community as 
well as private citizens explaining what might be expected of them in an emergency. This public 
notification is especially critical to educate non-responders to inform them of anticipated risks or 
safeguards that they can take when preparing for an emergency such as stocking supplies, 
sheltering in place or evacuation details.   
The seventh planning principle calls for frequent emergency drills and exercises to enable 
plan managers to critically evaluate response operations for various types of disasters (Perry and 
Lindell, 2003). These disaster response examinations also bring each of the agencies and teams 
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together to test their capabilities, efficiencies, personnel, equipment and procedures. The drills 
also provides an opportunity for these groups and individuals to become familiar with each other, 
perhaps establishing lasting personal or professional relationships that may enhance their 
emergency response capabilities.  
The eighth emergency planning principle proposed by Perry and Lindell (2003) stresses 
that this process be a continuing effort. No planning process can be static as situations are always 
changing and it becomes critical to address the changes in every emergency planning effort. 
Planning is never complete as threats change, equipment improves, personnel move on, 
organizations change, available funding disappears and lines of authority are moved. While 
planning does involve written documentation and threat probabilities, procedural checklists 
resource lists, agreements and records need to be defined, the plan always need to be more than a 
paper document on a shelf. Perry and Lindell (2003) describe elements of the emergency 
planning process that are difficult to put into writing such as, developing first-hand knowledge 
and experience, knowing the available resources of government and private experts, honing skills 
for anticipating demands and matching them to available resources, establishing workable links 
across organizational gaps and having the people skills to resolve personnel conflicts and getting 
people to work together. Treating the written plan as an unyielding end product risks creating the 
illusion of being prepared for any emergency when that may not the case (Quarantelli, 1977). 
The ninth principle for emergency planning cautions that it is almost always conducted in 
the face of conflict and resistance (Quarantelli, 1982). Many politicians and citizens avoid 
thinking about the negative consequences of disasters hence they often remain badly unprepared. 
Politicians and some organization officials are prone to state that preparing for an unforeseen 
event consumes precious resources that prevent improvements to areas that they perceive as 
 57 
more important to the organization or community (Perry and Lindell, 2003). Unfortunately, most 
of these politicians or managers control the purse strings and emergency managers trying to free-
up money to complete a planning process or training exercises are in for a struggle.  
Finally the tenth principle for emergency planning proposed by Quarantelli (1985) and 
others states that the emergency plan should recognize that planning and management are two 
separate functions and that the true test of a plan will occur when it is activated during an 
emergency. Quarantelli (1985) goes on to state that planning reviews and revisions are crucial to 
preparedness requiring planners to continually; 
1. Identify the hazards most likely to impact the community. 
2. Evaluate the seriousness and probability of these impacts. 
3. Define the geographical area or population at greatest risk. 
4. Identify the demands that a disaster would have on emergency responders and  
5. Estimate the resources (personnel, facilities, equipment and materials) required by the 
organization during the emergency.  
Management of an emergency, by contrast, involves performance during the event as 
measured by how well implementing the emergency plan has provided the corrective, protective, 
response and recovery actions demanded by the emergency (Perry and Lindell, 2003). These 
afore mentioned authors go on to state that having a written plan does not assure preparedness, 
but that by going through the planning process, an institution can begin to realize where the main 
threats lie and how to effectively organize the knowledge, guidelines and resources that can be 
used to prepare for and manage an emergency response to a variety of crises.    
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  Pandemic Planning Guidelines for Colleges and Universities 
Over the decades, comprehensive (Synoptic) pandemic influenza plans have been established by 
many governmental or health management organizations at the international, federal, state and 
local levels (IOM, 2008; WHO, 2009; CDC, 2010; DHS, 2006; PA DOH, 2013; ACHD, 2002; 
UPMC, 2006). Each year the Institute of Medicine (IOM), The World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) hold discussions about the 
coming influenza season (IOM, 2008). Based on these discussions and the forthcoming 
recommendations, state and local health departments, medical institutions and other 
organizations rework their influenza plans. Details of the planning include the specific design 
and availability of this year’s seasonal flu vaccine, mandates for hospital staff immunizations, 
the management of significant staff illness and how to avoid the deaths from seasonal flu of 
between 20,000 and 40,000 people nationwide resulting in billions of dollars of lost productivity. 
Also included in these discussions are the possibilities of a pandemic influenza, which have 
occurred every 10 to 50 years since the 1890s resulting in even greater losses of life and 
enormous costs (IOM, 2008).  
Influenza season in the northern hemisphere typically runs from November to May. Two 
groups of flu viruses (designated A and B) are responsible for causing seasonal flu infections in 
humans. All pandemic influenzas to date have been caused by Type A viruses. All flu viruses 
consist of only eight genes, two of which make the antigenic proteins on the surface of the virus 
(Kaplan, 2015). Influenza A viruses are further broken down into subtypes based on the number 
of antigenic proteins hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) present on the virus’s surface. 
The H protein allows the virus to attach itself to the cell membrane and enter the cell where it 
goes on to replicate. The N protein allows the replicated viruses to break out of the host cell 
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spreading to other cells. Currently there are 18 different hemagglutinin and 11 different 
neuraminidase viral subtypes (Kaplan, 2015). The predominant flu virus subtypes that have 
recently sickened humans are influenza A (H1N1) and Influenza A (H3N2) (Minnesota DOH, 
2011).  
Influenza viruses like many microorganisms frequently undergo slight mutations forming 
novel subtypes that can infect humans as well as birds and other animals. This can occur rapidly 
when the influenza viral proteins realign by a process known as antigenic drift creating a 
completely different strain of flu virus. When these mutations occur, manufactured vaccines for 
that flu season are rendered ineffective, opening the door for a serious seasonal flu epidemic or 
even a worldwide pandemic (Minnesota DOH, 2011). 
In 2003, the seeds for an influenza pandemic were planted when a highly pathogenic 
avian flu virus (H5N1) from Asia began infecting poultry and pigs and killing numerous people 
processing these animals. (Barnett and Balicer et al. 2005). Migratory birds were also found to be 
spreading this same virus throughout Europe and Asia elevating the risks of even more protein 
re-assortment possibly setting the stage for another swine flu pandemic (H1N1) that occurred in 
2009 (Kaplan 2015).  
Since then, the avian flu virus H5N1 has been joined by several newly detected bird flu 
strains (H5N2, H5N3, H5N6 and H5N8) presently spreading around the globe (IB Times, 2015). 
In 2013, doctors in China discovered yet another new strain of avian flu (H7N9), which has 
killed more than 30% of the people it infected. As this strain has recently been confirmed of also 
infecting people in Malaysia and Canada, scientists believe this avian virus has great potential to 
cause the next influenza pandemic. (Kaplan, 2015).   
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In 2006, The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed a landmark 78 page 
document entitled “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response and Recovery” as part of the US 
Government’s national pandemic preparedness strategy. It was a comprehensive guide to 
identifying critical infrastructure and key resources to aid communities and businesses in 
developing their pandemic contingency plans and preparedness actions (DHS, 2006). This 
guideline assembled many primary national and international flu references and other 
background information into one document with the hopes of stimulating the private sector 
business community to develop their plans for influenza preparedness, response and recovery. 
The document also tabulated the WHO pandemic flu phases alongside the U.S. Federal Response 
Stages to compare the recommended response actions to be taken during each phase of a 
pandemic outbreak (DHS, 2006).  
Given their assessment in 2005 that 85% of critical infrastructure resources are controlled 
by the private sector and realizing that few business contingency plans had identified pandemic 
flu as one of their major concerns, the U.S. Government realized the need to alert the business 
sector about the extreme health impact and the inadequacies of their current emergency plans 
(DHS, 2006). In this pandemic influenza guidance document, the business community was 
informed of their roles and responsibilities during the flu outbreak and told how important it was 
to protect critical infrastructure, key personnel and resources essential for maintaining priority 
services for themselves as well as their community partners. Private sector planning must be well 
coordinated and critical information shared with both private and public entities throughout the 
community if they expect to achieve a good outcome during an influenza pandemic (DHS, 
2006).  
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Another, comprehensive (synoptic) pandemic influenza response plan was formalized 
into law by Congressional passage of an updated Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 
Reauthorization Act (PAHPA) of 2013. As discussed earlier, the goals of the PAHPA were to 
further streamline the federal public health response, to hold states and local agencies 
accountable for their performance, to facilitate volunteerism, and to ensure the expedient 
deployment of medical countermeasures where needed (Hodge et al, 2007). According to Hodge 
et al. (2007), critics of the Act contended that it lacked specifics on how these goals were to be 
met and provided few incentives for state and local agencies to commit resources for improving 
their public health emergency preparedness.  
Since 2003, many colleges and universities have utilized portions of these synoptic 
(comprehensive) government designed influenza plans in concert with their own planning 
traditions to address specific goals, policies, traditions, values, sensitivities and budgets of the 
academic community (Pitt, 2007; CSU, 2009; Ithaca, 2009). As previously mentioned by Dooris 
(2002-2003), comprehensive strategic planning became popular on university campuses during 
the late 1980s into the 1990s. Since that time, university administrators have realized that “what 
comes up is as important as what is planned,” especially regarding emergencies, and that links to 
multiple levels of planning may be necessary (Schmidtlein, 2001, p.418). With this idea came the 
realization that strategic planning, focused on the overall mission and vision of the university, 
may be too long range and complex to meet the goals, objectives and flexibility of undefinable 
emergency and pandemic influenza plans. Given the unpredictability of pandemic influenza and 
the fluidity of responses required, a blend of tactical, operational and contingency planning may 
be better suited to fill the rapidly changing needs of a pandemic threat.  
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In keeping with the goals of strategic planning, Pirtea, Nicolescu and Botoc (2009), in 
their article on that subject, point out that higher level planning can highlight an organization’s 
unique strengths and weaknesses “enabling it to pinpoint new opportunities or the causes of 
current or projected problems” (p.956). Recognizing that tactical, operational or contingency 
plans driven by the long-range perspective of strategic planning and utilizing the tactics of 
internal and external scans plus SWOT analyses focused on the school’s ability to respond to a 
pandemic emergency as being invaluable (Pirtea, et al., 2009). It would be shortsighted for any 
college or university not to take a close look at the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats both within the school itself and in the surrounding community when making their plans 
for dealing with a pandemic flu emergency (Zubair, 2006). The CDC’s (2006) pandemic flu 
checklist for colleges and universities identifies several SWOT issues to consider when planning: 
1. The availability of on campus medical facilities and staff  
2. The expertise and dependability of key stakeholders expected to execute the plan 
3. The logistics of promoting and administering flu vaccinations 
4. Stockpiling quantities of non-perishable foods and other needed supplies 
5. Budgeting and financing for a pandemic influenza outbreak 
6. Responding to outside pressures brought by government authorities   
7. The adequacy of facilities to house, feed and care for sick students and staff 
8. Maintaining adequate staffing to operate the university and care for sick students 
9. Deciding when to shut down university operations 
10. Contingency plans for research involving animal housing and care 
Another key point that all colleges and universities must consider in their pandemic 
influenza planning is how to link the plan to their budget. Schmidtlein (2001) relates that 
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different levels of planning have differing budget implications. Given the unknowns surrounding 
pandemic flu planning, this issue has proven difficult for some academic institutions particularly 
at the strategic levels of plan management. Budgeting becomes easier at the operational level of 
the plan where short range objectives are established and prioritized. Once the short term 
objectives have been set and the goods and services needed for each department or program 
determined, including some contingency funds, the budgeted resources can be estimated and the 
source of revenue determined. As with any budgeting process some of the plan’s stakeholders 
will not be satisfied with their allotted funds requiring the plan managers to negotiate and 
reconcile competing claims with the available resources (Schmidtlein, 2001). 
In 2005 the World Health Organization (WHO) developed a global influenza 
preparedness plan from which most state and local health department along with many colleges 
and universities as well as businesses and health systems utilized in their plans (MacKellar, 
2007; WHO, 2005). The WHO Plan divided the influenza cycle into three periods and six phases 
as follows (MacKellar, 2007, p. 433, Colorado State, 2007).  
1. The Inter-Pandemic Period 
i. Phase 1 - Animal cases somewhere in the world but low risk of human cases 
ii. Phase 2 – More animal flu with higher risk of human cases  
2. Pandemic Alert Period 
i. Phase 3 – Animal to human flu cases but limited human to human transmission  
ii. Phase 4 – Evidence of increased human to human transmission  
iii. Phase 5 – Significant human to human flu transmission  
3. Pandemic Period 
i. Phase 6 – Efficient and sustained human to human flu transmission.  
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The first test of many U.S. pandemic flu plans occurred in March, 2009 when the CDC 
and WHO declared a flu emergency in Mexico (CDC, 2010). During the 2009 flu pandemic, 
implementation of influenza preparedness plans at many colleges and universities identified a 
number of shortcomings that could seriously impact a plan’s effectiveness (CDC, 2012). Factors 
that the CDC stated must be considered during future flu pandemics at a college or university 
included:  
1. Infection rates among college students living in dorms and attending crowded classes 
approaching 40% will seriously affect student housing, food preparation and other school 
operations. 
2. Virulence rates and duration will be unpredictable but, with this H1N1 flu strain, young 
adults age 16-24 are expected to be in one of the higher risk groups.  
4. Plans for communicating flu risk to faculty, staff and students around the U.S. will range 
from non-existent to over reactive leading to panic, uncertainty, apathy, mistrust, 
perceptions of incompetence waste, and a lack of empathy. 
5. Frequent false alarms with mild flu outbreaks will lessen the impact of warnings and the 
call for protective measures when the “real” pandemic hits.  
6. Protective masks, gowns and hand sanitizers were in short supply at some schools in 
2009 and now unused stockpiles are likely to deteriorate in storage.  
7. Infected students and others who begin shedding the flu virus two days before they begin 
showing symptoms will increase flu spread and make relocation or isolation plans 
ineffective. 
8. Flu vaccines and anti-virals, initially in short supply in 2009 and stockpiles of future 
vaccines could prove ineffective depending on the next flu strain and its likely mutations. 
 65 
9. Students, faculty and staff will continue to be reluctant to receive vaccinations fearing 
side effects or negligent in their responsibility and willing to take the risk of getting sick.  
10. CDC recommendations for “social distancing” and quarantine of infected persons may 
not be followed consistently or effectively when the next flu hits. 
11. Absenteeism of faculty and staff due to illness, care of family members or fear of being 
exposed to sick students will threaten to close institutions or seriously impede school 
operations. 
12. While some faculty, staff and administrators may not be essential, especially if school 
operations are suspended, Key personnel, such as healthcare employees along with 
service workers and security personnel may be critical to care for sick students and others 
not able to return to their homes after the pandemic hit. These personnel will be relied 
upon to implement the school’s Pandemic Plan and carry out key functions of the 
university. 
“Being ready for an influenza pandemic requires “having the necessary resources to 
minimize morbidity and mortality” (IOM, 2008, p. 171). The IOM (2008) suggests that the use 
of personal protective equipment (PPE), including the development of a next generation of 
comfortable and serviceable PPE, be advanced so that workers “will feel secure enough to come 
to work, work effectively, and return to their loved ones during an influenza pandemic” (IOM, 
2008, p. x).  
Addressing the need for a pandemic plan and preparing for the unknown the IOM further 
recommends a coordinated planning approach that incorporates local, national and international 
thinking to fill the numerous gaps in preparing for pandemic influenza including local healthcare 
team development, coordination of federal and state efforts and a renewed commitment to better 
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network international research on the transmission and prevention of pandemic influenza (IOM, 
2008).   
Several more lessons were learned from the 2009 Pandemic Flu Outbreak (Low & 
McGeer, 2010). 
1. While the death toll from the HINI pandemic flu was no higher than a typical seasonal 
flu, the years of life lost were higher because of the young age of the victims.  
2. This communication of risk to the public was not emphasized or widely accepted. 
3. The development and production of flu vaccine was slower than projected.  
4. When there was an adequate supply of vaccine available, miscommunication about its 
safety and the waning risk factors slowed its distribution and administration. 
5. Most of the flu vaccine produced went unused resulting in a waste of money.  
6. Flu planning efforts at all levels must focus on learning to deliver a consistent, truthful 
and believable assessment of risk to affected populations.   
Organizations worldwide, particularly colleges and universities must learn from these 
lessons and modify their emergency plans accordingly to prepare for the next pandemic 
that is coming.  
 University Business Continuity during a Flu Pandemic 
No discussion of emergency planning, pandemic influenza planning or planning practice in 
general would be complete without mention of business continuity, i.e. maintaining the critical 
operations of an institution during times of trouble. Not only is business continuity important 
during a flu pandemic on a university campus but many aspects of a continuity plan would be 
essential the same for all businesses or institution during many kinds of emergencies and 
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disasters, natural or man-made. On a college campus, fires, floods, winter storms, explosions, 
shootings or the threat of an infectious disease can be equally devastating, requiring the 
shutdown of buildings, key utilities, and disruption of class activities or communications and 
essential services making it necessary to partially or completely close down university 
operations.  
Comprehensive coverage of business continuity on a college campus is very complex and 
would require a dissertation of its own, which is not the intention of this document. But failing to 
mention it at all as part of university emergency preparedness discussion would be equally 
unacceptable, so critical aspects of maintaining business continuity during a pandemic flu on 
campus should be included.  
As discussed by CIDRAP in 2009, maintaining the operation of a college or university 
during a flu pandemic will require the combined efforts of most members of the emergency 
planning committee, especially representatives from, human resources, legal services, facilities 
management, safety and security, faculty and research compliance to address the following 
issues. 
1. Setting HR policies to minimizing unauthorized absenteeism while separating sick and 
healthy employees.  
2. Maintaining safe and clean housing and adequate food services for students and essential 
personnel remaining on campus. 
3. Providing medical screening, training, protective equipment and infection control 
supplies and treatments to students and employees as need.  
4. Establishing and enforce policies on social distancing, quarantine, medical screening, 
travel and communication with the media.  
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5. Deciding when it is time to send healthy students home before the first wave of flu hits. 
6. Arranging with faculty and IT personnel to expand off campus learning capacity and 
establish rules for attendance, class participation, exams and grades.   
7. Cross training employees to provide ongoing coverage of essential jobs and services.  
8. Maintaining open lines of communications between public health officials, community 
partners, medical personnel, employees, faculty, students and their families. 
9. Setting activation triggers to close child care facilities, shut down campus buildings, 
suspend classes, stop research activities, postpone athletic events and cancel social 
gatherings as the pandemic wave accelerates.  
Unlike many other campus emergencies due to natural disasters, human resource 
departments will have some of the more difficult personnel tasks surrounding a pandemic 
flu on campus.  
  Working Model for a University Pandemic Preparedness Plan  
This “Pandemic Preparedness Plan” was initially developed in 2007 as an appendix to the 
“University’s Emergency Response Guidelines.” The University’s plan was based on a 2006 
DHS/CDC pandemic flu planning checklist for colleges and universities, which has been updated 
each year to address changing needs at the school, evolving CDC recommendations and the 
latest worldwide pandemic threat assessments. The initial working group, under the guidance of 
the Executive Vice Chancellor and supervised by the Director of Environmental Health and 
Safety (EH&S), was tasked to develop a pandemic flu plan that was broad enough in scope that it 
could also be used for any infectious disease outbreak on campus. The multi-disciplined 
Pandemic Workgroup, consisting of stakeholders at the University and beyond, was divided into 
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four subgroups to closely examine and develop key segments of the plan dealing with 1.) Student 
Preparedness, 2.) Research Continuity, 3.) Academic Considerations and 4.)Administrative 
Operations.  
Each workgroup was asked to identify “triggers” that would initiate various responses of 
the plan in their segment of responsibility. Realizing the likelihood that clearly defined triggers 
may not be apparent in all flu outbreaks, a continuum of increasing response decisions (stages) 
was established that could be invoked dependent on several factors including; 
1. Government advisories or travel restrictions 
2. Disease outbreak near a University campus 
3. Disease severity 
4. Death or morbidity rates 
5. Response by the public  
6. Degree of social unrest 
7. Timing within the academic calendar  
8. Peer institution reactions and positioning 
9. Response or reaction of local institutions.  
 Each trigger could evoke a dynamic response by the committee as needed by the 
circumstances. The University Pandemic Preparedness Plan identifies five Response Levels (A 
through E) based on the six WHO Phases and Federal Government Response Stages as defined 
by the Department of Homeland Security (2006) and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (2014). The pandemic flu response levels and actions include:  
A. Planning Level; anticipation that a pandemic flu outbreak is possible will prompt; 
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• Updates to emergency contact information for students, staff, faculty and their 
families. 
• Continual tracking of WHO and CDC influenza surveillance activities. 
• Opening discussions with Working Groups on a flu plan review. 
• Considering options for an enhanced flu vaccination program.  
• Updating portions of the University’s Emergency Plan as needed. 
• Consideration of table-top exercise to test flu preparedness on campus.  
B. High Alert Level; confirmed cases of human to human pandemic flu transmission 
anywhere in the world may initiate;  
• Updating the University website linking the University to influenza experts at 
WHO, CDC, the county or state health department and the local medical center 
(s). .  
• Focused attention to government directives, travel advisories and reports on flu 
severity to include identifying faculty, staff or students traveling on University 
business. This alert may also call for travel restrictions, alerting individuals to the 
concerns and screening or quarantine of individuals prior to returning to campus.  
• Fortifying lines of communication between students, parents, staff and faculty to 
include website updates, print, e-mail, cell phone alerts, posters and select social 
media sites with a telephone hotline to include options for parents locating 
students, academic schedules, travel restrictions and health advisories.  
• Reviewing the “Preparedness Guide for Researchers” questionnaires that were 
completed by PIs or Lab Managers to analyze their research activities and 
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determining the requirements that may arise during a pandemic needing 
departmental attention to maintain research continuity as much as possible.  
• Preparing periodic responses to address media questions on preparedness.  
C. Full Alert Level; Heightened fears over confirmed reports of pandemic flu transmission 
spreading locally between humans within driving distance of any University campus will 
initiate; 
• Social distancing considerations to reduce the spread of illness that may involve 
cancelling extracurricular activities and the temporary suspension of lectures and 
classroom sessions.  
• Efforts to reduce the demand for on campus housing, food service and medical 
care will be made. Those living off campus will be encouraged to shelter in place 
avoiding crowds and leaving apartments unnecessarily.   
• Encouragement of local students to return home if possible, maintaining 
coursework activities via distance learning where practical. Alternative plans for 
well students unable to return home may require special dormitory isolation or 
relocation to off campus homes of friends or relatives.  
• Efforts to care for out of state or foreign students living in campus housing will be 
made with minimal food and housekeeping services provided. If possible, 
accommodations will be made to allow parents to retrieve their students from 
campus by methods similar to the “arrival survival” process, a coordinated effort 
that takes place during student move-in/move-out days.  
• Modification of absenteeism policies during this period anticipating staff and 
faculty absenteeism between 10 and 25%. Essential personnel have been 
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identified and these individuals will be expected to work if at all possible. Any 
University employees showing sign of flu-like illness will be asked to leave 
campus and not permitted to return without a medical clearance.  
• Modification of academic policies by the Chancellor, Provost, Deans, and others 
taking into consideration the point in the academic year when the social 
distancing mandate was enacted, scheduling of classes, student matriculations, 
available distance learning technologies, tuition reimbursement and the ability to 
disseminate information to students.  
• Activation of the emergency command center for University Officials at a secure 
pre-established facility to enable enhanced communications with faculty, staff, 
students and parents via the University’s emergency notification service and home 
page. In addition, activation of the command center will permit better 
coordination with local, state and federal officials responsible for implementing 
community wide response and recovery efforts during a pandemic emergency.  
• A decision to officially suspend classes will be made by the Chancellor, Provost 
and regional campus presidents when the risk of contagion is deemed 
unacceptable or when student or faculty and staff absenteeism reach levels that no 
longer support academic endeavors. Even if classes are cancelled, faculty may be 
expected to continue teaching and research activity to the extent possible per 
University policies. Class credit and grades may be decided by individual faculty 
members and their deans or department chairs depending whether classroom 
assignments can be satisfactorily completed by alternate means.  
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• Students who become sick or are affected academically by the suspension of 
classes will be given multiple opportunities to complete their course work via 
distance learning or on line programs. Students choosing not to continue with 
classes in this fashion can withdraw from the class and be reimbursed or take a G 
grade that allows them to complete the class in the future. Other options for 
students exist and can be discussed at the department level given these 
circumstances.  
• Faculty or staff who become ill or take off to care for a sick family member must 
comply with defined University sick leave or family medical leave policies.     
• Some academic and business operations such as distance learning and study 
abroad programs may be unaffected by the pandemic allowing these efforts to 
proceed normally.  
D. Pandemic Period; when pandemic influenza or another illness is efficiently spreading at 
the University or in nearby communities this response level will include provisions for; 
• Suspension of University operations to the minimal levels required to maintain 
security, to support students remaining on campus, to sustain research projects 
and to protect buildings or critical infrastructure.  
• Departmental planning to perform minimal operations with 40% or less staffing 
for a period of 6-12 weeks to sustain minimal operations. Additional absenteeism 
can be assumed due to illness at home and fears of 5% mortality from not 
practicing social distancing on the commute to work.  
• Maintaining research continuity while seeking extensions of grant funding and 
agency reporting requirements due to unavoidable disruptions related to the 
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pandemic. Specific issues such as controlling critical environments, regular 
monitoring of research subjects and caring for research animals are critical to 
maintaining research continuity. The University will endeavor to establish criteria 
for allowing some levels of research to continue during the suspension of 
operations as defined in this plan. These issues will be clarified with University 
officials and the grant agency. 
• Maintaining and securing University building throughout a pandemic period will 
fall to Facilities Maintenance, Public Safety, Housing and Property Management 
personnel deemed essential staff. Heating, cooling, water supplies, computer 
networks, communications and emergency systems and sanitary facilities for 
faculty, staff and students remaining on campus along with research animals are 
considered essential functions needing to be maintained in working order and 
secure.  
E. Management of Flu Cases on Campus includes the following provisions; 
• Faculty, staff and students who become ill should utilize their individual health 
care plans if possible going home and staying isolated until they are no longer 
infectious.  
• If there are sick students in campus dormitories who are unable to return home 
during this period and local medical facilities are unwilling to accept them, the 
University will relocate them to small residential facility where they will be 
isolated and cared for by Student Health Services personnel along with support 
from Housing, the University Police and Environmental Health and Safety.  
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• Students living outside of university residence halls will be referred to the city, 
county or state health department for case management. Visitors to the University 
campus who become ill and can’t return home, will be referred to the local health 
care network for treatment and case management.   
• If the number of students diagnosed with the flu exceeds 20, the university is 
prepared to utilize a larger dormitory to isolate and quarantine sick students. This 
facility should have the capabilities to provide food services, security and housing 
for several hundred individuals who can be isolated in separate areas of the 
building depending on their degree of illness. This residence hall should be close 
to medical facilities to enable critical treatment of seriously ill students. 
• Student health care, housing, food services, security, etc. will be provided as 
necessary at this isolation dormitory. Food services should be able to provide an 8 
week supply of food, water and disposable supplies as needed during this period. 
• The local medical center nearest to campus and many other community 
organizations have entered into an agreement with the University to provide 
mutual aid during an influenza pandemic. This agreement would allow the 
community surrounding the University to utilize the designated campus buildings 
as an overflow triage facility for the hospital. Large gymnasium or dormitory 
facilities should also be considered as a place for rest, shelter, food and showering 
for university, city or hospital staff and volunteers involved with the pandemic 
emergency. In addition, other university facilities can be identified as possible 
sites to care for recovering flu victims from the city or regional area.   
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• The local or state health department has coordinated with the University to 
organize and train volunteers to assist in a number of ways during an influenza 
pandemic. A point of distribution for health department services, medications and 
vaccines for the local area near the University should be designated. 
In reviewing this model plan and taking into consideration all that has been discussed 
concerning planning at the organizational level, it can be can be concluded that any well-
developed pandemic flu plan for a university, especially one that is part of a larger urban 
community, should draw on the planning theory or combination of theories that best enables the 
university to put theory into practice. The Pandemic Plan should be based on a rational analysis 
of the facts and science provided by federal, state and local authorities along with knowledge 
learned from past experience having the flexibility and motivation to quickly resolve problems 
both practical and emotional unique to a college campus. The University’s Pandemic Flu 
Program should be developed and practiced to an operational level containing the details 
necessary to activate the plan based upon the federal Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 
Act framework. It should be written in a style that also borrows and incorporates effective 
sections from applicable city, state or county operational and tactical plans adding its own 
contingency planning elements throughout to meet the changing needs at the university or in the 
surrounding community (University of Pittsburgh, 2009).  
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 METHODOLOGY  
  INTRODUCTION 
The topics discussed in the literature review for this dissertation center on the importance of 
emergency planning at colleges and universities in the event of a pandemic influenza. The 
review begins with the history of planning, modern planning theory and the evolution of the 
SITAR framework which blends multiple planning philosophies into a single plan perhaps best 
suited to the organizational culture at institutions of higher learning. The literature review also 
discusses the uniqueness of college and university committees especially in the way they 
develop, evolve, learn and accept change based on the organizational culture at that institution. 
(Schein, 2004; Kezar, 2001) Currently there are few published comparative studies on the state 
of pandemic flu preparedness at universities and this study will contribute to the body of 
knowledge in this subject area. 
Connecting planning and organizational theory to the real world practice of pandemic 
influenza planning at a university is a goal of this dissertation that I hope to achieve in answering 
my research questions. In reality, making this connection may not be as difficult as one first 
imagines if the numerous planning challenges are broken down into smaller tasks each addressed 
by a cooperative “team” of individuals experienced in problem solving at their institution. 
Hudson (1979) writes of two abiding planning principles enabling committee members to “sell” 
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their ideas for purposeful action as mainly those of labeling and packaging. Drawing in and 
blending the diversity (sometimes conflicting, sometimes complimentary) offered by Hudson’s 
SITAR planning traditions can be beneficial to a university committee seeking to compromise 
individual or departmental differences on budgets constraints, social sensitivities, philosophies, 
language, accountabilities and traditions. “Fuller possibilities can be created by the use of each 
theory in conjunction with the others” (Hudson, 1979, p.340).  
A critical factor in pandemic flu planning is the understanding by the organizing committee that 
the “operational plan” is going to change during the emergency once the epidemic is declared by 
the CDC, WHO or some other agency. Rapid reaction times by the university planning 
committee may be required on multiple fronts to quickly modify the plan and re-direct activities 
towards an effective response. When planning for contingencies, pandemic committee leaders, 
indeed all of the members, must realize and understand; 
• the strengths and weaknesses of individuals and groups relied on by the committee, 
• the dominant style of thinking and problem solving used by committee members, 
• the importance of empathy, trust and integrity when making decisions, 
• the impact that the leader’s operating style and attitudes may have on the committee.  
University pandemic committee members, especially the leadership, who have a good 
understanding of the organizational learning, development and change culture at their institution, 
can see a problem developing, will anticipate the contingency needed and convince others to 
react quickly to changing circumstances, more effectively controlling situations as they develop.      
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  RESEARCH DESIGN 
The design of this study was primarily a survey-based research project with quantitative 
descriptive analysis of data from the survey questionnaire responses received. An e-mail survey 
was sent to Environmental Health and Safety Directors at selected large universities across the 
U.S. assessing their Emergency Preparedness Committee organization and their level of 
pandemic influenza preparedness in comparison to an updated response framework developed by 
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta (2014). The design of the questionnaire and 
proposed data analyses attempted to provide the university plan coordinators with a metric 
informing them when they have “done enough” i.e. have a comprehensive plan in place for a 
pandemic emergency on their campus relative to other universities and in substantial agreement 
with CDC guidelines.  
My hypothesis was that many larger universities have let some of their pandemic 
preparedness efforts lapse in the six years since the last declared flu pandemic. The collected 
survey data was reviewed in an effort to compare the level of emergency preparedness for each 
plan with regard to pandemic flu surveillance, risk assessment, continuity preparedness, 
community participation, counter measures, communications, training, and overall response to an 
influenza pandemic as recommended by the CDC and others. This evaluation was achievable due 
to the updated pandemic planning materials from the CDC that provided a means of comparison.  
Table 3 below provides a matrix indicating which survey questions can be applied to the 
three research questions derived for this study based on the organization of the Pandemic Flu 
Committee, the contents of the Flu Plan and coordination of the Plan with regards to business 
continuity.  
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Table 3: Matrix Relating the Survey Questions to the Research Questions 
 
Pandemic Flu Preparedness Research Question Survey Questions Pertaining to these Research 
Questions 
1. When organizing their Pandemic Flu Committees, do 
universities optimize representation by departments, 
campus groups and outside agencies? 
 
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14 & 16 
2. Do universities’ Pandemic Flu Plans include elements 
that are comprehensive in scope and content?  
8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 & 20 
3. How does the Pandemic Flu Plan fit into the larger 
emergency planning framework for ongoing course 
instruction, research, and business continuity? 
4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,19 &20 
 
In addition to the descriptive analysis performed on most survey questions, comparative 
statistical analyses were going to be applied to a number of questions based on enrollment 
figures, the percentage of students housed on campus and the population density surrounding the 
main university campus collected in the first three survey questions. Unfortunately, there were 
not enough replies to some of the categories in these questions to enable meaningful statistical 
comparison.   
The Likert scores for the final three questions on pandemic flu preparedness were totaled 
from survey replies, to define a “metric” for comparison of campus pandemic programs. 
Comparison of these metrics between institutions could provide a theoretical measure that 
universities have invested in their emergency preparedness plans to the degree that might enable 
them to put forward an actionable response during a pandemic crisis. The basic statistical 
parameters of mean, variance and standard deviation were calculated for these questions along 
with the confidence intervals based on the number of survey respondents.   
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  RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
The primary source of quantitative survey data were Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) 
Directors at larger doctoral degree granting universities across the country having a total student 
population exceeding 10,000 including both undergraduate and graduate students. Initially, 156 
universities were e-mailed the survey questionnaire. All of these universities were members of 
the Campus Safety Health and Environmental Management Association (CSHEMA) to which 
the researcher has access to telephone and e-mail addresses for their EH&S Directors.  No on-
line universities or community colleges were included in this survey as they are unlikely to have 
on-campus housing. For logistical reasons, doctorate granting institutions that were CSHEMA 
members with total student populations under 10,000 were initially excluded from the survey. 
However, due to the low initial survey response, 60 smaller CSHEMA universities were added to 
the survey some with less than 10,000 students. Bachelor and master’s degree granting colleges 
and universities were excluded from the survey.  
As an EH&S staff member at one of the larger CSHEMA universities, I was particularly 
interested in learning how other peer institution having similar complex administrative structures 
with multiple school, departmental and facilities issues would organize their pandemic plans. 
The logic of excluding smaller universities and using total student populations later revealed two 
significant flaws in the study that will be discussed later in this document.   
In all, 216 CSHEMA universities met the study criteria and were included in the survey 
mailing as shown in Appendix C. Each EH&S Director received a Survey Request Letter, via e-
mail asking if they were the representative of their campus best able to complete this 
questionnaire. If not, they were asked to pass the survey along to the individual(s) more familiar 
with the applicable section of their pandemic plan. A response received e-mail for questions was 
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elicited. Table 4 below tabulates the number of universities included in this survey along with 
those responding and those completing more than half (>10) of the survey questions who were 
included in this study. 
Table 4:  Response Rate for Target Universities. 
Target Universities Sent Questionnaires 216 
Universities Opening Questionnaire 114 
Surveys Returned via Qualtrics® Software  44 
Completed Surveys  36 
Survey Response Rate  36/216 =16.7%  
 
Forty-four universities returned their questionnaires via Qualtrics®. For the purposes of 
this research, 8 universities were excluded from the study as their information was incomplete. 
The rationale behind this exclusion is that the research data could not be applied to any 
university not answering at least 50% of the questions. Thirty-six universities, completing more 
than 50% of the questions, were in the study. Table 5 in Chapter 4 contains a breakdown of the 
36 universities completing each question. Descriptive statistics (percentages) applied to 
responses listed in the survey tables was calculated using the number of universities answering 
that question as the denominator.  
While answers from the 8 excluded universities were not used in the statistical 
evaluations, their lack of answer to the remaining survey questions did provide some insight to 
the survey’s shortcomings. Most of those universities not completing the survey indicated in 
their responses to questions 4 and 5 that they either did not have a Pandemic Plan or a Pandemic 
Committee.   
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  DATA COLLECTION 
 Following IRB approval, EH&S directors and/or Public Safety professionals at the target 
universities who were members of CSHEMA were contacted by e-mail via the Qualtrics® 
survey system to determine if they were the best person to complete the survey and explaining 
the purpose of my research project.  
After determining valid e-mail addresses, the survey questionnaires were forwarded 
along with a cover letter explaining the importance of the study and confidentially assurances. In 
addition, the letter included instructions for completing the survey, the deadline for responses, 
directions for its return and information on getting copies of the survey results if they are 
interested.  
Institutions not responding by the stated two week deadline were sent a follow-up e-mail 
reminding them of the importance of this survey, asking them to respond and assuring them of 
the confidentiality of their reply. Two follow e-mails were made to EH&S directors who did not 
respond to determine if they received the survey packet and asking them if they would reconsider 
completing the survey. Thank you e-mails were sent to those completing the survey. 
  DATA ANALYSIS 
 Qualtrics® software was used as the e-mail survey provider and some of its data analysis 
capabilities were utilized when applicable. Available statistical services at the University were 
also called upon to obtain suggestions for data reductions and survey response analysis. One 
question required a short written answer as to which department at the school provides the 
 84 
Chairperson for the Pandemic Flu Committee. A few of the initial questions ascertained the 
existence of a pandemic flu plan and active committee participation. Additional questions 
inquired as to the universities overall emergency management approach, their preferred blend of 
planning theory and their ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances.  
The first three questions in the survey inquired about the demographic characteristics of 
the institution. This information on enrollment at the school, the percentage of students in on-
campus housing and the degree of urbanization of the main campus were to be used for some 
comparative analysis with survey questions 8 through 13. Unfortunately the low response 
numbers prevented meaningful statistical comparisons. Measures of central tendency such as the 
mean, variance and standard deviation were calculated for three questions where applicable 
along with the confidence intervals based on the number of survey respondents.   
Nine of the survey questions involved a descriptive analysis of various university 
planning measures checking “all that apply” to their Pandemic Plans. The percentage of 
responders checking the applicable circles for each question were also be used for program 
comparisons between the universities and model Pandemic Flu Program created by the CDC.  
For three questions (18-20), a five point Likert scale (0-4) was used to quantify the 
emphasis given to critical emergency preparedness characteristics in their Pandemic Flu Plan 
with regards to general, human resource and medical aspects of the plan producing a “numerical 
grade”, if you will, for these portions of their program. The Likert scores for the final three 
questions may also define a “robustness quotient” for campus flu programs providing a 
theoretical measure by which universities can considered and compare critical aspects of their 
emergency preparedness plans to other universities.  
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These three Likert Scale questions in the survey were answered using a 0 to 4 score 
asking the responder to rate the emphasis placed on key aspects of their pandemic flu plan as 
described in the instructions below.  
Instructions: The numerical scoring of questions 18-20, asked the respondents to assign a 
numerical grade that best matches their opinion of that aspect’s importance in their Pandemic 
Plan.  
• Grade 0 if your plan does not mention of this issue. 
• Grade 1 if your plan mentions this issue but it is given a low priority. 
• Grade 2 if your plan places a moderate priority on this issue. 
• Grade 3 if your plan places a high priority on this issue. 
• Grade 4 if this issue is an essential element of your plan. 
The following descriptors were included in the survey instructions to help guide 
responders in their numerical grading of the questions elements.  
• Low priority- mentioned but no one assigned to follow up.  
• Moderate priority- someone assigned responsibility for this issue.  
• High priority- someone assigned responsibility, budget allocated. 
• Essential element- assigned responsibility, budget allocated, issue stressed during drills. 
  LIMITATIONS 
As with any research study, certain factors remain beyond the control of the researcher. With any 
e-mail survey there is always the possibility that inaccurate information may be represented or 
that individuals may be overstating or understating the facts known to them. The possibility also 
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exists that the individual responding to a question may not be the most knowledgeable person to 
participate in the survey at that institution.  
Every effort was made during the development of the survey questionnaire to limit bias in 
the survey or interview questions and to make clear the information being sought. Efforts were 
also made, via the survey cover letter or via e-mail inquiries to clarify the intent of the survey, to 
stress its non-threatening nature and to find the most knowledgeable person at that college or 
university who can best respond to the proposed survey on pandemic flu preparedness.   
The researcher contacted some EH&S colleagues to pilot the survey questionnaire for 
clarity and comprehension. In response to comments received from a pilot survey, 10 questions 
were eliminated shortening the survey making it more attractive to respondents. 
 87 
  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The participants targeted for this research study were doctoral degree granting universities with 
total graduate and undergraduate populations exceeding 10,000 students. All of the universities 
selected were members of the Campus Safety Health and Environmental Management 
Association (CSHEMA) to which the researcher has access to telephone numbers and e-mail 
addresses for EH&S Directors. The survey became active on September 22, 2015 and was sent to 
156 universities, with a reminder e-mail sent on September 28th. On October 7th the survey was 
sent to an additional 60 CSHEMA universities in an effort to increase the number of responses. 
This second panel of universities included 26 universities with total student populations reported 
as less than 10,000. A second reminder e-mail was sent to both panels on October 19th with a 
final reminder following on October 27th. The survey was deactivated on November 5, 2015.   
In all 216 universities were contacted via e-mail and asked in a cover letter about 
completing the survey. CSHEMA maintains a directory of Environmental Health and Safety 
Directors who were each sent a survey link via the Qualtrics® Survey Software that is required 
by the University of Pittsburgh for doctoral dissertations. All but two of the surveys reached their 
destinations successfully as reported by Qualtrics®. Just over half of the surveys e-mailed, (53%) 
were opened by the recipients. Of the 114 surveys opened, 44 (39%) submitted them via 
Qualtrics® with 36 completing more than half of the questions.  
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  SURVEY QUESTION FINDINGS 
Table 5 summarizes the number of EH&S Directors responding to each of the 20 survey 
questions along with a brief accounting of the key responses. Detailed findings are addressed in 
the result and discussion sub-chapters for each question.  
Table 5: Summary of Survey Questionnaire Responses 
Question 
 Number 
Subject of Question  Number of 
Respondents 
Key responses 
Q-1 Number of students on main campus 36 74% reported >10,000 
Q-2 Percentage of students living on campus 36 Average36%, could not use 3 answers in the 
descriptive statistics 
Q-3 Location of main campus metropolitan, 
urban, suburban or rural 
36 75% metro. & urban; 19% suburban, 6% (2) 
rural campuses 
Q-4 Have a written Pandemic Plan? 36 30 yes; 4 no; 2unsure 
Q-5 Have a Pandemic Flu Committee? 36 26 yes; 10 no; 0not sure 
Q-6  Departments on Pandemic Committee 26 Top 5 (police, housing, student affairs, 
Facilities, EH&S)  
Q-7 Who chairs Pandemic Committee? 29 Police, Student Health, EH&S, Executive  
Q-8 How often was Plan updated since 2009? 36 Annually (22%), 1-3 yrs.(30%), once (33%), 
never (14%) 
Q-9 Which Emergency Management 
Approach used? 
36 58% All Hazard; 25% Incident Command; 17% 
Combination 
Q-10 Which SITAR Models used? 36 39%S; 28%I; 28%T; 0% A; 3% R 
Q-11 Speed of Learning, Development, Change 35 1 day <24%; 2-6days >42% 
Q-12 Plans revised after 2009 Pandemic? 36 72% yes; 25% no; 3% unsure  
Q-13 What changes were made to plan? 30 80 changes were indicated by respondents 
Q-14 EH&S responsibilities in Plan 35 Modification, development, pick committee, 
stockpiles, drills,  
Q-15 Critical Supplies Stockpiled 32 N-95s, hand sanitizer, gloves, cleaners, wipes, 
masks, food, water 
Q-16 Outside Agencies Included  32 Local & State Health Depts. Local Hospital, 
Local Admin, Police, EMS, Food & beverage 
vendors 
Q-17 Social Media Used 32 Twitter 91%; Facebook 91% ;Linked-in 34%; 
All others <16% 
Q-18 General Flu Planning Aspects in Plan 33 Top 5- Identify leaders & key personnel, feed 
& house students; communications, plan to 
close campus, quarantine plan, 
Q-19 Human Resource Aspects in Plan 33 Top 5- Maintain staff communications 
Suspend operations, faculty & staff needs, 
close campus, restrict travel,  
Q-20 Key Medical Aspects in Plan 33 Top 5- Hand hygiene, Stay away when sick, 
vaccinations, communicate with hospitals and 
health departments, inform committee of 
CDC guidelines  
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 Question 1 – Student Population on Main Campus 
In this question, survey respondents were asked to estimate the total student populations on their 
main campus. Thirty-six universities responded to this question and proceeded to answer most 
other survey questions. The results for Question 1 are listed in Table 5 below.  
Table 6: Total Student Populations at the Main Campus 
Estimated Population at 
University 
Number of Universities 
Responding to this question 
% of surveys 
received 
less than 10,000 students 9 25% 
10,001 to 20,000 students 7 19% 
20,001 to 30,000 students 13 36% 
More than 30,000 students 7 19% 
Totals 36 99% 
 
Nearly 74% of the universities responding to the survey reported having a total student 
population exceeding 10,000 students, while 25% reported less than this number on their main 
campus. Total student populations included both undergraduate and graduate students. 
Universities not offering doctoral degrees or having only undergraduate students were 
intentionally excluded from this survey.  
Survey questions 1, 2 and 3 were intended to establish the basic demographics of the 
responding universities; namely the total student population, the percentage of students living on 
campus and the rural vs. urban environment of the university’s main campus. A decision to 
exclude smaller colleges and universities from the study was made initially to allow a 
comparison of pandemic flu programs among larger universities (populations >10,000 students). 
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When the first round of responses from 156 universities surveyed was low, an additional 60 
CSHEMA universities were added to the cohort. The belief that this second cohort would include 
many institutions with student populations smaller than 10,000 was in error however, as many of 
these institutions actually had student populations larger than the original 156 universities. As 
shown in Appendix C, 34 of the 60 added institutions reported having total student populations 
exceeding 10,000 students on their website. Only 26 of the 60 universities selected in the second 
cohort were under the 10,000 total student population numbers and nine (9) of these universities 
responded to this survey question.  
 Question 2 – Percentage of Students Living on Campus  
Question 2 asked respondents to estimate the percentage of students living on campus. By 
obtaining these percentages, the researcher hoped to gauge the number of individuals that the 
university would be responsible for during a pandemic. These responsibilities would include 
housing, isolating sick students, providing medical care, feeding, housekeeping and security. 
During the early stages when a pandemic is declared, most universities encourage their students 
to return home for the duration if it is safe and possible to do so hopefully lessening the spread of 
disease and lowering the amount of care needed.   
Of the 36 respondents to this question, only 30 of the data points for Questions 2 could be 
used in the calculation of central tendency as six universities either responded with actual student 
numbers or did not know the percentage of students living on campus. The range for students 
living on campus was between 10% and 80%. Calculating a mean for the 30 usable entries 
indicated that 36% of students at the universities surveyed lived on campus. The median number 
of students living on campus was 30% and the mode was 25%.  
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The percentage of students living on campus at the 36 responding universities could not 
be determined based upon the manner in which six universities responded to the second survey 
question. Question 1 had asked survey respondents to position their universities into one of four 
total student population categories ranging from less than 10,000 to more than 30,000. While the 
survey question 2 asked for a percentage of students living on campus, some respondents gave 
the actual number of students without providing a percentage and therefore disallowing inclusion 
of those universities in statistical analysis. In hindsight, the survey question could have focused 
on the university’s undergraduate populations as these students are more likely to live in on-
campus housing thus remaining the responsibility of the university during a pandemic 
emergency. Graduate students, even junior and senior undergraduates in many cases, would 
likely live in off campus housing not affiliated with the university or would commute from 
home. Some of the students living off campus would presumably become part of the 
community’s response to a pandemic emergency, with many having private healthcare options, 
and not necessarily be included in the university’s response during a pandemic emergency. 
Most of the students living in off campus housing, even graduate students would likely be 
enrolled in a university healthcare plan and could however remain the responsibility of that 
institution, further complicating statistical or even descriptive analysis. Certainly, students 
unable to return home during a pandemic because of national or international travel restrictions 
would likely look to the university healthcare system for treatment and support during a 
pandemic illness. It is imperative that university Pandemic Planning Committees have an 
estimate of the number of individuals likely to remain on or near campus during an influenza 
outbreak, This number will be critical in determining many other factors in the Plan such as, 
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where sick individuals could be housed or quarantined, the quantities of critical supplies needed 
to be stockpiled and the support staff needed to care for this number of sick individuals.  
Beyond the legal, budgetary and public health requirements of being responsible for 
individuals sickened during a pandemic, moral and ethical consideration would likely influence 
universities to care for affiliated individuals as much as possible. This response is reflected in the 
next survey question describing the geographical surroundings of the universities and the 
available resources in or near the campus community.  
 Question 3 – Location of the Main Campus 
Question 3 asked survey participants to describe the location of their main campus based on the 
USDA County Rural-Urban Continuum Codes. Thirty-six universities responded to this survey 
question. The four codes used in this survey included Metropolitan, Urban, Suburban and Rural 
based on the population of the integral or surrounding communities. Table 7 below indicates the 
location mix determined by this survey. More than 75% of the universities resided in 
metropolitan or urban settings containing more than 20,000 people from this analysis. The 
remainder fell into the suburban or rural USDA code locations. 
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Table 7: Location of Main Campus in Relation to Population Centers 
 
 
By describing a university’s geographic setting, it was intended to establish criteria for 
statistical comparisons of other survey responses based on whether the universities were located 
in metropolitan, urban, suburban or rural settings. The small number of responses (2) from rural 
universities did not lend itself to meaningful statistical comparison with the other locations. In 
reviewing several articles on “town & gown” relationships, land grant universities in a rural 
setting often have a stronger sense of community than a large university in a metropolitan area 
(Martin et.al. 2005, Seifer, et.al. 2003, Bruning et.al. 2006). Due to limited resources available in 
the community, rural universities are often more self-reliant out of necessity. Sharing facilities or 
economic resources and providing mutual aid with the local populace, regardless of the 
universities geographic location, makes for better community relations and emergency response 
outcomes (Steinacker, 2004, Martin et.al, 2005). 
Metropolitan universities were more likely to experience the ongoing problems of noise, 
traffic, student disorder, higher crime, non-support of local business and the alleged ruination of 
communities by constant campus expansion (Bruning et.al. 2006, Lindsay, 2015). In response to 
USDA County  
Code Description 
USDA Code Criteria Number of 
Universities 
responding 
Percentage in 
Category 
Metropolitan Within a city having  
population >250,000 
 
15 42% 
Urban Within a city or town having a 
population between 20,000 and 
249,999 
12 33% 
Suburban Adjacent to town or city  
having a population between 
20,000 and 249,999 
7 19% 
Rural  Adjacent to suburban area with a 
population between 2,500 and 
19,999 
2 6% 
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these factors, some universities put up walls and fences, distancing themselves from the 
surrounding city’s politicians, local businesses, emergency services and even the local health 
care system thereby creating a competitive environment rather than one of cooperation (Martin 
et.al. 2005). While the emergency preparedness plans at many universities and those of the 
community do recommend mutual aid agreements, it will be interesting to see how these evolve 
when a real emergency strikes and the need to share resources becomes a reality.   
A consideration for future research could review the question if the isolation of rural 
universities makes them less vulnerable to pandemics in the first place. Or, on the other hand, 
would it raise questions about the lack of community resources or support from off campus 
making for a difficult response to and recovery from a pandemic emergency. Articles by Larson 
(2007), Leggat, et.al. (2009), Gholipour (2013), and Ferguson et.al. (2005) have determined that 
pandemic strains of influenza virus are more likely to emerge in remote tropical areas of Africa, 
Asia and Latin America usually in poultry raised by villagers in these areas. Pandemics flu 
strains originate when the infected birds pass a mutating virus to other animals or to humans. 
Normally these flu strains are contained to the areas where they originated but on rare occasions 
can spread rapidly through the community and beyond when infected individuals board airlines 
traveling internationally to other cities. These authors also explained that the next populations to 
become infected by this rural outbreak would be large metropolitan areas due in part to the 
crowded conditions on trains, busses and shopping areas. Hopefully by this time, the spreading 
flu pandemic would be recognized by health officials and steps initiated to encourage isolation, 
social distancing and other infection prevention measures to contain the virus. Rural universities 
should be spared this initial spread of the flu virus until infected individuals travel to that 
location which certainly can occur given the international activities of modern institutions.      
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 Question 4 - Written Pandemic Preparedness Plans  
Survey question 4 asked the universities Directors if they had a “written” Pandemic Preparedness 
Plan. Of the 36 Directors answering this question, 30 (83%) responded in the affirmative and 4 
(11%) stated they did not have a written Plan. Two University Directors were unsure if they had 
such a written plan in place or not.  
The fact that 83% of the responding university Directors indicated they had written 
Pandemic Preparedness Plans implies that the CDC guidelines are familiar and being followed. 
For the six universities indicating they did not have or were unsure if they had written pandemic 
plans, one possibility might be that their pandemic plan is incorporated within a larger 
Emergency Preparedness Plan, perhaps an All Hazard Plan.   
 Question 5 – Pandemic Preparedness Committees 
Survey question 5 asked EH&S Directors if their university had a Pandemic Preparedness 
Committee. Thirty-six replies were received of which 26 universities (72%) responded yes and 
10 (28%) responded no. Of the 36 EH&S Directors answering this question, 10 universities 
(28%) responded that they did not have a separate pandemic committee. 
Once again, it may be that the Emergency Preparedness Committee at that university 
incorporates pandemic issues as part of their responsibilities. This higher negative response, 
however, raises the question that pandemic concerns may have fallen to a low priority during the 
past six years and that pandemic preparedness is rarely discussed as part of the emergency 
planning process. Such actions could result in the university being totally unprepared to respond 
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in case of a pandemic emergency increasing the detriment to business continuity and delaying 
recovery of the campus community. 
On the other hand, the fact that 72% of the universities responding to this question did 
have Pandemic Committees is a positive indicator that most campus leaders remain cognizant of 
the need for vigilance in dealing with emerging pathogens in our communities and elsewhere.  
 Question 6 –Departments Represented on Pandemic Committee 
Survey question 6 asked university representatives to list each of the departments represented on 
their Pandemic Preparedness Committees. All 26 universities responding “yes” to Question 5 
also responded to this question listing 24 different departments with participation varying on the 
committees as summarized in Table 8 below. Campus Security/Police (100%) was most often 
represented on the Pandemic Preparedness Committee followed by Housing (92%), Student 
Health (88%), Physical Plant (85%) and EH&S (85%). The 10 universities responding no to this 
question did not list Committee participants. 
Having good working committees, with key departments represented, is the best way to 
anticipate university or community needs, to brainstorm ideas and to establish workable plans for 
getting critical tasks done during a pandemic emergency. In setting up such a committee of 
qualified and dedicated individuals can help assure that the “right” people are assigned to the 
duties that might arise during a pandemic emergency. It is essential that committee members are 
annually re-committed to their tasks. Were a pandemic emergency to impact a university, each of 
the 24 departments listed in Table 8 could become involved in some way to an escalating 
situation on their campus. 
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Table 8: Departments Represented on Pandemic Preparedness Committees 
Number University Department 
Designation 
Universities with this 
Department Represented  
Percentage of 
Responders 
1 Campus Security (Police) 25 96% 
2 Housing Services 24 92% 
3 Student Health 23 88% 
4 Physical Plant (Facilities Mgt.) 22 85% 
5 Environmental Health & Safety 22 85% 
6 Human Resources  21 81% 
7 Student Services 21 81% 
8 Executive Offices 19 73% 
9 Employee Health 19 73% 
10 Public Affairs 19 73% 
11 Communications 19 73% 
12 Academic Affairs 17 65% 
13 Risk Management 17 65% 
14 Information Technology 17 65% 
15 Faculty Representative 16 62% 
16 Legal Services 15 58% 
17 Food Service 15 58% 
18 Registrar 10 38% 
19 Emergency Management 3 12% 
20 Health System/Medical School 2 8% 
21 Global Affairs 1 4% 
22 Auxiliary Services 1 4% 
23 Business Continuity 1 4% 
24 Chaplain 1 4% 
 
Even if a department does not have a representative on the actual pandemic committee, 
they should be kept informed of the committee’s directives and fully committed to their role and 
responsibilities should the Pandemic Plan be activated. Preparations for such an event would 
require a commitment of budget, personnel, planning and practice to assure an effective response 
and recovery by a university community. Good committee leadership is essential in keeping all 
of its members as well as key members of the campus and community updated and prepared. 
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 Question 7 – Leadership of the Pandemic Committee  
In Question 7, survey respondents were asked to indicate the title and department of the person 
chairing the Pandemic Preparedness Committee. There were 29 respondents to this question with 
the “Director of Emergency Management” or someone with a similar title, usually at a Director 
level (40% of responses) occurring most frequently. Most often the person with this title resided 
in the Public Safety or Environmental Health and Safety Department. Other departments 
mentioned in decreasing order of frequency included; Student Health, Health Services, 
Administration and Operations, Risk Management, Human Resources and Business Continuity.  
Other titles reported with less frequency than “Director” included, Vice Presidents, Vice 
Chancellor, Vice Provosts, Risk or Emergency Manager, Dean of Students, Incident Commander 
and Public Health Nurse or Doctor.  
Respondents to Question 7 made it apparent that the responsibility for chairing a 
Pandemic Preparedness Committee resided at a fairly high level of administration. As previously 
mentioned, Pandemic Committee chairs typically held Director level positions or higher, even to 
the level of Vice President, Vice Chancellor or Vice Provost. Obviously, in the case of a rapidly 
evolving emergency like a pandemic, unquestioned decision making is essential and best left to 
high ranking university leaders having the ability to get things done quickly.  
Also apparent from the survey responses, the departments most often tasked with 
chairing the pandemic committee were staff or service functions rather than faculty or academic 
units. While academic departments play a critical role in deciding when and how to cancel 
classes or how best to maintain instructional business continuity via online instruction or 
distance learning, staff and service departments are important for maintaining brick and mortar 
functionality as well as assuring the campus can function effectively during the pandemic period 
 99 
for as long as possible. High level personnel from all sides of the university community should 
be represented on the committee and be willing to act in a collaborative manner conducive for 
rapid pandemic response and recovery. 
 Question 8 – Pandemic Preparedness Plan Updates  
Question 8 asked survey participants how many times their Pandemic Preparedness Plan had 
been updated since 2009, the year of the last declared influenza pandemic in the US. Of the 36 
respondents to this question, 12 (33%) reported that their plan had been updated one time. Eight 
others (22%) reported updating their plan annually since 2009. Seven universities (19%) reported 
updates every two or three years and two other knew it was updated but were not sure how often 
it had been revised. Five universities (14%) admitted that their plans had not been updated since 
2009.and two others (5%) did not have a Pandemic Preparedness Plan. 
The fact that there has not been widespread discussion about major influenza outbreaks 
or other pandemic illness in the mainstream media has lessened the priority for pandemic 
preparedness in the US as a whole and on universities campuses as well. That this survey 
indicates 74% of the universities answering this question have updated their Pandemic 
Preparedness Plans within the past three years, indicates a good level of preparedness and 
vigilance at those academic institutions..  
Even without widespread discussion about major influenza outbreaks or other pandemic 
illness in the mainstream media since 2010, 74% of the universities polled during this survey 
have updated their Pandemic Preparedness Plans. Perhaps the periodic news stories about minor 
infectious disease outbreaks on campuses and elsewhere since 2009 such as MRSA, SARS, 
MERS, bacterial meningitis, measles or mumps and most recently the Zika virus have kept 
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university officials vigilant to an ever present pandemic risk. The tendency for medical 
epidemiologists, news media outlets and social media to report infectious disease outbreaks 
around the world may be keeping most of our campus communities alert to coming events.   
 Question 9 – Emergency Management Approaches to Planning   
Question 9 asked survey participants which emergency management approach best describe their 
Pandemic Preparedness Plan format. The three response options included, “Incident Command 
System”, the “All Hazard” approach or another planning approach. Thirty-six universities 
responded to this question. The majority (21 or 58%) selected the All Hazard approach that was 
earlier described as a “bottom-up” planning format using a comprehensive committee driven 
approach incorporating both vulnerability and pragmatic planning models as described in 
Sections 2.2.2 - 2.2.4 of this document.  
The second choice, Incident Command System (ICS), was selected by 9 universities 
(25%) involving a “top-down” approach recommended by the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security. This system uses a detail 
oriented, technocratic approach to emergency planning where everyone involved has a specified 
role with assigned duties dictated by the Incident Commander who takes charge and relies on his 
chain of command to assure things get done as required.  
Four university representatives (11%) responding to the question indicated they had 
“another approach” to pandemic preparedness planning mostly involving a combination of all 
hazard planning with incident command components for specific emergencies. Two university 
planners noted that they did minimal emergency planning preparations.  
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For this survey question, 21 universities (58%) selected the All Hazard approach to 
emergency planning. Advantages of choosing the All Hazard Approach (Burton, 2010) include; 
• It provides a basic framework for dealing with a wide variety of business interruptions,  
• It is more cost effective in terms of time and resources, 
• It requires less effort to keep plans current. 
• It better suites organization less knowledgeable of business continuity. 
The disadvantages to All Hazard Planning are that it tends to lack details on the scale of 
response and recovery for more likely or predictable events, instead focusing on high profile or 
worse case scenarios and the resulting facility damage or loss of business continuity. All Hazard 
Plans, lacking specific details about the responsibilities of key personnel, strategic use of 
facilities, communication pathways and documented procedures, will often increase the overall 
response and recovery times and costs for most organizations (Burton 2010).  
The second choice for emergency preparedness, the Incident Command System, was 
selected by 9 universities (25%). The IC system involves a “top-down”, comprehensive approach 
to emergency planning recommended by the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security. This system uses a detail-oriented, 
technocratic approach to emergency planning where key personnel are identified, each having a 
specified role with assigned duties dictated by the Incident Commander who takes charge during 
an emergency and relies on their chain of command to assure tasks get done as required.  
According to the Department of Homeland Security (2016) the advantages of the Incident 
Command System for organizations are; 
• It is a comprehensive, nationally recognized and systematic approach to incident 
management, 
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• It provides a core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, organizational procedures for all 
kinds of hazards, 
• It lays out the essential principles for a common operating picture and mandates the 
interoperability of communications and information management, 
• It standardizes resource management procedures for coordination among different 
jurisdictions and organizations, 
• It is scalable and applicable for all types of incidents and emergencies, 
• It enhances organizational and technological interoperability and cooperation across 
jurisdictional boundaries, 
• It institutionalizes professional emergency management and incident response practices.  
Some colleges and universities may find the Incident Command System disadvantageous 
to their core doctrines in that ICS tends to be authoritarian, lacking in compassion, collegiality 
and the cooperative spirit conducive to an academic environment. However, in dire emergency 
situations an IC system has proven its effectiveness time and again in preparing for, responding 
to and recovery from crises or disasters of all kinds (Blanchard, 2008, FEMA 2003). 
The remaining six university representatives (17%) responding to this question either 
indicated they had “another approach” to pandemic preparedness planning with four involving a 
combination of All Hazard planning to deal with more likely problems at their universities such 
as storms, fires, or floods with Incident Command components added for specific emergencies 
like active shooters, or riots. Two university planners in this final grouping noted that they did 
minimal emergency planning preparations, realizing they would be forced to make last minute 
and probably less than ideal decisions during a pandemic emergency more in keeping with 
Hudson’s Incremental planning method for “muddling through” and incident or emergency.  
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While an All Hazard Plan approach was selected by most universities, it may not be as 
effective during a pandemic event when the situation calls for a hard decision to be made by a 
person in authority especially if that person may be overruled. In this case, the Incident 
Commander, preselected for their expertise in handling these situations may more effectively 
make that decision provided that person knows the facts and possible repercussions of their 
decision. In a university setting and depending on its chain of command structure, the expertise 
there-in and the situation at hand, it might be conducive to have the President or Chancellor of 
the university as the final decision maker based on the advice of “experts” sitting on the 
pandemic committee. Perhaps a blend of the planning systems would work best in a university 
setting; an All Hazard Plan for its simplicity and flexibility but having key individuals having the 
authority and the organization of the Incident Commander. 
 Question 10 – SITAR Model used for Pandemic Planning.  
Question 10 asked survey responders to indicate which of the SITAR Planning Models were 
used when preparing their Pandemic Preparedness Plans. Each of the five planning models 
(Synoptic, Incremental, Transactive, Advocacy and Radical) were described using their 
component characteristic as detailed by Hudson (1979). Respondents were asked to select all of 
the planning model components that were used in preparing their plans.  
All thirty-six university Directors in the study responded to this question, seven selecting 
more than one model. Fourteen (39%) indicated Synoptic planning characteristics were 
incorporated into their plan including; comprehensive goal setting and qualitative descriptors 
with technocratic central control, feasible policy alternatives, cost /benefit analysis all used to 
develop a detailed action plan. 
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Ten responses (28%) indicated Incremental planning characteristics entered into their 
Pandemic Plan including, partisan intuition, past experience, democratic decision making, 
incremental response, consultative views, wait and see decision making, muddling through 
problems if and when they arise.  
Ten responses (28%) were also recorded for Transactive planning that included dialog 
with those most likely to be affected during an emergency. This planning style places more 
emphasis on the human dimension of personal or organizational development and economic self-
interest. 
No one selected the advocacy planning model and only one (3%) picked Radical 
planning. Advocacy planning characteristics includes an adversarial defense of the public 
interest, social justice considerations and sensitivity to unintended environmental, social or 
financial side effects. Radical planning characteristics include self-reliant activism relying 
heavily on mutual aid provided with a cooperative spirit free from outside manipulation and 
utilizing more decentralized operations. Eleven other responses (31%) recorded for this questions 
indicating that none of the SITAR characteristics entered into pandemic preparedness planning at 
their university.   
Twenty-five of the responding university Directors incorporated at least one or two of the 
“S” (synoptic), “I” (incremental) and “T” (transactive) characteristics of Hudson’s (1979) SITAR 
model into their emergency plans. No responding university incorporated any of the “A” 
(advocacy) model characteristics and only one used “R” (radical) planning characteristics in their 
plan. Eleven universities (31%) responding that none of the SITAR characteristics entered into 
pandemic preparedness planning at their university indicated to this researcher either a failure to 
carefully read the question or to comprehend the SITAR model. Even a cursory understanding of 
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SITAR descriptions would lead one to realize that any planning exercise must incorporate some 
if not many aspects of the SITAR characteristics into their plan dependent on the goals, 
philosophies and attitudes existing among the planners. Hudson (1979) summarizes these 
characteristics as follows:  
• Synoptic planning involves comprehensive goal setting, central control, quantitative 
analysis, feasibility studies, policy alternatives, cost benefit analysis and detailed action 
plans.  
• Incremental planning relies more on partisan intuition and past experience, democratic 
decision making and an incremental responses to events. This model uses consultative 
discussions with experts and adopts a wait and see attitude as they “muddle through” 
events.  
• Transactive planning uses the interpersonal dialog with those to be effected when 
deciding on a path forward. It places emphasis on the human dimension of personal and 
organizational development as well as economic self-interests.  
• Advocacy planning involves an adversarial defense of the public interest while 
incorporating aspects of social justice in decision making. This planning model is also 
sensitive to unintended but likely environmental, social or financial side effects.  
• Radical planning incorporates self-reliant activisms into its decentralized operations 
relying on mutual aid and a cooperative spirit free from outside manipulation.  
 
University emergency planners must be decisive and capable of making good decisions 
rapidly in a crisis situation. This will involve serious consideration of each of the SITAR 
model components during the emergency planning stages even if they are not labeled as 
 106 
such. Each university must decide which emergency planning approach and which blend 
of SITAR models will work best for their institution during a pandemic emergency.  
  Question 11 – Pandemic Committee’s Capability for Rapid Learning, Development 
and Change  
Question 11 asked respondents to describe the speed with which their Pandemic Preparedness 
Committee could learn the facts about an impending crisis, develop contingency plans to react to 
that crisis and implement change in their response plan when faced with a pandemic emergency. 
Thirty-six universities responded to this question presented as a 5-point Likert scale in Table 9.  
Table 9: Pandemic Committee's Capability for Rapid Learning, Development and Change 
 
Question  
Characteristic 
Slow 
>2 
weeks 
Somewhat  
Slow 1-2  
weeks 
Neutral 
1 week  
Somewhat  
Fast 2-6  
days 
Fast 
1 day  
or less  
Number of 
Universities 
responding 
Mean 
Variance 
Std. Dev. 
Likert Rating 1 2 3 4 5 xxxxxxx xxxxxxx 
Learning 
3 4 5 14 10 36 
3.67 
1.54 
1.24 
Development  
4 3 5 18 6 36 
3.53 
1.46 
1.21 
Change 
4 4 7 12 9 36 
3.50 
1.69 
1.30 
 
Based on the figures shown in Table 9, 67% of the 36 university Directors responding to 
this question believed that their Pandemic Preparedness Committees are capable of both learning 
and flu response development fairly rapidly, in less than 7 days. Fifty-eight percent of 
respondents felt they could also complete the necessary program changes within that time frame. 
Approximately 33% of the universities responding believed that they may require more than a 
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week or two to complete their pandemic learning and development and 42% may need that 
amount of time to complete the necessary program response changes.  
When an influenza pandemic or some other infectious disease is declared by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), rapid decision making by the university’s Pandemic 
Preparedness Committee may be required as an emergency situation develops. Institutions will 
have to learn and understand what is likely to happen based on the information available, modify 
their preparedness plans and develop specific response protocols to meet various contingencies 
and be able to change their response actions quickly as new facts are learned and changing 
conditions dictate. 
 The faster a university pandemic committee can make educated decisions about an 
impending infectious disease threat, the more likely they are to assemble the needed resources 
and direct actions for a multifaceted response leading to an effectively managed emergency. As 
stated earlier, approximately 2/3’s of the universities responding believed they would be able to 
learn about, develop alternatives and change their plan in less than 6 days to meet a pandemic 
crisis. 
 Question 12 – Revised Flu Plans after the 2009 Pandemic Declaration   
Question 12 asked university Directors if they revised their Pandemic Preparedness Plans after 
the 2009-2010 pandemic influenza declaration by the CDC/WHO. Thirty-six university 
Directors responded to this question with 72% (26) responding yes and 25% (9) responding that 
they had not modified their plans. One Director (3%) was unsure of their Plan revisions 
The fact that 72% or the university Directors reported modifying their Pandemic Flu 
Plans may indicate a realization that many universities and communities had been poorly 
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prepared to respond to the 2009-2010 pandemic flu initially. In some communities where the 
first flu cases were reported, increased absenteeism became a problem as people were instructed 
to avoid crowds and practice social distancing to slow flu transmission. Fortunately the CDC 
/WHO declared flu pandemic of 2009-2010 was much less severe than predicted (CDC 2010).  
Several lessons should have been learned from the “near miss” during the 2009-2010 flu 
pandemic. One key lesson was that universities and other organizations need to perform an 
annual review of their emergency plans. Planners should at least assure that all contact 
information for key individuals and critical services are current and that planning members are 
still at the university and willing to remain active on the pandemic committee. In addition any 
plan shortcomings, failures or items overlooked at the university, in their communities or 
elsewhere during the “near miss” should be highlighted by the pandemic planning committee and 
the plan modified as needed.   
 Question 13 – Changes to Plans after 2009 WHO Pandemic  
As a follow-up to Question 12, respondents were asked to check off a list of Plan modifications 
made since the last declared flu pandemic in 2009. Thirty universities responded to Question 12 
by listing a combined 80 modification to their Pandemic Plans as shown in Table 10. The six 
universities not having or not knowing about their Pandemic Plans did not respond to this 
question. 
As shown in Table 10, the most frequent modifications that universities made to their 
Pandemic Plans was to update contingency plans addressing some of the problems encountered 
by universities and other institutions during the 2009-2010 flu pandemic. Seventeen of the 30 
Universities (57%) responding listed this change as the most common update to their plan. The 
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second most frequent plan update was the adoption of a more aggressive flu vaccination 
programs (40%), followed by changes to emergency supply stockpile priorities (27%). Added 
travel restrictions (27%), more practice drills (23%) and more committee members (23%) were 
among the most common reported updates to University Pandemic preparedness Plans.    
Table 10: Modification Made to University Pandemic Preparedness Plans 
 Following the 2009-2010 Pandemic Flu Declaration 
 
Pandemic Plan Modification by 
Universities who made Changes 
Number 
of Respondents 
Making This Change 
Percentage 
of 
Respondents 
Updated contingency plan 17 57% 
More aggressive flu vaccination policy 12 40% 
Changes to stockpiling priorities 8 27% 
Added travel restriction policies 8 27% 
More practice drills 7 23% 
More committee members added 7 23% 
Revised vendor contracts 5 17% 
Revised agreements with local hospitals 4 13% 
Additional Job cross-training 3 10% 
Enhanced flu screening policy 2 7% 
More detailed instruction 1 3% 
Administrative updates 1 3% 
Public health, isolation/quarantine 
agreements 1 3% 
Included additional diseases 1 3% 
Memorandum of Understanding with local 
Public Health officials 1 3% 
No assigned responsibilities in plan 1 3% 
Plan was specific for 2009-2010 pandemic, 
no changes made 1 3% 
 
In answering this question 30 university Directors identified 80 changes made to their 
pandemic plans after the WHO declared influenza pandemic in 2009. Fifty-seven percent of the 
universities needed updates to their contingency plans as they realized their plan’s shortcomings 
during the flu’s spread. Forty percent of respondents also realized weaknesses in their 
“voluntary” influenza vaccination campaigns due to misinformation spreading about the safety 
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and ineffectiveness of the current vaccine. Flu vaccinations became even more problematic when 
the flu threat increased and medical communities were faced with vaccine shortages and a 
controversial choice between the traditional flu shots verses a new nasal spray. By the time drug 
manufacturers ramped-up vaccine production early in 2010, the flu threat declined resulting in 
millions of vaccine doses going to waste (Coffey, 2014).  
These same “shortage to surplus” scenarios repeated for protective gloves, suits, masks 
and hand sanitizers as manufacturers, unable to meet the demand early during the pandemic, 
increased production only to realize a market glut as the flu threat subsided. Many universities 
placed these surplus supplies into emergency stockpiles in preparation for the next pandemic that 
never came. Now, as the 5 year shelf life of these supplies has past, universities are scrambling to 
sell, donate or discard these items with the realized financial loss as well as having to replace 
them in preparation for the next pandemic threat.  
The fourth most frequent change reportedly made to university emergency plans was 
mandatory travel restrictions during declared pandemic periods. While no specific details were 
collected during the survey, one can surmise the changes included developing protocols to 
discourage or prohibit faculty, staff and students from travel to countries where pandemic illness 
is likely. Changes were also made to ensure clearer communications with faculty, staff and 
students studying or working abroad to better keep everyone apprised of changing conditions. In 
addition, study abroad and other department staff were instructed to pay close attention to 
pandemic alerts as well as other political or environmental threats in countries where university 
personnel may be located. Finally, making provisions as to when and how to evacuate university 
staff and students if disease threats appear eminent and to do everything possible to facilitate 
their return home were also noted.   
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 Question 14 – Pandemic Plan Responsibilities Assigned to EH&S Departments 
Question 14 asked the EH&S Directors at surveyed universities to list all of the responsibilities 
assigned to them during Pandemic Preparedness Planning from a checklist of 14 tasks. Thirty-
five universities responded to this question with 80 selections documented. Table 11 is a 
compilation of those selections in order of their prevalence.  
As seen in Table 11, 50% of the universities responding EH&S had the responsibility for 
modifying the Pandemic Plan, presumably based on decisions made by the committee. For just 
under half (44%) of respondents, EH&S also had responsibilities for Plan development and 
maintenance as well as coordinating practice drills and training.  
More than one third of the Universities responding indicating that the EH&S Department 
was responsible for selecting individuals to serve on the committee and for maintaining 
stockpiles of pandemic emergency supplies. As shown in Table 11, only two of the 36 
universities responding to this question indicated their EH&S Department performed bio-waste 
disposal. Seven universities uniquely listed duties described in Table 11 as performed the EH&S 
department probably indicating shared responsibilities by other departments on the Pandemic 
Preparedness Committees. 
As an Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) professional at one of the responding 
universities, an assumption was made that the EH&S Department would predominate leadership 
of any Emergency Planning Committee and certainly a Pandemic Preparedness Committee as it 
does at my university. However, as this survey indicated in Table 8, EH&S placed fourth in 
Pandemic Committee leadership, 3 to 11 percentage points behind Campus Security, Housing 
Services, Student Health, tied with Physical Plant departments and just slightly ahead of Student 
Services, Human Resources and the Executive Officers at participating universities.  
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Table 11: Pandemic Preparedness Responsibilities Assigned to EH&S Departments 
Assigned Responsibility Number of Universities 
Indicating this as EH&S Duty 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
Pandemic Plan Modification 17 49% 
Plan Development and Maintenance 15 43% 
Consideration of Drills and Training 15 43% 
Committee Selection and Coordination 12 34% 
Maintain stockpiles of masks, gloves, suits 
and other pandemic emergency supplies 12 34% 
No assigned responsibilities for Pandemic 
Plan 6 17% 
Bio Waste Disposal 2 6% 
Business Continuity 1 3 % 
Employee/Public Risk Assessment 1 3 % 
Coordination with local public health 
agencies 1 3 % 
Training and assistance to other 
departments 1 3 % 
Consultation with Biosafety Officer in 
charge of Plan 1 3 % 
Provide information to committee 1 3 % 
Each Department develops their own 
business/operations continuity plan  1 3 % 
 
Table 11 however, did show that EH&S departments assumed major responsibilities for 
pandemic plan development, maintenance and modification at nearly half of the universities 
responding to the survey. EH&S also held responsibility for organizing drills and training at the 
universities surveyed in addition to committee selection and coordination and for stockpiling 
PPE and other pandemic emergency supplies.  
Six universities (17%) responding to the survey surprisingly indicated their EH&S 
department as having no responsibilities for pandemic emergency planning. It would be 
interesting to follow-up on this question during a future survey to learn how and why EH&S 
 113 
would or could avoid responsibilities during a campus pandemic given their experience with 
campus crises and responsibilities for staff and student safety.  
Two of the 36 universities responding to this question indicated their EH&S department 
performed bio-waste disposal, unusually low numbers in that bio-waste and chemical waste are 
routinely handled by vendors contracted through EH&S Departments. Seven universities 
individually listed unique duties in Table 11 performed the EH&S department involving risk 
assessment, public health coordination, consulting, training and business continuity, indicating 
greater shared responsibilities by other departments on the Pandemic Preparedness Committees. 
  Question 15 – Supplies Stockpiled at Universities to Avert Shortages during a 
Pandemic Emergency. 
Question 15 asked survey respondents to indicate from a checklist the critical supplies stockpiled 
at their universities to avert shortages during a pandemic emergency. Thirty-two university 
Directors responded to this question and 4 elected not to answer the question even though they 
did reportedly have Plans. The results shown in Table 12 indicate the relative priorities placed on 
stockpiling these essential supplies that may become difficult to order during a pandemic. 
Note from Table 12, that N-95 respirators, hand sanitizer and protective gloves were the 
most commonly stockpiled items for pandemic emergencies. This may be an outcome of 
manufacturer’s or supplier’s threatened shortages during the 2009-2010 pandemic flu 
declaration. Next among the priority items to stockpile (less than half of the universities 
responding) were disinfection supplies, surgical masks, protective suits, non-perishable foods 
and water all of which can be used on a rotating stock basis. Supplies with expiration dates like 
anti-viral medications and electrolyte are less likely to be stockpiled.  
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Table 12: Pandemic Emergency Supplies Stockpiled at Responding Universities 
Critical Supplies to be Stockpiled Number of Universities 
Stockpiling This Material  
Percentage of 
Respondents 
N-95 Respirators 23  72% 
Hand Sanitizer 23  72% 
Protective Gloves 21 66% 
Disinfectant Wipes 15 47% 
Cleaning Supplies 14  44% 
Surgical Masks 13 41% 
Protective Suits 13 41% 
Non-perishable Foods 12  38% 
Bottled water 11  34% 
Portable beds, cots or sleeping bags 8  25% 
Anti-viral medications 6  19% 
Bed linens 5 16% 
Tissues 5 16% 
Electrolyte Drinks 3 9% 
No Stockpiles of pandemic supplies 2 6% 
Rely on local public health stockpiles 1 3% 
 
Stockpiling of critical supplies in anticipation for pandemic emergency is a guessing 
game. Part of maintaining business continuity during an emergency of any kind is making an 
educated guess given the information available. Good guesswork is part of any contingency 
planning effort to assure that adequate supplies are on hand and more will be available when 
needed. In 2009 when manufactures warned their customers that some emergency supplies like 
N-95 respirators, hand sanitizer and protective gloves might be in short supply during a 
pandemic; these became the most commonly stockpiled items on campus. When the stockpiles 
were not exhausted during that declared pandemic, the University of Pittsburgh was fortunate in 
being able to sell or donate these supplies as their 5-year expiration dates approached and while 
they were still serviceable. New stock piled supplies have been purchased, albeit in lesser 
quantities, and are now placed on a rotation schedule to avoid being stuck with an irreplaceable 
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of supply deteriorated and unusable PPE should a pandemic emergency arise (OSHA, 2009, 
Falcone, et.al. 2015, Radonovich, et.al., 2009).  
Among the priority items to stockpile (less than half of the universities responding) were 
disinfection supplies, non-perishable foods, water, surgical masks and protective suits all of 
which also can be used for other purposes. Supplies with expiration dates like anti-viral 
medications are less likely to be stockpiled possibility due to costs and also reports from the 
medical community that their effectiveness for most flu victims is in question (CDC, 2011). 
Universities and their vendors need to work towards better on-demand purchasing of both 
perishable and non-perishable supplies that will be available in sufficient quantities when 
needed. Perhaps manufacturers can develop rubbers or elastics and other PPE materials as well 
as food supplies and medications that don’t degrade as quickly remaining viable during long 
term emergency storage.  
  Question 16 – Outside Agencies Coordinating with Pandemic Committees 
In question 16, universities were asked to indicate from a checklist, other outside agencies they 
coordinate with regarding their Pandemic Preparedness Plans. Thirty-two university Directors 
responded to this question as shown in Table 13 and four Directors chose not to respond.  
As seen in Table 13, Local and State Health Departments along with the nearby hospitals 
are the most likely institutions to be included in pandemic preparedness communications with 
the responding universities. Local health departments were most commonly included (91%) with 
community hospitals next at 66%. State health departments were included in Plan coordination 
53% of the time. All other outside organizations listed in the survey coordinated with university 
pandemic committees less frequently.   
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Table 13: Outside Agencies Coordinating with Pandemic Preparedness Plans 
 
Outside Agencies involved with University Pandemic 
Planning 
Number of Schools 
Responding  
Percentage of 
Respondents  
Local Health Department 29 91% 
Local Hospitals 21  66% 
State Health Departments 17 53% 
Local Government Administration  12 38% 
Local Police 12 38% 
Food and Beverage Suppliers 12 38% 
Local Paramedics 10 31% 
Local FEMA Office 7 22% 
State FEMA Office 7 22% 
Federal FEMA Office 2 6% 
Local Business Owners 2 6% 
City Fire Department 1 3% 
City/County EMS 1 3% 
World Health Organization 1 3% 
 
Local health departments, having community infection control as their principle mandate, 
are listed in the survey as most likely (91%) to coordinate with the university’s Pandemic 
Preparedness Committee. In addition, the local health departments are more likely to be in close 
communication with their state counterparts, the CDC and WHO as they determine when a 
pandemic declaration will take effect and what response actions are being recommended. Critical 
during all phases of a pandemic emergency is that local, state and federal health agencies 
establish a cooperative relationship with universities in their jurisdiction as opposed to one that is 
overbearing and intolerant. Directives or response actions based on “one size fits all” mandates 
from some bureaucratic emergency plan rather than common sense actions imposed by 
individuals familiar with local norms and customs would be counterproductive.   
Any recommended response actions should be based on sound expert information proven 
effective for the given situation as determined by past experience or at least tested during an 
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exercise drill. The decision making for emergency response should also consider what best fits 
the community “needs” based on local knowledge and attitudes being careful not to let the 
community “wants” get in the way when a difficult decision must be made to control the 
pandemic. Common sense, flexibility and decisiveness must be among the hallmarks of those 
committee members “in-charge” when determining the coordination needed by local 
governments, emergency responders, hospitals, suppliers, FEMA and others responding to or 
having a stake in the declared pandemic emergency. The pandemic response should be 
coordinated by an effective leader working with everyone’s best interest in mind and not one 
focused on being “in-control” or taking advantage of the emergency for political, social or 
monetary gain. 
  Question 17 – Social Media Outlets used for Pandemic Plan Communications 
With the ever expanding services offered by electronic social media, this question inquired 
which social media outlets might a university use to spread the word through campus and beyond 
about a pandemic emergency. Table 14 lists, in descending order, the social media outlets used 
by respondent universities. Thirty-two universities responded to this question most using 
multiple social media outlets used for communication.  
Overwhelmingly (91%), Facebook and Twitter were most commonly indicated by 
responding universities as a possible means to advance communications about a pandemic 
emergency. Under reported (22%) in this survey for campus emergency communications were 
the university’s emergency preparedness webpage or the emergency e-mail/phone alert system 
present on many campuses. A number of respondents did however include these avenues of 
emergency communication under the “other” category for this survey question. You-tube and 
 118 
Instagram were used by 25% of the universities responding as a means of communication with 
their campus.  
In this survey five (16%) of the respondents considered their campus emergency 
communications webpage and two (6%) listed their emergency e-mail/phone alert system as 
social media outlets. Unfortunately, while many universities are currently using e-mail and cell 
phone alerts as a primary means of notifying students, faculty and staff about campus 
emergencies, many campus occupants are permitted to opt out of these services or fail to check 
for website updates and alerts in a timely fashion when issued (Schuler, 2016, UC Berkley, 2016, 
WVU, 2016). 
 
Table 14: Social Media Outlets used at Your University to Facilitate Communications 
 
Social Media Outlets used to Facilitate  
Campus Communications  
Number of Schools 
Responding 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
Twitter 29 91% 
Facebook  29  91% 
You Tube 8 25% 
Instagram 8 25% 
University Webpages 5  16% 
Linked-in 5 16% 
Google + 5 16% 
Pintrest 3 9% 
Flickr 3 9% 
University’s Emergency Alert System  2 6% 
Tumblr 2 6% 
Snapchat 2 6% 
Reddit 1 3% 
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PBS Nova (2015) reported in a television special how social media texts about an 
earthquake in the Himalayans easily beat the earthquake’s shock waves traveling around the 
globe. In this survey, it was found that Facebook and Twitter were used by many more 
universities (91%) than other lesser known services such as You Tube or Instagram (25%).  
Even though they were not listed as social media selections on the questionnaire, five 
Directors wrote- in votes for indicated their emergency response website and two listed their 
emergency alert lines as social media outlets for campus communications. Whether used by 
parents, family members, the media or the students themselves, these sites should be focused on 
supplying reliable, up to date information on any emerging situation on campus. The website 
must be updated periodically as the primary source for directives and guidance on what students 
should be prepared to do during a pandemic emergency. It should also contain information on 
emergency plan implementation, class scheduling, event postponement, campus evacuation, 
travel restrictions, vaccination sites and medical treatment options. The website should also 
speak to the general, human resource and medical aspects of the campus pandemic plan based on 
CDC/WHO and local health department directives. Emergency websites must be prominent on 
the university home page, easy to navigate, clear in their guidance, current and full of accurate 
information with active links to other pertinent websites and emergency contact information. 
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  Question 18 – Ranking the Importance of General Aspects to Pandemic 
Preparedness Plans 
In Question 18 respondents were asked to assign numerical Likert grades (0-4) on the importance 
of 15 general aspects to their Pandemic Preparedness Plans as listed on the survey. Thirty-three 
(33) universities responded to most of the general aspects listed. For three aspects (13, 14 & 15) 
one university did not include an entry. Table 15 presents the results in descending order of 
importance for each general plan aspect based on the mean Likert score of the respondents.   
Topping the list with a mean Likert score of 3.39 and 3.36 out of 4 points respectively 
were delineating the responsibilities of key personnel and identifying Plan leaders Twenty-one 
universities out of the 33 responding indicated these two general aspects as essential elements of 
their Plans.  
Next highest importance, with 22-29 universities scoring these general aspects as either 
high or essential to their plans (Likert means between 2.52 and 3.09) was given to feeding and 
housing sick students, maintaining communications with key personnel, deciding when and how 
to close the campus, establishing quarantine provisions and deciding when to cancel classes, 
sporting events and extracurricular activities. 
Lower priorities, with mean Likert scores between 2.21 and 2.48, were given to 
maintaining research facilities and animals, identifying key decision makers from the state or 
local communities, provisions for feeding and housing essential personnel on campus, holding 
exercise drills and stockpiling critical supplies and equipment to enable limited caretaking 
operations.   
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Table 15: Rank Order of Importance for General Aspects of a Pandemic Plan 
 
General Aspect of Pandemic 
Plan 
No 
Mention  
0 points 
 
Low  
Priority 
1 point 
Moderate  
Priority 
2 points 
High  
Priority 
3 points 
Essential  
Element  
4 points 
Mean 
Likert 
Score 
1. Delineate responsibilities of key 
personnel on campus 
1 1 3  7 21 3.39 
2. Identify Plan leader and 
response team 
1 2 2 7  21 3.36 
3. Feeding & housing students 
unable to return home 
2 0 2  18 11 3.09 
4. Emergency communication plan 
for key personnel  
1 1 5  13 12 3.06 
5. Action plan for closing campus 4 0 2 13  14 3.00 
6. Emergency housing and 
quarantine plans 
2 2 4 16  9 2.95 
7. Action plan for cancelling class 4 1 5  12 11 2.76 
8. Action plan for cancelling sports 
events & extracurricular activity 
5 3 4 12  9 2.52 
9. Plan for maintaining key 
research facilities and animals 
4 1 11 9 8 2.48 
10. Identify decision makers from 
state and community partners 
2 4 12 7  8 2.45 
11. Plan for feeding & housing 
essential personnel 
5 0 9 14  4 2.30 
12. Exercise drill on campus 4 7 12 7  2 2.25 
13. Stockpiling essential supplies 
and equipment 
4 5  8  12  4  2.21 
14. Providing surge capacity for 
local hospitals and community 
9 6 5 8  5 1.82 
15. Participation in community 
drills 
8 7 12  3 2 1.50 
 
Least important to their Pandemic Plans was, with Likert means less than 2.0 (moderate 
importance), were providing surge capacity for the local hospitals or the community and 
participating in community drills. Only 2-5 universities reported these two elements essential to 
their pandemic plans and 8 or 9 universities made no mention of these elements in their 
pandemic plans.  
In comparing the Likert scores of the collective universities with their own pandemic 
priorities, the intention was to determine if university planning committees needed to re-evaluate 
and modify their plans to enable a more effective response to a pandemic crisis if one occurs. As 
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discussed previously, topping the list of important general planning aspects was the need for 
good leadership as reflected in a committed and decisive pandemic planning chairperson 
surrounded by committee members and other key campus personnel each knowing their 
responsibilities and capable of carrying them out during a crisis.  
Ranking next in importance were aspects dealing with providing food, water, shelter and 
other support for those remaining on campus during the pandemic period, providing for students 
unable to return home or essential personnel maintaining campus facilities during the pandemic. 
High on the list of importance is staying in communication with everyone remaining on campus, 
or those working from home as well as those in the community providing service to the 
university. Factual and timely communication is essential to limit the spreading of false rumors 
that can arise creating unnecessary fear, selfish acts, costly mistakes and poor community 
relations all of which can make responding or recovering from a pandemic period more difficult.  
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  Question 19 - Ranking the Importance of Human Resource Aspects to Pandemic 
Preparedness Plans 
As in the previous question, respondents to Question 19 were asked to assign numerical Likert 
grades (0-4) on the importance of 14 human resource aspects relating to their Pandemic 
Preparedness Plans. Thirty-three universities applied scores to each aspects of this question. Two 
universities skipped one aspect rating each. Table 16 presents the results in descending order of 
importance for each aspect based on the mean Likert score of the respondents.    
Unlike the General aspect scoring, none of the mean Likert scores for the Human 
Resource (HR) aspects exceeded 3.0. The two highest scored HR aspects in this question, with 
mean Likert scores of 2.55 and 2.53 respectively, were defining the criteria for suspending 
university operations and determining critical faculty and staff needs, closely followed by 
drafting a campus shutdown plan at 2.45. Between 19 and 23 universities rated these elements 
with a moderate or high priority with only 6 to 9 universities scoring these aspects as essential to 
the pandemic Plan. 
Other HR aspects rated as moderately important during a pandemic, with mean Likert 
scores ranging between 2.12 and 2.36, included issues such as restricting travel, assuring 
faculty/staff communications, drafting plans for suspending athletic or social events and 
reopening campus to such events.  Between 19 and 25 universities scored these HR issues with 
moderate to high importance. Only 3 to 5 universities out of the total had these aspects rated as 
essential elements of their plans, while 2 to 6 respondents made no mention of them in their 
plans.  
At the lower end of the Likert scoring, with means ranging between 1.75 and 2.09, were 
the HR issues of planning for increased absenteeism when child daycare centers close, 
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establishing liberal work from home policies and providing technologies and access to office 
records allowing productive work from home to happen. Modified leave and payroll policies and 
cross training of personnel to perform key jobs were also scored in the moderate range with more 
universities (4 to 7) having no mention of these aspects in their plans (0 points) vs. only 1 to 4 
respondents rating them as essential elements ( 4 Likert points).  
Table 16: Rank Order of Importance for Human Resource Aspects of a Pandemic Plan 
 
Human Resource Aspect of 
Pandemic Plan 
No 
Mention  
0 points 
 
Low  
Priority 
1 point 
Moderate  
Priority 
2 points 
High  
Priority 
3 points 
Essential  
Element  
4 points 
Mean 
Likert Score 
1. Define criteria for suspending 
university operations 
5 0 9 10  9 2.55 
2. Determine critical faculty/staff 
needs 
3 0 12 11  6 2.53 
3. Draft plan for shutting down 
campus 
5 1 8 12  7 2.45 
4. Restrict travel during pandemic 
period 
2 5 9 13  4 2.36 
5. Plan for faculty/staff 
communication during shutdown 
2 3 15 10  3 2.27 
6. Assure accuracy of faculty & 
staff contact information 
4 3 11 10  5 2.27 
7. Provisions for suspending 
athletic or social events 
5 4 9 10  5 2.18 
8. Draft plan for reopening campus 6 0 11 12  3 2.12  
9. Plan for increased absenteeism 
due to child care closure 
4 5 12  8 4 2.09 
10. Establish liberal work from 
home policies 
4 5 13 7  4 2.06 
11. Develop policy for personnel 
lacking paid leave 
7 3 12 8  3 1.96 
12. Facilitate technology allowing 
productive work from home 
6 4 13 7  3 1.91 
13. Assure home access to key 
records and files 
4 7 13 8  1 1.85 
14. Cross training of employees 
critical to operations 
6 5 16  5 1 1.75 
 
Human Resource aspects included in this survey looked at business continuity, labor 
relations, leave policies, staff communications, and event coordination. The Likert scoring, 
prioritizing the importance of these aspects by survey respondents, named suspending university 
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operations, providing critical faculty and staff needs and drafting plans for shutting down campus 
as the top three factors. Interestingly, even the three highest ranked issues averaged just over a 
2.5 level of importance on a 4 point Likert scale. 
The list of priorities with low to moderate Likert scores ranging from 1.7 to 1.9 were 
cross training of employees to perform critical functions, remote access to key records and files 
and providing technologies permitting staff to work from home. Various other issues such as 
travel restrictions, postponing classes and social events and other faculty or staff policy changes 
rank in the middle of the 14 human resource aspects considered. One reason for the lower 
priority scores given these Human Resource considerations in pandemic planning may be that 
the General Aspects considered in Question 18 and the Medical Aspects listed in Question 20 are 
more prominently addressed in CDC and other published pandemic plans. It could also be that a 
rapid response to an emerging pandemic crisis with effective leadership, good plan 
implementation and proper medical attention overrides concerns about employee needs, 
paychecks and maintaining business continuity. While these Human Resource aspects are 
important in the long run for a swifter campus recovery, in this survey, they are secondary to 
protecting the health and safety of those involved in the initial pandemic response.  
 Question 20 - Ranking the Importance of Medical/Health Aspects to Pandemic 
Preparedness Plans 
In the final survey question, respondents again assigned 0 to 4 Likert scores to each of 15 
medical or health aspects based on the importance to their Pandemic Plans. Thirty-three (33) 
universities responded to this question again with two universities missing one aspect in their 
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answer. Table 17 presents the results in descending order of importance for each medical/ health 
aspect based on the mean Likert scores applied by the respondents.  
As seen in Table 17, the top three ranked medical/health related aspects in university 
pandemic preparedness plans were 1) recommendations for hand hygiene, 2) encouraging sick 
employees to stay away from campus and 3) having aggressive flu vaccination programs. 
Between 24 and 27 of the 33 universities responding to this question rated these aspects as high 
or essentially important to pandemic planning.  
Aspect numbers 4 to 8 relating to communications with local, national and global medical 
agencies, setting common sense infection prevention and cleaning guidelines ranked slightly 
lower with 20 or 22 Universities giving them high and essential scores. Factors 9-13 dealing with 
personal medical screening, quarantine provisions, stockpiling medical supplies and protecting 
high risk individuals were rated less important to the plans with between 12 and 17 universities 
scoring them high or essential element ratings.  
Aspects 14 and 15, setting the requirements for vaccinating students, faculty and staff 
received the lowest importance ratings with 14 universities not mentioning them at all in their 
pandemic plans or scoring them low to moderate in priority. Nine and ten of the 33 respondents 
still scored these vaccination requirements highly important to essential for pandemic 
preparedness planning.  
Among the highest ranked Likert scores noted in this study were the Medical and Health 
aspects addressed in survey question number 20. During a flu pandemic, as with other contagious 
illnesses, people understand the importance of washing their hands, staying home when sick and 
getting vaccinated to prevent infectious disease (CDC 2009). These were the top three issues 
ranked on the survey with Likert scores ranging from 2.97 to 3.09. This message is reiterated 
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time and again in the media and by health care professionals whenever an infectious illness is at 
play. Paying attention to federal and community health alerts concerning a possible pandemic 
along with recommendations for health screening, social distancing, infection prevention actions 
and quarantine were also among the top ranked aspects of this question.  
 
 Table 17: Rank Order of Importance for Medical/Health Aspects of a Pandemic Plan 
 
Medical / Health Aspect of 
Pandemic Plan 
No 
Mention  
0 points 
 
Low  
Priority 
1 point 
Moderate  
Priority 
2 points 
High  
Priority 
3 points 
Essential  
Element  
4 points 
Mean 
Likert Score 
1. Hand Hygiene recommendations 2 1 3 12  14 3.09 
2. Advise sick employees to stay 
home 
1 0 8 14  10 2.97 
3. Coordinate flu vaccination 
program on campus 
2 0 4 18  9 2.97 
4. Communicate with hospitals & 
health departments  
2 0 10 9  11 2.84 
5. Inform committee of CDC, 
WHO & FEMA flu updates 
3 3 6 7 14  2.82 
6. Recommend surface cleaning 
practices 
3 1 8 11  10 2.73 
7. Recommend social distancing 
requirements 
2 5 4 11  11 2.73 
8. Establish cough & sneeze 
control guidelines 
3 2 7 13  8 2.64 
9. Set quarantine provisions for on 
campus students 
4 2 12 7  8 2.39 
10. On campus flu screening of 
employees 
4 4 8 12  5 2.302 
11. Set quarantine provisions for 
faculty, staff & students returning 
from travel 
3 5 13 7 5  2.18 
12. Stockpile flu related medical 
supplies 
4 6 7 13  3 2.15 
13. Develop plan to ID and protect 
higher risk individuals 
5 7 8  9 4 2.00 
14. Set flu vaccination 
requirements for faculty & staff 
7 7 10  5 4 1.88 
15. Set flu vaccination 
requirements for students 
7 7 9 6  4 1.79 
 
As the pandemic flu approaches a university campus, recommended restrictions by health 
agencies are expected to increase. Many of these health restrictions received lower priority 
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rankings on the survey with Likert scores ranging from 1.79 to 2.39. People in general don’t like 
to be told what to do for their personal healthcare as evidenced by firings over flu shot refusal, 
misconceptions about flu vaccines, pharmaceutical conspiracy theories etc. (Health Impact News 
2014). Doctors, nurses, paramedics, and other healthcare providers, however, are serious about 
this advice. Even non-medical personnel, private citizens, will put themselves in harm’s way to 
help others in need even at great personal risk to themselves. However, personal interests and the 
basic drive for self-preservation may tend to overshadow ethical or moral inclinations to protect 
others when a medical panic sets in. Violence and hording, may also affect who will get treated 
when medications supplies run short or essential personnel are absent to provide help as 
evidenced by the Ebola outbreak in West Africa (Draper, et.al. 2008), Mody, 2007, OSHA, 
2009).  
  SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The purpose of this survey research study was to evaluate pandemic influenza preparedness at 
major universities in the United States and to gauge their efforts at maintaining a high level of 
preparedness in the time period since the pandemic flu outbreak in 2009-2010. In reviewing 
answers to the 20 questions in this survey, this researcher attempted to determine whether the 
surveyed university emergency plans were in substantial agreement with current CDC and WHO 
guidelines for effectively and comprehensively preparing for, responding to and recovering from 
pandemic emergencies at their institution and in the nearby community. 
Survey questionnaires were e-mailed to CSHEMA (Campus Safety, Health and 
Environmental Management Association) destinations using the Qualtrics® survey software 
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required by the University of Pittsburgh. Of the 216 surveys e-mailed, 114 (53%) were opened 
by the recipients. Thirty-six universities participated in the survey with 33 answering most of the 
applicable questions leaving a few answers incomplete. While the overall survey return rate of 
16.7% was lower than desired, the data obtained did provide insight into some of the current 
thinking about Pandemic Planning at larger U.S. universities.  
Descriptive analysis was performed on all 20 survey questions, including the first three 
questions on enrollment figures, the percentage of students housed on campus and the population 
density surrounding the main university campus. Given the number of responses and the 
anonymous nature of the survey, comparative statistics were deemed infeasible using population 
or location data from questions 2 and 3 so descriptive analysis continued for questions 4-10 on 
how pandemic plans and committees were organized, structured and administered. A 
comparative statistical analysis using Likert scoring was performed on Question 11 to better 
evaluate replies addressing how quickly university pandemic committees believed they could 
learn about arising needs, develop new response strategies and change their emergency plans 
during a crisis. While Likert scores indicated that approximately 77% of the responding 
universities on average could learn develop and make changes to their pandemic plans within a 
week, less than 24% on average indicated they could accomplish these tasks in one day or less. 
Descriptive analysis resumed in questions 12-17, which addressed planning methodology, plan 
revisions and enhancements for issues concerning vaccinations, responsibilities, supply 
stockpiles, agreements with outside agencies and communications via social media.  
Likert scores were also applied to the final three questions to determine the relative 
priorities applied to the general, medical and human resource aspects of university pandemic 
plans. The Likert scores, totaled from survey replies, were used to give some measure as to 
 130 
where the pooled universities were investing their time, talents and money when developing 
emergency preparedness plans. This scoring was done with the hope of providing universities 
some theoretical benchmarks for where to expend their resources, better enabling them to invoke 
an effective response to a pandemic flu crisis if one occurs. The mean Likert scores were 
calculated for these questions based on the number of survey respondents to each question   
 In summary, this study made an effort to survey key individuals from emergency 
planning groups at larger universities in the U.S. to gather information on what is important in 
their pandemic flu plans and how their committees and plans are structured. The survey 
responses gave an indication that many of the university plans were in substantial agreement 
with current CDC and WHO guidelines for effectively and comprehensively anticipating, 
preparing for, responding to and recovering from pandemic emergencies at their institution and 
in the nearby community. Some shortcomings, particularly those involving Federal agency 
collaboration, lower priorities given some human resource planning aspects and practice drills 
were noted. The data generated from this research study will hopefully provide pandemic flu 
planners with useful comparisons to their peer universities for judging when their plans are 
sufficiently robust to meet a pandemic threat and to minimize the impact on their campus in the 
face of rising costs, shifting university priorities and increasing demands on their time. 
Logistical limitations, priority given emergency preparedness, budget restrictions of 
public vs. private universities, risk tolerance, available resources from communities, cooperation 
from state or local health departments and nearby medical centers and support from local police, 
fire and EMS are just some of the issues universities need to consider when developing their 
pandemic emergency plans.   
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 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This dissertation was written from the perspective of an Environmental Health and Safety 
(EH&S) professional for EH&S Directors and other university personnel responsible for 
developing and managing Pandemic Preparedness Programs. Its goal was to give university 
leaders a compass to determine if they had optimized their committee participation, planning 
scope, plan content and level of effort with regards to their Emergency Preparedness Program to 
assure an effective response to and recovery from a future pandemic event.  
The final determination of this optimization can only be determined after the pandemic 
occurs and a comprehensive study is made of the outcomes at each institution. However, 
constructive information on what to include and setting priorities is needed to compare a 
university program to model Pandemic Plans developed by Federal or International agencies 
tasked with disease surveillance and maintaining public health. Also, much can be learned by 
comparing a university’s Pandemic Plan with those of peer institutions in the struggle to develop 
an effective plan for their university. With these intended goals, this dissertation now offers the 
following conclusions and recommendations.  
   This study was a survey-based research project with quantitative descriptive analysis of 
data from the survey questionnaire responses received. A Qualtrics® e-mail survey was sent to 
Environmental Health and Safety Directors at universities across the U.S. assessing Emergency 
Preparedness Committee organization and their level of pandemic influenza preparedness in 
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comparison to a response framework developed by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta (CDC, 2010). The design of the questionnaire and data analyses 
was intended to provide university pandemic plan coordinators with metrics on Pandemic 
Committee organization, planning methodologies, key elements to include in the plan and when 
they have optimized their strategies i.e. have a comprehensive plan in place for a pandemic flu 
emergency on their campus relative to other peer universities and in comparison to CDC 
guidelines. The next three sections will evaluate the survey questions’ effectiveness in answering 
each of the three main research questions.  
 PANDEMIC FLU COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION 
This research question asked, “When organizing Pandemic Flu Committees, do universities 
optimize representation by departments, campus groups and outside agencies?” This question 
was addressed in the collective answers to survey questions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14 & 16. The 
survey findings of this dissertation demonstrate that the CDC/WHO Pandemic Flu Guidelines 
have influenced planning efforts for most of the universities polled in this study. Based on the 
higher percentages (60-83%) of universities reporting current pandemic plans, frequent updates, 
active committees, participating departments and high level leadership it was apparent that 
federal guidelines were being followed by the majority of respondents.  
Optimizing representation on a Pandemic Flu committee is going to depend on the size 
and location of the university along with the number of students living on campus assumed to be 
the responsibility of the Student Health program. These issues were addressed in the first three 
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survey questions that were focused on larger, doctoral degree granting universities who were also 
CSHEMA members.   
In their 2010 guidance document of influenza response for higher education, the CDC 
provided a listing of key decision makers and stakeholders to be involved in pandemic flu 
preparations at universities. The list included the following departments or outside organizations: 
local and state health departments, Homeland Security agencies, campus security and emergency 
managers, student affairs and residence life, communications staff, physical plant staff, food 
services, student and faculty leadership, community representatives, and student families. 
This study of larger CSHEMA universities indicated that the majority of these campus 
groups and local outside agencies were listed as planning committee members on the collected 
surveys. Although, student families, federal agencies and individual students and faculty 
members were give lower priorities or were not specifically listed on any survey response. The 
universities Directors responding to the survey appear to have an understanding about the key 
decision makers at their institutions and the importance of committee members being able to 
work together, learn of needs, develop plans and change strategies, often times very quickly, to 
achieve a better outcome.  
 ELEMENTS TO INCLUDE IN A PANDEMIC PLAN 
This research question asked, “Do universities’ Pandemic Flu Plans include elements that are 
comprehensive in scope and content?”  This question was addressed in survey questions 8, 10, 
14, 15, 16, 18, 19 & 20. One intended outcome of this study was to broadly determine if larger 
universities have let their pandemic preparedness efforts lapse in the six years since the last 
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declared flu pandemic or have they modified their plans annually incorporating the key elements 
included with the CDC/WHO recommendations of 2010. Pandemic Plan modifications 
recommended by the CDC in their “Preparing for the Flu” publication included the following 11 
steps. (CDC, 2010) 
1. Review and revise flu or emergency response plans annually including plans to protect 
high risk students, faculty and staff. 
2. Collaborate with local health departments, social organizations and businesses in the 
community.  
3. Communicate with vendors who supply critical products and services ensuring continued 
service during flu period. 
4. Update emergency contact information for students, parents, staff and faculty.  
5. Establish contacts for local medical, public health and education agencies.  
6. Develop a plan to staff key positions at your institution (housing, medical, facilities). 
7. Encourage good hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette via posters, flyers and other direct 
education means.  
8. Develop flu prevention resource materials to communicate with students, parents, faculty 
and staff. (CDC Toolkit, 2009) 
9. Adjust sick leave and absenteeism policies allowing faculty, staff and student to stay 
home without negative consequences during flu episodes. 
10. Develop options to allow work and lessons to continue from home if university suspends 
classes or closes campus.  
11. Help students and staff understand the role they play in controlling the spread of flu.  
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The data shown in Question #8 of the survey indicated that only 24% of the universities 
polled have updated their pandemic plans every year as recommended. This percentage shows 
low compliance with the CDC guidelines. However, 74% of the universities responding had 
updated their pandemic plans at least once since the last declared flu pandemic in 2010 with 42% 
reportedly updating their plans every one to three years. Most of the CDC recommendations 
listed above did appear in the university survey elements for questions 18-20. In particular, 
collaboration with local health departments, hospitals and EMS, stockpiling critical supplies, 
designation of key personnel or services, infection prevention, emergency communications and 
suspending campus operations each given higher priorities on the Likert scaling in Questions 18-
20.  
Scoring the level of emergency preparedness for each plan with regard to pandemic flu 
surveillance, risk assessment, continuity preparedness, assigned responsibilities, community 
participation, counter measures, communications, training, and overall response to an influenza 
pandemic would be difficult given the anonymous way survey data was collected in this study. A 
qualitative evaluation would be achievable only if each university had self-rating their flu plans 
or if their emergency preparedness websites were evaluated using the pandemic planning 
guidelines from the CDC to provide a rating scale or comparison standard. Perhaps this kind of 
qualitative analysis can be considered in future studies.  
 IMPLICATIONS OF UNIVERSITY PREPAREDNESS 
This research question asked, “How does the Pandemic Flu Plan fit into the larger university 
emergency planning framework for ongoing course instruction, research, and business 
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continuity?” This question was addressed in survey questions 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19 & 20. Pandemic Plans have many unique components, especially from a medical 
standpoint that are not included in most University Emergency Plans. While Pandemic Plans 
often stand alone, many elements can be incorporated into an All Hazard Emergency Plan to ease 
the burden on campus planning committees. Many of the business continuity efforts during a 
pandemic should be similar to efforts needed during other long duration or high impact 
emergencies disrupting campus life. Another objective of this dissertation was to answer the 
practical question posed by many university pandemic planners around the country giving them 
some idea when they have optimized their efforts to assure an effective response to and recovery 
from a pandemic emergency. In reality, optimization is a hypothetical answer that no one can 
really determine until the pandemic emergency takes place and university officials have an 
opportunity to judge if their response was sufficient to minimize the short term and long term 
impacts of the crisis.  
The answer to this research question as indicated by the survey data has determined that 
the universities surveyed have at least considered making plans to maintain some semblance of 
business continuity during a campus emergency especially regarding education continuance, 
research efforts and event planning? Again it would be difficult to judge if a university’s 
business continuity plans are sufficient or not until after the event has happened and a critique of 
the emergency response effectiveness is made. While these “post mortem” critiques are 
commonplace in every aspect of our society, waiting for a potentially ruinous pandemic to occur 
before developing a university preparedness or business continuity plan seems unwise. Certainly, 
learning what today’s experts in the medical, university management or EH&S professions are 
recommending for pandemic preparedness combined with how peer institutions and their 
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emergency planning committees are proposing to respond and recover from any crisis can set 
benchmarks for which to strive.   
 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
A number of limitations were encountered during this survey including the following; 
• Less than 53% of the universities acknowledged receipt of the survey questionnaire. 
• Less than half of those receiving the questionnaire attempted to answer all questions. 
• Requesting total student populations in Question number 1 may have biased school size 
relating to pandemic preparedness as commuters, online learners and grad students living 
off campus would likely not be part of the university’s response plan.  
• Six respondents to Question number 2 asking for the on-campus student population 
answered the question incorrectly thereby invalidating use of this data in statistical 
analysis. 
• Of the 44 university Directors submitting the survey, eight (8) were excluded from the 
study because they answered six or fewer questions.  
• Of the 36 accepted surveys, five respondents did not answer between 3 and 9 questions, 
either because they did not have a pandemic plan or committee and considered a response 
inappropriate.  
• The anonymity requirement for the survey prohibited contacting the respondents to 
clarify survey responses. 
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• Most university websites publicize limited information on their pandemic plans often 
omitting details about plan responsibilities and response strategies making fact checking 
difficult even when the responding university was known to the researcher.   
• This survey assumed the individual completing the questionnaire was the most qualified 
to provide the correct information. Some may not have had the information at hand 
leaving answers blank.  
• Respondent’s unfamiliarity with All Hazard Planning verses the Incident Command 
System or the SITAR planning methodologies may have resulted in an incorrect 
characterization of their university pandemic plans.  
Strategies to minimize or correct these limitations and to more clearly define the survey 
questions would certainly improve the outcome of this survey for future studies.  
  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS 
  CDC/WHO Flu Prevention Strategies 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a pandemic preparedness strategy 
for institutions of higher education during and after the WHO’s pandemic flu declaration in 
2009. The following key elements included in this CDC prevention strategy have remained 
essentially unchanged since they were presented (CDC, 2010). 
1. Encourage vaccination against the flu, with higher risk groups first in line. 
2. Facilitate self-isolation of students and staff having flu symptoms, at home if possible. 
3. Establish system to check on and care for students remaining on campus. (Flu buddy) 
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4. Revise absenteeism policies to discourage sick individuals coming to campus. 
5. Establish distance learning programs and work from home policies during a pandemic. 
6. Promote sneeze and cough etiquette and hand hygiene providing soap, water and hand 
sanitizer in convenient locations.  
7. Avoid close contact with sick individuals (social distancing). 
8. Perform periodic cleaning of frequently touched surfaces (door knobs, hand rails, etc.) 
9. Seek medical treatment and anti-viral medication (if prescribed) at first manifestation of 
flu (Gavura, 2014). 
10. Use PPE (gloves, masks) when close contact with sick individuals cannot be avoided. 
11. Limit or suspend campus events during flu period and encourage sick not to attend.  
12. Establish restrictions for study abroad students, campus tours, sporting events, and other 
large gatherings during flu period.  
 Added Strategies as Flu Severity Increases 
When the CDC and WHO determine that the Flu Pandemic is spreading globally, nationally or 
regionally the following additional actions are recommended by the CDC, (2010) 
1. Encourage students, faculty and staff to remain at home continuing to perform education 
and work activities as best they can using distance learning, Blackboard chat rooms, 
remote file access, etc.  
2. Increase social distancing as much as possible (6 foot minimum recommended). 
3. Postpone or cancel campus events. 
4. Extend the self-isolation period to 7 days when flu symptoms are realized.  
5. Suspend classes and close buildings when untenable to continue operations.  
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6. Establish clear lines of communication with all students, their parents, faculty and staff 
via campus website, emergency alerts and social media.  
7. Frequently update communications for all aspects of campus life affected announcing 
what is suspended, what services are available, campus restrictions, medical treatments 
and who to call for additional information. 
Comparing these straightforward CDC recommendations with the collective survey responses, it 
was apparent that, as a group, the universities completing the survey appeared to have an 
understanding of what is required or recommended in their Pandemic Emergency Plans. Looking 
at the individual survey replies, as one might expect, universities committing more time and 
resources to their flu preparation plans have addressed most if not all of the key elements 
stressed by the CDC and WHO.  
 The Reality of University Emergency Planning and Some Practical Considerations 
No one would argue that having a Pandemic Plan that addresses all of the key aspects of a CDC 
or WHO model plan is a starting point for a university planning committee. Taking the basic 
federal guidelines and comparing it with your peer university groups or local emergency 
planning organizations, customizing it to better fit the particular needs or those of the community 
can make it even stronger. Universities, however, are busy places and department managers 
within those institutions constantly struggle to complete day-to-day tasks. The Environmental 
Health and Safety or Public Safety Department whose job it might be to develop, implement and 
manage Emergency Management Programs on campus, must consider many hazards or risks and 
set priorities, addressing first the higher probability, higher impact issues.  
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Figure 2 displays an example of a decision making matrix to help organizations decide 
where to commit their time, talent and resources for cost effective emergency management.  
 
 
Figure 2: Decision Matrix for Prioritizing Campus Emergencies 
Source: Created by the author. 
 
In an All Hazard planning effort the likelihood of a pandemic flu or some other deadly 
illness impacting a university campus is a lower probability event when compared to a fire, 
weather emergency, riot, or terrorist event. Despite the lower probability often perceived for a 
pandemic flu, should one occur, the potential for loss of life and campus disruption could be 
devastating. In light of these facts, University Pandemic Planners should consider implementing 
the following recommendations based on this dissertation study.  
1. Each year, planning leaders should determine if there have been any changes to federal, 
state or local guidelines and CDC or WHO flu alerts that impact their Pandemic Plans. If 
so Plans should be modified to address these issues.  
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2. Each year, planning leaders should verify that all University committee members are still 
willing and able to serve and that their contact information is current.  
3. Each year, University management should be informed on the status of their Pandemic 
Plan as well as other Emergency Plans at their campus. Management should also be made 
aware of their Emergency Planning Committee participants to acknowledge this 
important responsibility and confirm their continued support.  
4. Each year, the outside agency coordinator on the Pandemic Flu Committee should 
contact each agencies listed in the Plan to confirm their continued support and to update 
contact information and current expectations under the Plan. Periodically Mutual Aid 
Agreements should be developed to formalize what resources would be made available 
during a crisis or emergency.  
5. In addition, this same person or persons should contact University management to 
confirm that they are still committed to holding up the university’s end of these 
reciprocating agreements to provide supplies, temporary housing and aid to these outside 
groups during a crisis or emergency.  
6. Every two years, University Emergency Planning Committees should meet to reevaluate 
their plans to prioritize the time and resources allocated to the possible crises events. 
Perhaps a simple 4 block matrix, as shown in Figure 2, can be created to segregate high 
and low probability emergencies further classifying them as high or low impact events 
for their University Campus location.  
7. Every two years Emergency Planning Committees should perform a SWOT analysis to 
evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats impacting the campus. 
Using this information, planners can determine what equipment and resources to 
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stockpile and in what quantities to assure adequate supplies during a crisis. The matrix 
shown in Figure 2 could also be used to stock up on supplies useful for multiple 
emergencies, especially items that have a long shelf life or can be part of a rotating stock 
of materials used during day to day university operations in order to minimize waste.   
8. Pandemic Planning Committee should perform table top exercises every 2-3 years to be 
sure that all parties know their roles when a pandemic is declared by the CDC or WHO. 
Outside agencies should be invited to these exercises to better evaluate established 
coordination efforts aimed at minimizing duplication and cost when response plans come 
together.  
9. Every 3 years Emergency Planners should gather data to estimate how many students, 
faculty or staff might have to remain on campus becoming the responsibility of the 
university to care for during a pandemic emergency. Ideally, the intent is to send most 
people home to minimize the flu impact on campus, leaving only those students unable to 
return home or key staff required to remain on campus under the care of the university.   
10. Management, faculty and students from medical schools, nursing schools and other 
health related professions at the university should be asked to commit their time and 
talents during a pandemic emergency when Hospital staff and resources are over 
extended. An example of this would be using student volunteers to administer seasonal 
flu vaccinations or assist during campus blood drives.  
Another consideration for Pandemic Planners, during this modern age of instant global 
communications combined with the diligent “flu watch” efforts of medical epidemiologists, is 
the likelihood that no one will be surprised by a flu pandemic. Local health departments and 
 144 
those they serve should have several weeks warning about an emerging flu pandemic giving 
universities and others time to plan and prepare.   
 Federal Disaster Preparedness Efforts 
All three of the research questions in this dissertation involved some level of coordination with 
outside agencies including the Federal Government. Universities are encouraged to develop these 
relationships and to keep them “in the loop” when developing campus emergency plans. FEMA 
and the CDC can provide much needed information, support and critical supplies during an 
emergency.  
National Public Radio (NPR) recently reported on Government warehouses stocked with 
essential medicines and supplies ready for public health catastrophes (Greenfield-Boyce, 2016). 
Reportedly there are at least six of these warehouses strategically placed around the U.S. to 
provide rapid access to “at risk” population centers in time of need. The locations of these 
warehouses and their exact contents remain undisclosed in the interest of national security. The 
warehouses are operated by a number of federal agencies ranging from the Department of 
Defense to the Food and Drug Administration. 
Universities who are aware of available government programs and have developed a 
working relationship with the local agency contacts could incorporate some of these Federal 
resources into their planning efforts and develop protocols for gaining access to them in a crisis. 
Perhaps a mutual aid agreement can be established whereby the agency can make use of some 
university facilities for overflow casualty housing or sharing of resources stockpiled at the 
university.  
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During the NPR interview and site visit to one of these warehouses, CDC Program 
Director, Greg Burel commented that the Strategic National Stockpiles were first created in 1999 
in preparations against terrorist attacks involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Some 
of the current inventory, valued at more than 7 billion dollars, consists of vaccines against 
smallpox, anthrax and other bioterrorism agents, chemical agent antidotes, and medicines used to 
treat radiation exposures. Since the 9/11 attack in 2001, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the 2009 
flu pandemic the importance and focus of these warehouses has expanded to provide medical 
triage supplies, antiviral medicine, food, water and other essentials required during many kinds 
of national emergencies.  
One of the most interesting items described by the NPR reporter (Greenfield-Boyce, 
2016) was the 12-hour push packages. Approximately 130 of these 50 ton shipping containers at 
each warehouse are pre-packed with pharmaceuticals, ventilators, IV fluids and other essential 
emergency supplies designed to be loaded on a truck beds, trains or transport aircraft for delivery 
to Emergency Responders at the disaster site within 12 hours. The containers are color coded and 
packed with all of the supplies needed to respond to a particular kind of emergency. Custom 
supplies can also be ordered from a warehouse catalog to accompany the push packages as 
needed.  
At the urging of Congress, a committee was formed to study the effectiveness and 
sustainability of these warehouses. The committee determined that although the warehouses 
contain many kinds of the essential supplies, some of which, like vaccines, will expire after 
several years and continually need to be discarded and replaced at a high cost. In addition, the 
audit determined that some state and local public health resources have declined over the past 
decade with a loss of 50,000 health officials. These local health officials and responders are the 
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individuals who would be expected to receive, deploy and distribute the warehouse shipments 
during an emergency. Despite these logistical downsides, directors at the warehouse are 
confident that they can still provide essential supplies during an emergency and they continue to 
operate (Greenfield-Boyce, 2016). One might question if universities are on the list of recipients 
for such emergency supplies or if they would have access to these resources. Logically, larger 
universities and their affiliated medical centers with the available of dormitory rooms, 
auditoriums and gymnasiums to serve as potential triage sites should be considered as a key 
resource for community pandemic response. In additional the medical personnel available at 
most large universities, including doctors, nurses, medical researchers, as well as volunteer 
medical or nursing students and those from other health related professions and could prove 
invaluable during a pandemic crisis.  
 The Next Pandemic 
A 2016 study conducted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National  
Bio-surveillance Integration Center (NBIC) concluded that the next influenza pandemic would 
cost twice as much as previously estimated (Society for Risk Analysis, 2016). These costs 
however would depend on how well the public, government and businesses prepare for and 
respond to the epidemic. Risk experts concluded that cost could be reduced from $45 to $34 
billion dollars with diligent use of vaccines and rapid deployment of more effective antiviral 
medications.  
Most of the economic losses from a pandemic would be related to hospital expenses and 
lost business productivity from deaths, illnesses, and reduced workforces staying home to deal 
with family issues. Besides the ineffective use of flu vaccines, further cost reductions could be 
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realized if the public would comply with CDC recommendation to avoid confined public places 
like subway stations and airports, limit attendance at concerts and sporting events during a 
pandemic flu, practice social distancing and quarantine sick individuals (Society for Risk 
Analysis, 2016). 
The DHS study concluded that, for both seasonal and pandemic flu outbreaks, 
vaccinations are the most effective way to reduce the overall spread of the flu and to limit the 
resulting economic impacts. With the addition of effective avoidance and resilience measures the 
study estimated that economic losses to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) could be 
reduced by almost $10 billion dollars (Society for Risk Analysis, 2016).  
 Worst-Case Scenarios: How Should We Plan? 
Sandman, (2007) and Harmon (2011) speculating on the worst-case scenarios of the next 
influenza pandemic raised issues on risk communications, preparation planning and business 
continuity. Sandman (2007) discusses the dilemmas faced by senior executives of any 
organization having to make business decisions for a worst case scenario like a pandemic 
influenza outbreak. The difficulty comes from simultaneously thinking about a risk that has 
multiple adverse outcomes but is unpredictable in its likelihood to occur. While not intellectually 
difficult, knowing that most catastrophic events are unlikely, leaders logically tend to pick one 
above the other. However, when emotions cloud intellectual reasoning and the focus is placed on 
the hard lessons learned from past horrific events in a worst case scenario, a decision is made to 
take maximum precautions regardless of the costs. On the other hand, when decision makers 
emotionally focus on the low probability of a serious threat, a choice is made not to allocate time 
or resources to pandemic preparedness.  
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Sandman (2007) goes on to state that either of these emotional decisions are the wrong 
approach to take when planning for or responding to a predicted flu event. Acting on the horrific 
nature of a worst-case outcome runs the risk of creating panic among the planners or the people 
at risk. Telling people that the risk is very unlikely is taking a gamble with the hope that nothing 
bad will happen leaving your institution totally unprepared if your decision is wrong. In the 
interest of maintaining credibility and honesty, Sandman (2007) suggests that leaders explain to 
their constituents that predicting the severity of a flu outbreak would be impossible because there 
are too few facts known in advance. Better to assure them that you will be ever vigilant to 
reliable reports on where flu is spreading and how fast, keeping everyone updated on planned 
responses appropriate to the risks. In summary, Sandman (2007) recommends using the 
following guidelines when communicating with constituents.  
• Don’t claim that a worst-case flu scenario is likely. 
•  Don’t downplay how bad a worst-case flu could be. 
•  Don’t rely too much on numbers to convey your point. 
• Always put your worst-case scenario into context by not understating or overstating      
how bad the flu may become. 
•    Consider the importance of planning for less than the worst case flu scenarios. 
• Remind decision makers that it is good business practice to hedge your bets. 
• Expect the unexpected and prepare to change your plans.  
In a Scientific American article where the author interviewed several leading experts 
attending a European conference on influenza, Harmon (2011) related how important it was for 
researchers and public health officials to make use of the latest scientific discoveries about flu 
virus behavior along with the past lessons learned when preparing for the next influenza 
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pandemic. In addition, researchers must continue to study how these viruses mutate, how they 
grow and spread from animal species to humans, why they preferably infect victims of certain 
age groups and which of the virus mutations under surveillance might emerge as the next 
pandemic flu.  
The article also conveys the historical fact that during the 2009 flu pandemic declared by 
the WHO, experts were closely watching bird (H5N1) and swine (H1N1) flu outbreaks spreading 
through animal populations in Africa and Southeast Asia (Harmon, 2011). These experts were 
caught off guard when the H1N1 swine flu virus began infecting humans in Mexico and quickly 
began spreading into the United States leaving little time for medical experts to prepare treatment 
regimens or develop a vaccine. Fortunately, this flu outbreak was milder than expected and we 
learned that older adults had retained some immunity from previous flu vaccinations. We also 
learned that college age youth were reported to be at highest risk for catching the flu and 
numerous deaths were reported among this age group. This is another reason for optimized flu 
plans at a university.  
Harmon (2011) relates how efforts to understand and predict future pandemic flu 
outbreaks must continue to focus first on the spread of flu strains in animal populations around 
the globe. Mutations of these virus strains must then be studied by researchers with the goal to 
find faster ways to develop and test effective flu vaccines. The current four to six months 
required to develop a flu vaccine against an emerging pandemic virus will not be adequate. 
Harmon (2011) commented on some of the logistical challenges facing the world during the next 
pandemic influenza, namely shortages of emergency supplies, hospital beds and emergency staff 
willing to put themselves at risk. From all that has been written about pandemic preparedness 
since 2009, federal, state and local governments, health departments, emergency responders and 
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medical providers in the U.S. appear better prepared to contain, treat and recover from a 
pandemic flu but what about the rest of the world?   
World renowned experts acknowledge that global eradication of influenza viruses will be 
impossible and predicting flu severity or spread and the availability of effective treatments will 
remain uncertain (Harmon, 2011). In spite of this dilemma, our methods of communicating these 
uncertainties to the media and general public must be improved if only to gain trust and prevent 
panic during a public health response. Harmon (2011) concludes by describing three lessons 
learned from the last pandemic flu that must be put into action when planning for the next one.  
1. Organizations must make pandemic plans capable of handling many different scenarios.  
2. Pandemic plans must be comprehensive, flexible and able to adapt quickly to changing 
conditions. 
3. Plans must be kept up to date, refreshing supply stockpiles and reevaluating needs based 
on the latest research of flu viruses, exposure prevention and effective treatments. 
 Recommendations for Future Study 
Future studies of pandemic emergency planning should continue to evaluate the effectiveness of 
written emergency plans and preparedness activities stressing the importance of leadership, 
committee dedication, realistic expectations by its members, interaction with state and local 
health departments, and willingness of university partners and community stakeholders to 
participate in drills and exercises even in the face of budget cuts and low risk tolerance.   
In future studies using the Qualtrics® survey system, it would be recommended to 
formally contact the survey population in advance of the questionnaire mailing to establish a 
relationship with the individuals making them aware of the pending solicitation. In this way, 
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perhaps one can learn of the best contact person, someone who may be more knowledgeable 
about your subject and willing to participate in the survey. This was done with a Pilot group in 
this project, and while there was limited negative feedback, respondents knew what was being 
asked of them and they remained willing to complete the survey.  
Using the Qualtrics® survey system and complying with the IRB recommendation for 
making this an anonymous survey, created some problems and limited the usefulness of some 
data. One example of this was survey Question 2 that asked what percentage of students lived on 
campus. Four of the 36 respondents to this question gave a raw number rather than the 
percentage. Being unable to link these replies to the Universities, these data could not be 
included in the descriptive statistics.   
Another comparison that would have been interesting to look at was community 
involvement and support depending on the university’s location in a rural vs. an urban setting. 
The hypothesis suggested would have been that residents in a small rural community would be 
more likely to become personally involved in a pandemic tragedy at the local campus bringing 
the community together with a desire to help. Unfortunately, as the data was collected 
anonymously there was no way to determine which survey responses for Question 3 came from 
large urban universities verses smaller colleges or rural campuses. This could be a potential area 
of future research on campus/community relations.  
Future studies in this area might also compare the amount of money spent on pandemic 
preparedness based on the size of the university and its geographic location. Speculation might 
surmise that Colleges and Universities in metropolitan or urban settings might be able to share 
costs and resources with the surrounding communities in the spirit of cooperation and mutual 
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aid. This study might also focus on “Town and Gown” relationships rating them as good, fair or 
poor.  
As with most research, future studies take the lessons learned from what has been done in 
the past and move forward into uncharted territory exploring new ideas and mining additional 
information previously overlooked. This research statement is especially true for the broad world 
of emergency preparedness and even the smaller subset of pandemic preparedness where there is 
so much more to explore. Much has been learned and written about preparations, response and 
recovery from the next pandemic influenza and indeed many of the techniques and response 
action proven effective in real world events albeit on a smaller scale or with a less deadly agent.  
As previously stated about lessons learned with war planning and preparations, once the 
battle begins, often the best laid plans are found to be ineffective. Unpredictable events, genetic 
mutations, ineffective medications, unexpected reactions by stakeholders, political figures, or the 
public are just a few scenarios of what can go wrong with the best preparations.  
Any stakeholders including government experts, emergency responders, campus officials, 
local health department, medical staffs and the general public must maintain preparations and 
keep vigilant of pandemic risks. Old plans, new plans, old tools and new tools must be tested and 
revised over and again to assure effectiveness. Organizations and political structures must be 
constantly reviewed to maintain current communications and participation. Drills, exercises 
should be conducted with sufficient frequency to gage readiness and to modify plans when 
shortcomings are realized. Finally, all involved in pandemic preparedness at a university campus 
and the surrounding community must understand that successful planning can only be realized 
when a pandemic event like the flu occurs and the response is timely and effective as measured 
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by minimal fatalities, adequate care for the sick and quick restoration of classes, research and 
business operations.  
As discussed by many authors referenced in this document, planning is critical to the 
success of any operation even though plans should be expected to change. Failure to plan for an 
emergency event like a pandemic flu is a mistake likely to result in an ineffective response, a 
poor casualty outcome and a slower recovery. While not perfect, universities with an active 
emergency planning committee are better equipped to anticipate their needs, quickly recognize a 
potential problem, logically evaluate the risks and better control the outcome and cost of their 
response. Indeed, “failing to plan is planning to fail.”     
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE EVALUATING THE PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS OF A 
UNIVERSITY  
Q1. Please select one of the choices below estimating the total student population at your university’s main campus. 
o Less than 10,000 students 
o 10,001- 20,000 students 
o 20,001 – 30,000 students 
o More than 30,000 students 
Q2. Please provide a percentage estimate of students living in on-campus housing at your main university campus.  
 
 
Q3. Based on the USDA County Rural-Urban Continuum Code how is the location of your main university campus 
best described? 
 
Q4. Does your university have a written Pandemic Preparedness Plan? 
o Yes 
o Don't know 
o No 
 
Q5. Does your university have a Pandemic Preparedness Committee? 
o Yes 
o Don't know 
o No 
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 Q6. If you answered yes to Question 5, indicate each university department represented on your university's 
Pandemic Preparedness Committee. 
o Executive Office 
 
o Academic Affairs o Legal Services 
o Employee Health o Campus Security 
(Police) 
o Housing Services 
o Student Services 
 
o Student Health o Food Services 
o Human Resources o Faculty Representative o Physical Plant/ 
Facilities Mgt. 
o Health and Safety 
 
o Public Affairs o Information 
Technology 
o Communications 
 
o Registrar o Risk Management 
o Other 
__________________ 
o Other 
__________________ 
o Other 
 
Q7.   Who chairs your Pandemic Preparedness Committee? (Indicate their job title and department) 
      ___________________________________________________ 
 
Q8. How frequently has your Pandemic Preparedness Plan been updated since 2009? 
o Annually 
o Bi-annually 
o Once 
o Not Updated 
o Other ____________________ 
 
 
Q9. Which emergency management approach best describes your Pandemic Preparedness Plan? (Note descriptors).  
o All Hazard Plan (Bottom up approach, comprehensive plan, vulnerability/pragmatic model) 
o Incident Command System (top down approach, National Incident Management System, technocratic 
model, 
o Other approach (please describe) ____________________. 
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 Q10.  The SITAR Planning Model (with its 5 segments indicated by the first letter in the name) incorporates a blend 
of 5 planning models each containing characteristic methodology. Please indicate any of these SITAR model 
characteristics evident in your University Pandemic Preparedness Plan.      
o Synoptic Planning (comprehensive goal setting, qualitative, central control, feasibility, policy alternatives, 
cost/benefit analysis, detailed action plan) (1) 
o Incremental Panning (partisan intuition, past experience, democratic decision making, incremental 
response, consultative, wait and see attitudes, muddling through) (2) 
o Transactive Planning (interpersonal dialog with those affected, emphasis on human dimensions of personal 
and organizational development, economic self-interest) (3) 
o Advocacy Planning (adversarial, defense of the public interest, social justice, sensitivity to unintended 
environmental, social or  financial side effects) (4) 
o Radical Planning (self-reliant activism, mutual aid, cooperative spirit  free from outside manipulation, 
decentralized operations) (5) 
o None of these planning styles were used (6) 
 
Q11.  When a pandemic flu emergency is declaration by the CDC, rapid decision-making by a university's 
planning committee may be required as new facts are learned and the situation develops. Institutions may have to 
modify their plans numerous times to better respond to the pandemic on their campus. How would you describe your 
university planning committee's ability to learn quickly, develop contingency plans, and implement the changes 
needed for an effective pandemic response? (Mark the correct box with an x.) 
 
Contingency Slow 
 (>2 weeks) 
Somewhat slow 
(1-2 weeks) 
Average speed  
(1 week) 
Somewhat fast  
(2-6 days) 
Fast  
1 day or less) 
1. learning      
2. development      
3. change      
 
 
Q12.  Did your university revise your Pandemic Preparedness Plan after the 2009-2010 flu season? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Don't know 
 
 
Q13. If your Pandemic Preparedness Plan was changed, indicate the modifications made as a result of the 2009 
WHO pandemic declaration. 
o Enhanced flu screening policy o More aggressive flu vaccination policy 
o More committee members added o Additional job cross training 
o Updated contingency plan o Changes to stockpiling priorities 
o Added travel restrictions o More practice drills 
o Revised vendor contracts o Revised agreements with local hospitals 
o Other ____________________ o Other ____________________ 
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Q14.  Indicate responsibilities assigned to the Environmental Health and Safety Office in your Pandemic 
Preparedness Plan. 
o Pandemic Plan development and 
maintenance 
o Committee selection and coordination 
o Considerations for drills and training o Plan modification as needed 
o Maintain stockpile of flu masks, gloves, 
suits and other  pandemic flu supplies 
o Other ____________________ 
 
Q15.  Indicate critical supplies that your university stockpiles to avert shortages during a pandemic emergency. 
o Non-perishable food o Bottled water o Electrolyte drinks 
o Anti-viral medicines o Hand sanitizer o Protective gloves 
o Surgical masks o N-95 respirators o Protective suits 
o Portable beds o Linens o Cleaning supplies 
o Tissues o Disinfectant wipes o Other _____________ 
 
Q16.  Indicate outside agencies coordinating with your university's Pandemic Preparedness Committee. 
o Local hospitals o Local Administration o Local Police 
o Local Paramedics o Local Health 
Department 
o State Health Department 
o Local Businesses o Food & Beverage 
Suppliers 
o Local Aid Organizations 
o Local FEMA Office o State FEMA Office o Federal FEMA Office 
o Other _____________ o Other _____________ o  
 
Q17.  Which social media outlets might be used at your university to facilitate Pandemic Plan communications? 
o Facebook o Twitter o LinkedIn 
o Google+ o YouTube o Instagram 
o Pintrest o Tumblr o Snapchat 
o Reedit o Flickr o Other ____________ 
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Q18.  Please assign a numerical grade (0-4) to each of these general aspects based on its importance to your 
Pandemic Preparedness Plan.  
 No mention in 
plan – 0 Points 
Low priority 
element – 1 point 
Moderate priority 
element – 2 points 
High priority 
element – 3 points 
Essential element  
of plan – 4 points 
Identify 
campus plan 
leader and 
response team. 
o  o  o  o  o  
Delineate 
responsibilities 
of key 
personnel on 
campus 
o  o  o  o  o  
Identify 
decision 
makers from 
community 
and state 
partners 
o  o  o  o  o  
Action plan for 
cancelling 
classes 
o  o  o  o  o  
Action plan for 
cancelling 
sporting events 
and 
extracurricular 
activities 
o  o  o  o  o  
Action plan for 
closing campus o  o  o  o  o  
Emergency 
housing plans 
and quarantine 
o  o  o  o  o  
Plan for 
feeding and 
housing 
students unable 
to return home 
o  o  o  o  o  
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o Question 18 (continued) 
Plan for 
feeding and 
housing 
essential 
personnel 
maintaining 
critical 
facilities 
o  o  o  o  o  
Plan for 
maintaining 
key research 
facilities and 
animals 
o  o  o  o  o  
Stockpile of 
essential 
supplies and 
equipment. 
o  o  o  o  o  
Providing 
facilities for 
surge capacity 
from local 
hospitals or 
community 
o  o  o  o  o  
Emergency 
communication 
plan 
identifying key 
personnel on 
and off campus 
o  o  o  o  o  
Exercise drills 
on Campus 
 
o  o  o  o  o  
Participate in 
community 
drills 
o  o  o  o  o  
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 Q19.   Please assign a numerical grade (0-4) to each of these human resource aspects in your Pandemic 
Preparedness Plan.    
     No mention in 
plan – 0 Points 
Low priority 
element – 1 
point 
Moderate 
priority element 
– 2 points 
High priority 
element – 3 
points 
Essential 
element  of plan 
– 4 points 
Cross training of 
employees 
critical to 
operations 
o  o  o  o    
Assure accuracy 
of staff contact 
information 
o  o  o  o    
Assure access to 
key records, 
files, passwords 
o  o  o  o  o  
Establish liberal 
work from home 
policies 
o  o  o  o  o  
Develop policy 
for personnel 
lacking paid 
leave. 
o  o  o  o  o  
Facilitate 
technology 
allowing more 
people to work 
from home 
o  o  o  o  o  
Determine 
critical 
faculty/staff 
needs 
o  o  o  o  o  
Develop plan for 
faculty/staff 
communication 
during shut-
down 
o  o  o  o   
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o Q -19 (continued) 
Provisions for 
suspending 
athletic or social 
events 
o  o  o  o  o  
Restrict travel 
during pandemic 
period 
o  o  o  o  o  
Plan for 
increased 
absenteeism due 
to child care 
closure 
o  o  o  o  o  
Define criteria 
for suspending 
school 
operations 
o  o  o  o  o  
Draft plan for 
shutting down 
campus 
o  o  o  o  o  
Draft plan for 
reopening 
campus 
o  o  o  o  o  
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Q20.  Please assign a numerical grade (0-4) to each of these medical/health aspects in your Pandemic Preparedness 
Plan.   
     No mention in 
plan – 0 Points 
Low priority 
element – 1 
point 
Moderate 
priority 
element – 2 
points 
High priority 
element – 3 
points 
Essential 
element  of plan 
– 4 points 
Advise sick 
employees to 
stay home 
o  o  o  o  o  
On campus flu 
screening of 
employees 
o  o  o  o  o  
Set flu 
vaccination 
requirements 
o  o  o  o  o  
Coordinate flu 
vaccination 
program on 
campus 
o  o  o  o  o  
Inform 
committee of 
CDC, WHO and 
FEMA updates 
on pandemic 
severity status 
o  o  o  o  o  
Hand hygiene 
recommendations o  o  o  o  o  
Recommend 
surface cleaning 
practices 
o  o  o  o  o  
Recommend 
social distancing 
requirements 
o  o  o  o  o  
Establish cough 
and sneeze 
control 
guidelines 
o  o  o  o  o  
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Q -20 (continued) 
Stockpile flu 
related medical 
supplies 
o  o  o  o  o  
Develop plan to 
identify and 
protecting 
persons at higher 
risk of illness 
o  o  o  o  o  
Set quarantine 
provisions for on 
campus students 
o  o  o  o  o  
Set quarantine 
provisions for 
faculty, staff or 
students 
returning from 
travel 
o  o  o  o  o  
Communicate 
with local 
hospitals and 
state or local 
health 
departments on 
issues affecting 
university. 
o  o  o  o  o  
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APPENDIX B 
Table 18: Combined Flu Matrix for Colleges and Universities 
CDC Interval State and Local Planning Indicators College and University Response Actions 
Number 1. 
Investigation 
Interval – 
Coincides 
with WHO 
Inter-
pandemic and 
Alert phases 
Identification of novel influenza A 
Infection of animals or humans in the 
U.S. with potential implications for 
human health. 
Continuous tracking of WHO and CDC flu 
surveillance activities.  
Update the university’s emergency planning 
website with active links to CDC, WHO and 
other pandemic flu healthcare sites.  
Contact pandemic flu committee to assure that all 
individuals wishing to remain active provide 
current contact information 
Check that emergency resources such as; food, 
water, hand sanitizer, bedding, gloves, protective 
masks and other safety wear are still available. 
Begin flu awareness campaign emphasizing 
sneeze and cough etiquette, hand hygiene and 
voluntary isolation when ill to limit flu 
transmission.  
Reestablish communications with local health 
care facilities, community leaders and emergency 
services to assure mutual support of pandemic flu 
plan partners.   
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Table 18 (continued) 
Number 2. 
Recognition 
Interval – 
Overlaps with 
WHO Alert 
phase 
 
Increasing potential for influenza A 
Infections in humans in U.S. with 
indicators of ongoing human to human 
transmission 
Have university medical personnel in close 
contact with local laboratories and medical 
facilities to facilitate novel influenza surveillance 
in the local area.  
Consider options for an enhanced flu vaccination 
plan and purchase of anti-viral drugs and 
supplies.  
Communicate confirmed flu cases to local and 
state health departments as recommended by the 
National Notifiable Disease Surveillance 
Program.  
Consider recommending isolation of ill persons 
on campus and voluntary quarantine of close 
contacts when flu cases suspected.  
Send ill dormitory students home if practicable 
after notifying their parents.   
Encourage ill faculty, students and staff to remain 
away from campus until their illness passes.   
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Table 18 (continued) 
Number 3. 
Initiation 
Interval 
Coincides 
with WHO 
Pandemic 
phase 
 
Confirmed wave of human pandemic 
influenza anywhere in the world with 
efficient (>20%) and sustained (3 
generations) human to human 
transmission 
Activate the Campus Pandemic Flu plan 
mobilizing key departments and support 
personnel to begin mitigation activities. 
Enhance focus on flu surveillance on campus and 
in the local community alerting plan partners as 
appropriate when flu cases are confirmed by 
laboratory analysis. 
Implement a pandemic flu vaccination campaign 
if the appropriate supplies are available based on 
federal guidelines and recommendations. 
Disseminate an updated risk message providing 
guidance for faculty, staff and students and their 
parents on what might be expected along with 
any appropriate precautions or mitigation efforts. 
Campus medical personnel should ready their 
stockpiles of antiviral and other flu relief 
medication in preparations to treat patients.  
Campus medical efforts should be coordinated 
with other local medical facilities, nearby schools 
of nursing and medicine along with city, county 
and state health departments who may provide 
added personnel and material support during the 
pandemic.        
Impose travel restrictions to locations where 
active flu cases are occurring. 
Encourage faculty, staff and students visiting 
those areas to return home if permitted by local 
quarantine restrictions. Or if stranded to isolate 
oneself as much as possible.  
Provide regular updates to the campus 
community and plan partners along with elected 
officials and the media as appropriate.  
Recommend suspension of extracurricular 
activities such as sporting events, concerts and 
other social gatherings.   
As flu cases increase on campus or in the local 
community, consider activation distance learning 
thereby limiting classroom activities.  
Reinforce the need for sick faculty, students and 
staff to remain at home or isolated from group 
activities in dorms, cafeterias or classrooms.  
 
 
 
 167 
Table 18 (continued) 
Number 4. 
Acceleration 
Interval 
Overlaps 
WHO 
Pandemic 
phase 
  
 
Consistently increasing number of flu 
cases locally or in nearby states or 
cities indicating established pandemic 
flu transmission  
Continue initiating response actions deemed 
necessary by medical experts continually gauging 
their effectiveness and modifying as needed. 
Continue surveillance of flu transmission on 
campus obtaining lab confirmation of select cases 
if possible to monitor for changing epidemiology.  
If not already activated, initiate closure of 
childcare facilities, campus schools, and non-
essential gatherings.  
Institute the practice of social distancing for all 
school and campus workplaces.  
Encourage use of hand sanitizers, sneeze and 
cough control and other infection prevention 
measures throughout campus. 
If the flu continues spreading on campus, despite 
these mitigation efforts, implement the 
suspension of classes and all other non-essential 
work activity.  
This will require the designation of essential 
housekeeping, maintenance and security 
personnel and volunteers to maintain critical 
campus facilities and to care for students who are 
unable or too sick to return home.  
Provisions must be made to care for sick students 
living in campus dormitories, residence halls or in 
off campus apartments. Food service, 
housekeeping, maintenance and medical staff and 
volunteers must be coordinated to check on and 
care for these students as needed during this 
phase of the pandemic.    
During this active pandemic phase, campus 
business continuity plans will be implemented to 
allow essential campus activities, distance 
learning and critical research activities to 
continue as best they can. 
As in the other pandemic phases, updated risk 
messages along with other critical information on 
the Pandemic flu status and mitigation or 
response information should be issues frequently 
to keep all stakeholders informed and to provide 
needed instructions. 
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Table 18 (continued) 
Number 5. 
Deceleration 
Interval 
Overlaps 
WHO 
Pandemic 
phase 
 
 
A steadily decreasing rate of pandemic 
flu cases locally or in nearby states or 
cities  
Continue flu response activity and pandemic 
surveillance as needed during this phase.  
Assess if response activities can be decreased and 
supplies conserved. 
Update flu risk messages and other critical 
information on lessening mitigation activities. 
Implement the cession of select mitigation 
measures communicating needed information to 
plan partners.  
Begin a staged resumption of normal school 
activities according to a phased schedule.  
Maintain infection control measures including 
hand hygiene, cough controls and social 
distancing throughout this phase.  
Provide pertinent instructions to stakeholders on 
the resumption of school activities. 
Be vigilant and remain prepared to respond to a 
second wave of flu.  
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Table 18 (continued) 
Number 6. 
Preparation 
Interval 
Coincides 
with WHO 
Transition 
phase  
Low pandemic flu activity nearby with 
ongoing vigilance for a recurring 
outbreak and preparations for future 
pandemic waves. 
Post statements on University websites that the 
flu risk has subsided on campus and that normal 
activity can resume. 
Remain vigilant for a persistent flu agent in the 
environment and the need for an ongoing 
response to a second wave of illness. 
Be attentive to WHO and CDC monitoring of 
genetic and phenotypic changes to flu viruses and 
how these may impact next year’s influenza 
season.  
Restore medication stocks and other supplies and 
equipment as needed.  
Recover any unused and time sensitive medicines 
and supplies and consider donating them to 
locations where they can be utilized before 
expiration.  
Provide ongoing mental health support for post 
event reactions among students, faculty and staff.  
Create an after action report with input from 
community partners to document the response 
actions of the various working groups and to 
discuss lessons learned.  
Convene a meeting of the school’s planning 
partners to modify their plan as needed based on 
the effectiveness of the response and mitigation 
measures during this episode.  
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APPENDIX C 
Table 19:  List of Universities with Total Enrollments 2012-2013 
 
Name of School Total Enrollment 
1.    Arizona State University 73378 
2.    University of Central Florida 59601 
3.    Ohio State University Columbus 56387 
4.    University of Texas At Austin 52186 
5.    University of Minnesota Twin Cities 51853 
6.    Texas A & M University 50627 
7.    University of Florida 49913 
8.    Pennsylvania State University Main Campus 45783 
9.    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 44520 
10.    New York University School of Medicine 44516 
11.    University of Washington Seattle 43485 
12.    University of Michigan 43426 
13.    University of Wisconsin Madison 42269 
14.    University of Maryland Baltimore 42268 
15.    Indiana University 42133 
16.    University of Houston, Clear Lake 40747 
17.    Florida State University 40695 
18.    Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 40434 
19.    Purdue University 40393 
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Table 19 (continued) 
20.    University of Southern California 39958 
21.    University of California Los Angeles 39945 
22.    California State University Fullerton 37677 
23.    Temple University 36855 
24.    University of California Berkeley 36137 
25.    University of Georgia 34816 
26.    North Carolina State University Raleigh 34767 
27.    University of Missouri 33762 
28.    University of Cincinnati Main Campus 33347 
29.    University of Texas Arlington 33279 
30.    George Mason University 32961 
31.    Boston University 32603 
32.    University of Colorado Boulder 32558 
33.    University of California Davis 32354 
34.    University of Utah 31660 
35.    University of Alabama 31647 
36.    University of Texas San Antonio 30968 
37.    Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 30936 
38.    Florida State University at Jacksonville 30863 
39.    Wayne State University 30765 
40.    University of South Carolina 30721 
41.    Colorado State University 30467 
42.    Texas Tech University 30194 
43.    University of Tennessee 29833 
44.    University of Iowa 29810 
45.    Louisiana State University 29718 
46.    West Virginia University 29617 
47.    Iowa State University 29611 
48.    San Francisco State University 29541 
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Table 19 (continued) 
49.    University of Wisconsin Milwaukee 29350 
50.    Florida Atlantic University 29246 
51.    University of North Carolina Chapel Hill 29137 
52.    New Mexico State University Main Campus 28977 
53.    University at Buffalo 28849 
54.    University of Pittsburgh 28766 
55.    University of California San Diego 28593 
56.    Portland State University 28584 
57.    Central Michigan University 28194 
58.    University of Illinois Chicago 28091 
59.    University of Kansas - Lawrence 27939 
60.    Kent State University 27855 
61.    Harvard University 27392 
62.    University of Nevada Las Vegas 27364 
63.    Washington State University 27329 
64.    University of Kentucky 27226 
65.    University of California, Irvine 27189 
66.    University of Oklahoma 27138 
67.    Northeastern University 26959 
68.    Utah State University 26757 
69.    Oklahoma State University 26201 
70.    Columbia University of Health Sci. Morningside 26050 
71.    University of Connecticut 25868 
72.    Auburn University 25469 
73.    Northern Arizona University 25359 
74.    University of North Carolina Charlotte 25277 
75.    Oregon State University 24962 
76.    University of Pennsylvania 24832 
77.    Old Dominion University 24753 
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Table 19 (continued) 
78.    University of Nebraska Lincoln 24593 
79.    University of Oregon 24396 
80.    Ohio University Athens 24390 
81.    University of Virginia Main Campus 24297 
82.    Kennesaw State University 24175 
83.    Stoneybrook University (SUNY) 23920 
84.    Kansas State University 23863 
85.     University of Arkansas 23199 
86.     Northern Illinois University 22990 
87.     University of Memphis 22725 
88.     Boise State University 22678 
89.     University of Texas El Paso 22640 
90.     University of Toledo 22610 
91.     University of Colorado Denver 22495 
92.     California State University Fresno 21981 
93.     University of California Santa Barbara 21685 
94.      University of Delaware 21489 
95.      Towson University 21464 
96.      Illinois State 21310 
97.      California State Univ. Los Angeles 21284 
98.      University of Texas Dallas 21193 
99.     Cornell University 21131 
100.    California Polytechnic State University 21107 
101.    Saint John’s University 21067 
102.    Johns Hopkins University 20996 
103.    Northwestern University 20959 
104. Georgia Institute of Technology 20941 
105. University of California Riverside 20900 
106. Syracuse University 20829 
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Table 19 (continued) 
107. University of Hawaii 20429 
108. Mississippi State University 20424 
109. Missouri State University 20276 
110. Stanford University (ChemTracker) 19945 
111. Clemson University 19914 
112. University of Nevada Reno 18766 
113. Miami University Oxford 17901 
114. Georgetown University 17849 
115. University of North Carolina Greensboro 17707 
116. University of California Santa Cruz 17454 
117. SUNY At Albany 17338 
118. University of California Santa Cruz 17203 
119. University of Missouri, Saint Louis 16814 
120. Wright State University 16656 
121. University of Massachusetts Boston 16277 
122. Baylor University 16263 
123. University of North Florida 16198 
124. University of Miami 16068 
125. Loyola University Chicago 15957 
126. Southeastern Louisiana University 15662 
127. University of Missouri, Kansas City 15473 
128. Duke University 15427 
129. West Chester University of PA 15100 
130. University of New Hampshire 14942 
131. University of North Dakota 14697 
132. Youngstown State University 14483 
133. North Dakota State University Main Campus 14399 
134. Washington University in St. Louis 13908 
135. Emory University 13893 
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Table 19 (continued) 
136. Montana State 13671 
137. Boston College 13525 
138. Saint Louis University 13505 
139. University of Vermont 13478 
140. University of Maryland, Baltimore County 13199 
141. California State, Univ. East Bay  13160 
142. Carnegie Mellon University 12991 
143. Tulane University 12845 
144. University of Wyoming 12778 
145. South Dakota State University 12725 
146. University of West Florida 12588 
147. University of Idaho 12312 
148. Yale University 12109 
149. University of Notre Dame 12004 
150. Marquette University 12002 
151. The University of Tennessee At Chattanooga 11600 
152. Massachusetts Institute of Technology 11319 
153. University of Dayton 10835 
154. Villanova University 10735 
155.    University of South Dakota 10061 
157.    Univ. of Florida 49,785 
158.    Kennesaw State Univ. 33,000 
159.    U. of Calif. Irvine 29,000 
160.    Univ. of Oklahoma 28,966 
161.    Washington State Univ. 28,686 
162.    Univ. of Kentucky 28,435 
163.    Carleton University 28,289 
164.    Utah State Univ. 27,662 
165.    Kent State University 27,500 
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Table 19 (continued) 
166.    Old Dominion Univ. 24,670 
167.    Ohio Univ. Athens 23,306 
168.    Towson University 22,000 
169.    California State Fresno 20,000 
170.    Univ. of Alaska 19,629 
171.    Miami Univ. Oxford 18,456 
172.    Georgetown University 17,858 
173.    Appalachian State 16,636 
174.    Eastern Kentucky U. 16,454 
175.    Baylor University 16,263 
176.    West Chester Univ. PA 15,845 
177.     Youngstown State Univ. 15,194 
178.     Northern Kentucky Univ. 15,000 
179.     Southeastern Louisiana 14,498 
180.     Arkansas State 13,144 
181.     Marquette University 11,745 
182.     U. of Tenn. Chattanooga 11,670 
183.     Univ. Of Idaho 11,534 
184.     Mass. Institute Of Tech. 11,319 
185.     Murray State Univ. 11,207 
186.     Univ. of Dayton 10,835 
187.     Tufts University 10,819 
188.     Case Western Reserve 10,771 
189.     Villanova University 10,735 
190.     American University 10,580 
191.     Univ. of South Dakota 9,971 
192.     Duquesne University 9,757 
193.     Slippery Rock Univ. 8,495 
194.     Gonzaga University 7,400 
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Table 19 (continued) 
195.     Seattle University 7,273 
196.     Belmont University 7,244 
197.     Lehigh University 7,133 
198.     Rensselaer Polytechnic 7,028 
199.     Catholic University 6,838 
200.     Rice University 6,498 
201.     Southern Methodist U. 6,391 
202.     Univ. of Rochester 6,166 
203      Clarion University 6,000 
204.     Midwestern University 6,000 
205.     Monmouth University 5,634 
206.     Santa Clara University 5,486 
207.     Robert Morris University 5,358 
208.     Ryerson University 5,300 
209.     Lipscomb University 4,489 
210.     Stevenson University 4,400 
211.     Clarkson University 3,873 
212.     Bob Jones University 3,000 
213.     Waynesburg State Univ. 2,516 
214.     Whitworth University 2,470 
215.     Trinity University 2,353 
216.     Southwestern Univ. 1,528 
 
University Enrollment Figures Obtained From:  
• Digest of Education Statistics (2013) 
• Stat.University.com (2012)  
• U.S. News and World Report (2015) 
• University Websites (2015)  
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APPENDIX D 
Questions Eliminated from Final Survey   
Q14.  Indicate responsibilities assigned to the University Executive Officers in your Pandemic Preparedness Plan.    
o Issue directives to flu planning committee o Review CDC/WHO pandemic alert levels 
o Direct campus operations as needed o Liaison with local, state and federal 
officials 
o Approve media releases o Make decision to cancel classes 
o Make final decision to close campus o Other ____________________ 
o Other ____________________ o  
 
Q15.  Indicate responsibilities assigned to the Academic Affairs Office in your Pandemic Preparedness Plan.    
o Track student absenteeism o Track faculty absenteeism 
o Recommend need to suspend classes o Consider alternate learning options as 
needed 
o Evaluate study abroad options o Consider foreign student travel options 
o Maintain student contact list o Other ____________________ 
o Other ____________________  
 
Q16.  Indicate responsibilities assigned to the Human Resources Office in your Pandemic Preparedness Plan.   
o Establish policy for absenteeism o Set guidelines for working from home (if 
possible) 
o Maintain current employee contact list o Facilitate cross training of employees 
o Identify persons with higher flu risk o Encourage sick employees to remain at 
home 
o Encourage social distancing practices o Other ____________________ 
o Other ____________________  
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Q17.  Indicate responsibilities assigned to the Student / Employee Health Services Department(s) in your Pandemic 
Preparedness Plan.   
o Coordinate vaccine distribution o Employee/student screening 
o Coordinate student health care o Promote infection control practices 
o Communicate with state and local health 
departments 
o Set policy for quarantine 
o Facilitate extended student care while in 
isolation 
o Coordinate with local hospitals 
o stockpile anti-viral medications o stockpile other medications 
o stockpile electrolyte drinks o other ____________________ 
 
 
Q18. Indicate responsibilities assigned to the University Public Safety Department in your Pandemic Preparedness 
Plan.   
o Continue to provide public safety and law 
enforcement 
o Facilitate campus security during pandemic 
phases 
o Restrict visitors coming to campus during 
pandemic 
o Facilitate command center activities 
o Other ____________________ o Other ____________________ 
 
 
Q19.  Indicate responsibilities assigned to the Communication/IT Department in your Pandemic preparedness Plan. 
o Maintain normal campus wide phone, e-
mail and website operations 
o Frequently update website during 
pandemic periods 
o Maintain telephone hotline o Facilitate radio and cell phone 
communication to essential personnel 
o Other ____________________ o Other ____________________ 
 
 
Q20.  Indicate responsibilities assigned to the Student Housing Department in your Pandemic Preparedness Plan. 
o Maintain normal operations for as long as 
possible 
o Facilitate student's return home as campus 
suspends operations 
o Consolidate  students into fewer 
dormitories 
o Arrange on campus housing for students 
unable to return home 
o Facilitate infection control practices with 
tissues, hand sanitizer, sneeze etiquette and 
social distancing 
o Increase surface disinfection during 
housekeeping 
o Identify/prepare potential isolation 
dormitories 
o Facilitate daily monitoring of sick students 
o Other ____________________  
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Q21.  Indicate responsibilities assigned to the Dining and Food Service Department in your Pandemic Preparedness 
Plan. 
o Maintain normal food service for as long 
as possible 
o Consolidate dining facilities as dormitories 
close 
o Increase surface cleaning practices in 
dining halls 
o Switch to disposable tableware 
o Stockpile non-perishable food o Stockpile water and electrolyte drinks 
o Plan lighter diet suitable for sick students o Provide food services to essential 
personnel living on campus 
o Promote hand hygiene and sneeze etiquette 
in dining halls 
o Other ____________________ 
o Other ____________________  
 
Q22.  Indicate responsibilities assigned to the Facilities Management/Physical Plant Departments in your Pandemic 
Preparedness Plan. 
o Maintain normal operations as long as 
possible during pandemic 
o Identify critical infrastructure to be 
maintained as a priority 
o Develop plan to cut back on facility 
maintenance as staffing diminishes 
o Notify faculty, staff and students ASAP 
when facilities are to close 
o Establish contingency plan for facilities to 
be used for school or community health 
care overflow 
o Focus essential staff on priority duties 
established by Pandemic Flu committee 
o Focus custodial cleaning towards infection 
control priorities 
o Other ____________________ 
o Other ____________________  
 
Q23.  Indicate responsibilities assigned to the University Business/Financial Office in your Pandemic Preparedness 
Plan. 
o Establish business continuity plan(s) 
o Coordinate vendor agreements for added support during a pandemic emergency 
o Maintain financial obligations for insurance, bill payment, salaries 
o Other ____________________ 
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